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IMPLICATIONS  OF  FURTHER  HARMONIZATION  OF  THE  EXCISES 
ON  MANUFACTURED  TOBACCO 
Report by the  Commission to the European Parliament 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
1.1.1  On  27  June  1980,  the Commission  made  a  proposal(!) to the Council 
for a  third stage  of harmonization of the excises on  manufactured tobacco. 
Earlier directives (see  Chapter 4  below) had established the principles and 
enacted the first two  stages of harmonization,which have  in practice been 
limited to taxes on  cigarettess  in particular, they required that the 
excise  on  cigarettes should consist  of a  specific element - a  fixed amount 
per cigarette - and an ad valorem element  related to the retail price.  The 
third stage  of harmonization was  to cover the period from  1  Januar,y  1981  to 
31  December  1986,  during which period the permissible limits for the 
specific element  of the excise,  as a  percentage of the total tax levied 
on  the most  popular price categor,y  of cigarettes, would be progressively 
narrowed as follows: 
in 1981  and 1982:  not  less than 5%  nor more  than 55 fo 
(no  change  from  the  second stage) 
in 1983  and  19841  not  less than 71'%  nor more  than 42t fo 
in 1985  and  19861  not  less than 10 fo  nor more  than 35  fo. 
1.1.2  In the explanator,y memorandum  to the proposal,  the  Commission 
indicated that the proposal had been prepared with a  view to a  ratio between 
(l)Draft directive amending  Directive 72/464/EEC  on  taxes other than 
turnover taxes which affect the  consumption of manufactured tobacco 
(OJ  No.  C 264,  11.10.1980,  P•  6). - 3-
the specific element  and the total tax which,  at the final stage of 
harmonization of the tax structure,  should be  20~~ 
~  1.1.3  By  letter of 25  Ju~ 1980,  the President of the Council requested 
the European Parliament to deliver an opinion.  The  proposal was  referred 
to the Committee  on Economic  and Monetar,y  Affairs as the Committee 
responsible for preparing a  draft  resolution and to the  Committee  on 
Budgets and.the  Committee  on  Agriculture for their opinion. 
1.1.4  The  report(l) of the  Committee  on  Economid and Monetary Affairs of 
the Parliament was  presented on  13  Februar,y  1981,  together with a  draft 
resolution.  Paragraph 6  of the draft resolution:  "Requests the  Commission 
therefore to investigate as soon as possible, whether as regards the final 
stage it would not be more  neutral from  the point of view  of competition to 
determine the effect of proportional taxation of retail prices than to fix 
the relationship between the specific and proportional components  of duty" 
{see Annex  1,  page  5)  •  The  resolution also expressed disagreement with 
the Commission's present  proposals and urged a  further prolongation of the 
second  stage  of harmonization  {alre~ prolonged to' 30  June  1981  from  the 
original expir,y date  of  31  December  1980)  pending the  submission of final 
proposals which would take into account all aspects of the harmonization 
question. 
1.1.5  In the vote  in the plenar,y session of Parliament  on  8 M~  1981 1  the 
Commission's proposal failed to secure  a  majority of the votes cast.  The 
Commission  having declined to withdraw its proposal,  Parliament  decided, 
under Rule  35(3)  of the Rules of Procedure,  not to vote on  the motion for 
a  resolution, but to refer the matter back to the Committee  on Economic 
and Monetar,y  Affairs for further report. 
(l)Doc.  PE  66.992  Fin -4-
1.1.6.  In the discussions with the Economic  and Monetar,y  Affairs Committee, 
the  Commission  indicated that it could accept  two  of thirteen amendments 
{Nos.  1  and  2) to the draft Resolution which had been put forward(l).  The 
first of these limited the third stage of harmonization to the first two 
phases  on~ of the timetable prposed by the Commission,  i.e. to a  7.5 ~-
42.5 ~  range for the  specific element  and covering the period to end-1984 
(see paragraph 1.1.1 above). The  second asked the  Commission to present the 
results of the further investigations requested in the resolution before the 
end of 1982  and,  on  that basis, to define the final stage and to submit  a 
proposal for a  subsequent  {fourth) stage, to commence  at the latest on 
1 January 1985.  The  net effect of the two  amendments  would be to allow the 
process of harmonization to continue, without  excluding the possibility of 
other approaches at  a  later stage. 
1.1.7.  The  Commission's preparedness to aocept  these two  amendments  was 
conditional upon  the approval by Parliament  of the remainder of the 
Commission's  proposalsfor the third stage.  However,  at its meeting on  21 
and  22 ~  1981,  the Economic  and Monetary Affairs Committee  could not 
agree to this compromise.  Instead,  the  Committee,in its second report to 
Parliament~
2 )  maintained its original draft resolution unchanged. 
1.1.8. In the light of this further report  of the Economic.and Monetar,y 
Affairs Committee,  the Commission  offered at the plenary session of 
18 June  1981,  to carr,y_ out  a  thorough and wide-ranging  stu~ of the issues. 
This offer was  made  on  the assumption that, when  the conclusions of the 
stu~ were  presented to Parliament,  an opinion would then be adopted 
without  del~.  The  Commission made  it clear that its existing proposal 
for the third st.age  was  not withdrawn.  However,  the Commission  accepted 
that examination by the Council  Should be  suspended,  pending the  outcome 
of the  stu~. 
(l)Docs.  PE  72.093/1-13 
(2)Doc.  PE  66.992/Fin/II - 5-
1.1.9  In. response to the  Commission undertaking,  the matter was  referred 
back to the Economic  and Monetar,y  Affairs Committee  under Rule  85. 
~  1.1.10 This report, which  examines  the  implications of further 
harmonization of the taxes on  cigarettes,  is presented in fulfilment  of the 
•  Commission  undertaking of 18  June·1981.  As  far as has been practicable, the 
stu~ has taken account  of the opinions of the Economic  and  Social Committee, 
of 25  Februar,y 198l(l) on  the Commission's  proposals for the third stage of 
harmonizat.ion,  and  of 30  June  1976(2)  on  the second stage proposals.  The 
relevant paragraphs of these two  opinions and  of the report  and draft 
resolution of the Economic  and Monetar,y  Affairs Committee,  are set  out in 
Annex I. 
1.1.11 It has not  alw~s proved possible to obtain comprehensive  or 
identical information on  t.he  situation in all ten Member  States.  Where 
differing sources have  been used in order to offer a  compre~ensive picture, 
the  sources are  indicated. 
(l)OJ No.  C 138,  9.6.1981,  P•  47 
(2)  OJ  No.  C 204,  30.8.1976,  P•  1 - 6-
2.  THE  m:ED FOR  HARMONIZATION  OF  THE  EXCISE 
2.1.1  Th~ establishment  of a  common  market  by wey  of,  among  other things, 
the free movement  of persons,  goods,  services and capital and a  s,ystem  that 
ensures that  competition is not distorted is a  fundamental  objective of the 
Treaty.  This objective has been confirmed on  numerous  occasions,  most 
recently in the resolution of the Parliament  of 15  October 198l(l) on  the 
achievement  of the internal market. 
2.1.2  Moreover,  the role  of excise harmonisation in the realisation of 
this objective has been  explicit~ recognised.  For example,  the Council 
Resolution of 22  March  1971(2)  on  tax aspects of economic  and monetar,y 
union reads:-
"In order that effectively free movement  of persons,  goods, 
services and capital and  progress in interpenetration of economies 
mey  be achieved at  a  faster rate, the Council,  acting on  a  proposal 
from  the Commission  and having regard to the need to preserve a 
balance,  shall decide  on  measures concerning: 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
(v) 
••••••••••••••• 
the harmonisation of the  scope,  basis of assessment  and the 
mode  of levying excise duties,  in particular those which 
have  an appreciable influence  on  trade 
•••••••••• 
•••••••••• 
the progressive extension of duty-free concessions granted to 
private individuals crossing frontiers within the  Community. 
Harmonization of the excises on  tobacco is an essential element  in the 
realisation of both (ii) and (v) above. 
(l)OJ C 287  of 9.11.1981 
(2)0J C 28  of 27.3.1971. - 7-
2.2  Excise harmonization and the internal market 
2.2.1  As  regards (ii) above  and as can ~e seen from  Chapters 5  (Raw 
Tobacco)  and 7 - 9  (Employment,  production,  tax incidence) the  importance 
of the tobacco excises in achieving the  internal market  is considerable. 
The  tobacco manufacturing industr,y  direct~  employs more  than 100,000, 
supplied by 250,000 planters of raw  tobacco (possibly 600,000 employed)  and 
with perhaps half a  million or more  involved directly or indirectly in 
distribution.  Tobacco products account for between 1 ~  and 3,2 ~ of con-
sumer expenditure,  and tax receipts from  tobacco account  for between  0,7 tJ, 
and 4,2 ~ of total Government  revenues (social contributions included).· 
2.2.2  It is striking that, notwithstanding the abolition of Customs  duties 
for  intr~Community trade and the  implementation of two  stages of excise 
harmonization,  there is no  true Community  market  for cigarettes {see Tables 
7.2, 7.3 and 7.4).  This is all the more  surprising, when  it is recalled 
that access to the Community  market  for third countries is virtually ex-
cluded by the 90 fo  external tariff on  imported cigarettes (see Annex  III) 
and that many  Community  producers are major cigarette exporters to the rest 
of the world (total exports account  for about  20  ~and exports to the EEC 
for about  6 ~ of total EEC  production). 
2.2.3  There  is general agreement  that this state of affairs is due  to a 
wide variety of factors,  over and above  the continuing differences in the 
excise  ~stems, such as differences in consumer tastes, the existence of 
state and private sector producers,  differing policies governing advertising, 
differing health policies.  Obvious~, not all of these factors apply on  all 
of the markets;  nor are they all of equal importance  in all oases. 
Consequently,  harmonization of any  one  of these factors will not  of itself 
lead to the achievement  of a  single cigarette market.  On  the other hand, 
it is clear that  significant interpenetrat-ion of all the markets will be 
~  impeded  so  long as any  one  of the major limiting factors is ignored. -8-
2.2.4.  As  far as the excises are  concerned,  there  can_be  no  doubt that, 
whatever additional measures m~  be necessar,y,  harmonization of the excise 
structures is a  pre-condition for the establishment of a  single market  for 
cigarettes.  Where  taxation accounts on average for 70~ or more  of retail 
price,  uniform market  conditions are not possible unless the tax is levied 
in a  harmonized fashion.  At  such tax levels,  even minor differences in tax  • 
structure can make  access from  one  market  to another unattractive or 
difficult.  The  fact that the first two  stages of harmonization have  not 
radical~  improved market  inter-penetration is persuasive evidence  of this 
view:  notwithstanding the reduced differences between the excise systems 
achieved by harmonization to date,  those  remaining are sufficiently potent 
to exeroise a  powerful  inhibiting factor on  intra-Community trade.  Were 
further proof required,  the difficulties encountered by the Community  in 
arriving even at a  harmonized structure for the cigarette excise - which has 
only limited implications for tax revenues - is itself proof of the crucial 
importance  of the excise in the  eyes  of the  industr.y. 
2.2.5. There  are of course those who  argue that harmonization of the excise 
should await  a  common  approach  on  all the  other~otors bearing on  the 
cigarette market.  This is a  dubious  and dangerous  argument.  Dubious, 
because it rests implicitly on  the nypothesis that the removal  of one 
distortion is either impracticable or undesirable without the  simultaneous 
removal  of all others.  Dangerous,  because it is in reality a  formula for 
inactivity.  For example,  the policies of the Member  States on  the  smoking 
issue are bound to have  a  considerable  impact  on  the markets.  In the 
absence  of a  comprehensive  Community  polic.y on this issue,  divergencies and 
distortions are unavoidable.  On  the other hand,  although the  Commission 
itself favours the evolution of a  common  health polic.y,  it has to be 
acknowledged that there are considerable divergencies in practice between 
the policies of the Member  States and there is as yet no  common  approach. 
Consequent~, to subject  further progress on excise harmonization - the need 
for which is not  challenged - to a  successful outcome  of the health and 
' .. "' 
- 9-
other issues,  would be in effect to tie together two  processes whioh, 
although havl.ng the  same  objective,  are at a  different  stage in their 
development.  Consequently,  unless it is possible to aeoelerate the develop-
ment  of the fi:vst,  the development  of the second would necessarily be  slowed 
down. 
2.2.6  It is therefore clear that  a  single cigarette market  cannot be 
achieved without  harmonization of the excise structure,  and that the  linking 
of excise harmonization to progress with other factors bearing on  the 
market will tend to put  off,  rather than bring closer,  the realisation of 
that  single market. 
2.3  Excise harmonization and the extension of travellers'  concessions 
2.3.1  The  excise also has an essential role in (v)  above  - the progressive 
extension of travellers'  allowances,  the ultimate objective of which is the 
abolition of fiscal frontiers.  This has l'ong been,  and still remains,  a 
major political objective of the Community,  a  fact which the Parliament 
explicitly recognised in its opinion of 18  April 1980  on  the fifth directive 
on travellers'  allowances(!). 
2.3.2  Paragraph 6 of that  opinion calls on  the  Commission  "to take ever.y 
opportunity of easing and in time abolishing the quantitative restrictions 
on  tobacco, wine  and spirits for private travellers between Member  States". 
Given the generally high excise rates and their importance as a  major source 
of tax receipts,  the realisation of this objective is inextricably linked to 
the programme  of harmonization of the excise struotursand rates. 
2.3.3  It cannot be  stressed too strongly that there is no  realistic 
possibility of  substantial~ increasing any one  of the quantitative excise 
allowances so  long as significant differences remain between the Member 
States as regards either the structure or the rates of the excises in 
(l)OJ C  117  of 12.5.1980 - 10 -
question,  including tobacco.  Where  tax incidence is generally 70~ or more 
of retail price, but nevertheless varies by  a  sizeable margin between 
individual Member  States,  there is a  considerable  incentive for travellers 
to cross frontiers solely in order to benefit, by virtue of the  Community 
allowances,  from  b~ing excise goods abroad at relatively lower tax-paid 
prices than obtain on  their own  market.  This  can  lead to deflection both 
of trade and of tax revenue  from  high- to low-excise Member  States.  ~ite 
apart  from  any other considerations,  any narrowing of the gaps between the 
excise rates is of only limited value  so long as excise structures have 
not  themselves been harmonized (since,  unless both the field of  applicat~on 
and the methods  of imposition are harmonized,  no  uniformity is possible, 
either as to the products to which the excise rates will apply,  or indeed 
as to the form  in which the rates themselves are expressed). 
2.3.4  In aqy  case,  it is not  in the Commission's view either desirable or 
realistic to attempt  harmonization of excise rates before harmonizing 
structures,  part~ because  structural changes  can give rise to revenue 
changes {as  i~deed is explicitly rec~ized in Article 1(4) of the first 
tobacco directive) which require freedom  over tax rates if they are to be 
adequately corrected,  and partly because the Member  States are -
understandably - reluctant to accept  constraints on  the absolute levels of 
individual excises without first knowing  the  coverage  and method  of 
application of the harmonized  structure of the excise.  Consequently, 
harmonization of each of the excise structures is an essential condition 
for the realisation of the internal market  and thus for ~  programme  of 
enlargement  of Community  excise allowances for.travellers.  Any  del~s 
on this soore will inevitably impose  similar del~s on the aehievement  of 
free movement  of travellers across  intra-Community frontiers. -11-
<  3.  CIGARETTE  MARKETS  AN.D  TAX  SYSTEMS  BEFORE  IMPLEMENTATION  BY  THE 
MEMBER  STATES  OF  THE  FIRST  TAX  HARMONIZATION  MEASURES 
3.1.  In all the Member  States,  cigarettes have  alw~s been subject to 
ver,y  high consumption taxes (excise duties and  other taxes). 
3.2.  France 
3.2.1.  On  the French market  the Service d'exploitation industrielle des 
tabacs et des allumettes  (SEITA),  falling under the Ministr,y of the  Econo~. 
and Finances,  controlled the monopoly  of ma~ufacture,  importation and  sales 
of manufactured tobacco. 
Most  SEITA  products were  manufactured from  dark tobacco of French 
origin.  The  basic cigarette brands,  filter and plain,  accounted for about 
85  '%  of the French market.  The  remaining  15%  was  taken by blond cigarettes, 
either manufactured  ~y the  SEITA  (sometimes under  licence from  foreign 
manufacturers)  or imported  (about 5 %). 
3.2.3.  The  tax on  cigarettes was  a  direct function  of the retail price 
fixed by the Ministry for the Economy  and Finances.  It was  proportional to 
the retail price at  a  rate  of about 75%. 
3.2.4.  The  range  of prices was  ver,y  wide,  with a  large difference between 
the prices of dark and blond cigarettes;  between the  cheapest brands 
(ordinary dark cigarettes) and blond cigarettes,  the difference  could be as 
much  as 300 %. 
3.3.  Italy 
3.3.1.  In Italy, the manufacture,  importation and  sale of manufactured 
tobacco was  also organised and  controlled by  a  State monopoly:  11Azienda 
Autonoma  dei Monopoli  di Stato,  falling under the Ministry of Finance. - 12-
3.3.2.  In the early 1970s,  the monopoly's  own  brands accounted for about 
65% of the Italian market," and foreign brands manufactured by the monopoly 
under licence accounted for a  further 15  %.  The  volume  of unofficial 
imports (i.e. contraband) was  considerable,  and has been estimated at up to 
15% of the market(l)• 
The  tax due  on  cigarettes and the retail selling prices were  laid 
down  in a  scale,  as a  function of the different wholesale prices.  A 
comparison of the different retail prices with the tax showed that the tax 
was  in fact  ad valorem. 
3.3.4.  Before the first harmonization measures,  the rate of the tax was 
about  80 % of the retail price ftr  most  cigarettes,  on  a  slightly degressive 
scale,  down  to 70 % for the most  expensive cigarettes.  As  the scale started 
at a  certain retail price, there was  in practice a  minimum  selling price. 
3.3.5.  The  range  of prices on  the Italian market  in cigarettes  was  even 
larger than  on  the French market.  The  price range was  as great  as 400 %. 
~elgium and Luxembourg 
Before  1973,  the Belgian market  was  supplied by five major 
manufacturers,  most  of which were  associated more  or less closely with 
international groups,  together accounting for more  than 85  % of output. 
There were  also a  few  smaller producers.  In Luxembourg  there was  only one 
manufacturer,  holding about  5 tfo  of the  Belg~Luxembourg market. 
Excise duties in Belgium  and Luxembourg  were  almost entirely 
proportional:  a  small specific two-tier tax depending on  the price 
(l)In recent years,  the  share  of contraband in the Italian market 
estimated at:  between 35% and  4Q%  in volume  in 1978  {source: 
at  18% in value  in 1979  {source:  "la Voce  del Tabaccaio"). 
has been 
UNCTAD); - 13-
categor,y was  levied on  top of the  ad valorem taxes.  The  tax burden 
(including turnover taxes),  as a  percentage  of the retail price, was  about 
65  "/o  in Belgium and  61 %  in Luxembourg.  There was  a  minimum  excise duty 
and thus a  minimum  retail price. 
Despite the predominance  of the  ad valorem tax,  the  range  of prices 
on  the Belgian and  Luxembourg  markets was  fairly narrow.  Cigarettes  in the 
popular price categor,y alone represented almost  BQ%  of the market.  National 
brands were  sold in packets of  25  cigarettes, while  international brands were 
sold in packets of 20. 
3.5.  The  Netheriands 
3.5.1.  Four major manufacturers,  all foreign-owned,  held  9Q%  to 95 %  of·. 
the Dutch market,  the  remainder being shared by a  few  small producers and 
by  imports.  " 
3.5.2.  A feature  of the market  in the Netherlands was  the high percentage 
of sales of non-filter cigarettes (over 60 %  in 1970).  As  in Belgium, 
popular brands were  sold in packets  of 25,  mostly at  a  single price. 
Cigarettes in the  most  popular price category accounted for about  75  "/o  of 
sales. 
3.5.3.  · The  Netherlands  system of excise duties  on  cigarettes in 1971  was 
exclusively proportional.  Excise  duty and  VAT  accounted for about 70"/o  of 
the retail price of cigarettes.  In spite of ad valorem taxation,  the price 
range was  ver,y  ~arrow. 
3.6.  Federal Republic  of Germany 
Five major manufacturers,  mostly allied to international groups, 
shared the West  German  market.  There were  also a  few  small firms,  and a 
small  amount  of imports,  mainly  from  the Benelux countries and France. - 14  -
Until 1973,  the  structure of the German  market  depended  on  a  s,ystem 
of taxation involving a  scale ~ specific excise duties.  Cigarettes were 
subject to a  mixed  s,ystem,  and were  classified according to the retail 
price into a  number  of tax categories.  The  specific and proportional 
components  of the excise duty varied from  one  category to another.  As  a 
consequence  of this system,  there were  minimum  retail prices. 
3.6.3.  The  incidence of the excise duty  on  retail prices was  between 50 % 
and 58 %;  there was  also VAT  at 9.91%. 
The  range  of selling prices was  very narrow,  with two  large and 
two  small price categories. 
3.6.5.  A special feature  of the German  market  was  the large  share  of sales 
from  automatic vending machines  (45 %). 
General  remarks  on  taxation in the  six original Member  States 
At  that time - that is, beofre the 1972  Directive - there were 
several  systems of cigarette taxation in the  Community  of Six.  The  system 
in the Federal Republic  of Germany  incorporated several categories of 
retail prices,  each subject to a  different  specific duty,  while the  other 
five Member  States levied excise duties that were basically proportional 
to retail prices.  In brief, cigarette taxes in the  six countries were .very 
high (between 60% and  80% of the retail price) and,  in practice or by 
statute, were  proportional to the retail price.  The  schedule  of retail 
prices was  decided either autonomously by the tax authorities (in France 
and  Ita~), or with their agreement.  In some  countries,  the proportional 
rate of tax was  degressive for the most  expensive cigarettes, which, 
however,  held. only a  small  share of the market.  A minimum  retail price 
was  imposed  in practice in all the Member  States, but this price was  very 
low  in the Benelux countries and very high in the Federal Republic of 
Germa.rzy. .. 
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3.71.2.  The  range  of retail prices was  very wide  in France  and  Italy, but 
narrow  in the other countries  • 
3.8.  Denmark 
3.8.1.  There is only  one  cigarette manufacturer in Denmark,  financially 
linked with an international group.  As  imports are negligible, this 
manufacturer enjoys in practice a  monopoly  position. 
3.8.2.  For many  years,  cigarettes in Denmark  have  been very heavily taxed, 
which puts them  among  the most  expensive in the world (four to five times 
the price  charged in France for cigarettes in ;the  "populartt price category). 
Before  jqining the  Community  in 1973  and  adopting the provisions of. 
the first Directive,  Denmark  applied only specific excise duties to 
cigarettes, with a  different  level of tax for each price category. 
Before  1973,  there were  in fact  only two  main  price categories. 
The  transition from  the  system of a  multi-tier specific tax to the mixed 
s.ystem  provided for in the first Directive did not  change  retai~ prices. 
Demand  in Denmark  has remained loyal to the  cigarette~ produced in the 
country.  The  tax burden (excise duties plus VAT)  is extremely heavy  (up to 
more  than 85%  of the retail price),  and the range  of prices is very narrow. 
United Kin,gdom 
Before the United Kingdom  joined the Community,  the United Kingdom 
market  in cigarettes was  almost  exclusively supplied by three major national 
manufacturers.  It was  divided into a  number  of  segments  according to the 
format  of the cigarettes and their prices.  The  tax was  based on  the tobacco 
content of cigarettes (a specific tax on  the weight  of the raw  tobacco used). 
Small  cigarettes containing less.tobacco were  therefore taxed less heavily 
than larger cigarettes. - 16  -
A special feature  of the market,  ever since the manufacture  of 
cigarettes on  an industrial basis, was  the existence of two  ver.y  popular 
sizes,  the  smaller and  cheaper of which had no  equivalent  on  a.rzy  other 
market  except that in Ireland.  These  two  main  size categories, which 
eixsted before the  second world war  in the non-filter cigarette sector, 
also appeared in the filter sector which developed after the war.  Since 
1960,  the range  of sizes has  increased with the  introduction of ver,y  large 
cigarettes (King Size) at  one  end  of the scale,  and two  slightly smaller 
variants of the two  ordinar,y sizes. 
3.9.3.  The  shift in demand  from  plain to filter cigarettes had alreaqy 
substantially eroded the market  for the  former. 
By  the early 1970s,  plain cigarettes,  in two  size and price 
categories,  represented only 15 %  of the market.  The  remainder of the 
market  was  filter cigarettes,  in six size categories a.?'ld  six "recommended" 
price categories. 
3.9.5.  The  system of taxation based on  raw  tobacco weight  made  it 
difficult to determine  exactly the  incidence of the tax on  the retail 
price.  However,  it has been estimated that,  for the most  popular brands 
of cigarettes,  taxes represented about 70% of the retail price. 
Unlike prices in the continental countries,  retail prices in the 
United Kingdom  were  not  imposed  or fixed:  they were  "recommended"  prices. 
Moreover,  some  brands offered cigarette coupons.  As  there were  so many 
different  sizes,  the range  of cigarette prices was  fairly wide  (up to 150 %). 
Ireland 
3.10.1.  There  are three producers  on  the Irish market. (2) 
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The  basic structure of the Irish market  was  very similar in many 
WB\Y'S  to that of the United Kingdom  market. 
Tobacco  tax was  based on  weight,  as·in the United Kingdom. 
3.10.4.  Consequently,  the Irish market  was  also subdivided according to 
the  size of the cigarettes and the tobacco content.  However,  while the 
categories were  clearly defined in the United Kingdom,  the distinction was 
less clear in Ireland. 
3.10.5.·  The  tightness of the packing and the diameter of cigarettes were 
much  more  important  on  the Irish market  than on  the British market;  where 
the main  criterion was  length.  For example,  small cigarettes have aenr 
held a  large  share of the Irish market. 
3.10.6.  Among  the  seven price categories for filter cigarettes, that of 
the most  popular oategor.y,with about  30% of the market,was more  dominant 
in Ireland than in the United Kingdom  (where  two  price categories each 
accounted for about  25%  of the market).  There were  also two  price categories 
for plain cigarettes in Ireland.  Retail prices and the tax incidence were 
slightly lower than in the United Kingdom,  and the  range  of prices was 
slightly narrower. 
3.11.  Greece 
3.11.1.  When  Greece  joined the  Community,  five national manufacturers 
shared the Greek market  in cigarettes,  about  90 %  of which was  accounted for 
by filter cigarettes, mainly manufactured from  oriental tobacco. 
3.11.2.  In principle,  taxes in Greece were  collected on  an ad valorem 
basis applied to the retail price.  However,  the tax was  levied at  a  lower 
rate on  the most  expensive  categories of cigarette,  so that the  g,ystem  had - 18 -
a  degressive effect  somewhat  comparable to the mixed  Community  system. 
According to the type  and price of the cigarettes, the tax amounted to 
between 63  ~ and 53  ~ of the retail price. 
3.11.3.  There were  some  dozen retail price categories,  fixed by the 
manufacturers or the  importers.  Selling prices cannot be  increased or 
reduced without the prior agreement  of the tax authorities. 
3.11.4.  The  most  popular price category was  near the middle  of the price 
range,  and  accounting for almost 40 ~ of the market.  The  range  of prices 
was  fairly wide,  and  imported cigarettes were  considerably more  expensive 
than nationally produced cigarettes. 
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4.  BACKGROUND  TO  THE  HARMONIZATION  OF  THE  EXCISES  ON 
MANUFACTURED  TOBACCO 
4.1.1.  In the 196os analysis of trade in manufactured tobacco,made  by 
the  Commission~revealed a  particularly high degree of market  segregation 
within the  Community.  The  lack of market  interpenetratiorrwas not 
attributable to natural factors but was  primarily attributable to 
artificially distorted conditions of competition.  The  barriers to market 
interpenetration and  competttion were  mainly to be  found  in the three areas 
of agriculture,  State monopolies and taxation.  It was  for this reason 
that the  Commission transmitted to the Council on 4  July 1967  a  proposal 
for a  Regulation concerning these three sectors. (1). 
4.1.2.  On  21  April 1970,  the Council of Ministers of the six founder 
...  2  Member  States adopted three Resolutions concerning
1the tobacco  sector:1 
(a)  a  Resolution on taxes, other than turnover taxes,  on the  consumption 
of manufactured tobacco; 
(b)  a  Resolution on national monopolies of a  commercial nature in 
manufactured tobacco f 
(c)  a  Resolution on an improved  control of agricultural markets. 
4 .1.  3.  With  regard to the third Resolution,  Chapter 5  contains further 
informatiC?n  on the markets  in raw  tobacco and on the  common  agrioul  tural 
policy as it applies in this sectcr. 
4.1.4. As  regards the  second Resolution,  which  concerns the adjustment 
of the tobacco  monopolies  in France and Italy,  see Chapter 6. 
1  Commission  proposal to the  Council  (Doc.  67/564/EEC) J  OJ  J(o  198 
of 17  Augo.st  19~7, PP•  12-23 
2 OJ Wo  0  50  of 28  April 1970,  pp.  1 and  2 20 
4.1.5.  The  Council Directive of 19  December  1972  (see Section 4.3 below), 
stems from  the first Resolution of 21  April 1970.  This directive has been 
supplemented by a  Council Directive dated 19  December  1977  (see Section 
4·4 below). 
4.1.6. The  Resolution and Directives referred to  in the previous paragraph 
are in fact  concerned solely with the structure of the  excise  on  cigarettes 
and  say nothing about the levels of taxation.  Apart  from  some  general 
provisions re&arding the principles of hannonization,  the basic 1972 
Directive does no:t  contain any special provisions relating to  other kinds 
of manufactured tobacco. 
4.2  Ent;y in Copncil minates concerning the Resolution of 21  April 1970 
4.2.1. Of the main principles governing the harmonization of cigarette 
excises, which are laid down  in the a>uncil Resolution of 21  April 1970 
and repwduced in the basic 1972  Directive,  the most  important  is that 
which  providess  "As  regards excise duty on cigarettes,. that system will 
involve a  proportional component  and a  specific component  in order that 
·at  the final  stage,  which  is to start on l  January 1980,  a  fixed relation 
between those  components may  be attained so  that the range of retail sale 
prices freely fixed by manufacturers should reflect to a l!l£ extent the 
differences in delivery prices."  The  interpretation of the word  "fair" 
has  alw~s been a  matter of judgement.  It should be noted that,  on  the 
adoption of the Resolution,  the Commission and five of the national 
delegations had  included in the minutes of the  Council meeting a  state-
ment  to the effect that they took the word  "fair" to mean  that, when 
excises come  to be harmonized,  the proportional component  should be 
pred<?minant. 21 
4.3.  Council Directive of 19  December 19721 
4  4.3.1.  Subsequently to the Resolution of 21  April 1970  the  Council 
Directive was adopted on 19 Decmeber 1972,  following consultations with 
the three new  Member  States. 
4.3.2.- The  Directive is divided into three main sectionss  "General 
principles",  "Special provisions applicable during the first stage of 
harmonization" and "Final provisions". 
4.3.3.  The  most  important of the general principles:{A.rticles 1  to  6  ) 
are certainly whose  which stipulate that cigarettes are to the  subject 
in each Member  State to a  mixed excise made  up  of a  proportional  component 
calculated on the maximum  retail price and a  specific component  calculated 
per cigarette, that harmonization is to be achieved in stages and that, 
at the final  stage,  a  single ratio·. is to be established between the. 
proportional and the specific components  in such a  way  that the range of 
retail selling prices reflects fairly the range of manufacturers'  deliver.y 
prices. 
4.3.4.  Article 5 of the Directive provides  11manufaot'llrers and importers 
shall be free to determine the maximum retail selling prices. for each of 
. th~i,~_ pro_duots.  _ This  __ proyision_ ?!elY  _not,  however,  hinder  implement  at  ion of 
the national  systems  of legislation regarding the control of price levels 
or the  observance  of  imposed prices"2• 
4.}.5.  The  special provisions (Articles 7 to 10)  relate to the first 
stage of harmonization,  which began on 1  July 1973. ·  This stage was 
initially intended to  cover a  period of only two  years.  It was,  however, 
extended on four occasions,  so that it finally covered a  five-year period. 
It ended on  30  June  1978. 
1 OJ No  L  303  of 31  December 1972 
2 
Being of the view that France had not  respected this principle,  the 
Commission instituted infringement  proceedings against this Member  State,.:,. 
A reasoned opinion was  despatched on 31  October 1980. 
On  15  July 1981,  the  Commission decided to refer the matter to the Court 
of Justice. 22 
4.3.6.  Of the special provisions,  the principal is that, without 
prejudice to the solution to be finally ad9pted,  the amount  of the 
specific  component  in each Member  State may  not be lower than  ~  or 
higher than 7~  of the ·aggregate amount  of the proportional excise and 
the specific excise levied on cigarettes in the most  popular price 
category.  Accordingly,  during this stage each Member  State could opt 
for any combination ranging from  specific component  of  5%  coupled with 
an ad valorem  component  of 95%  to a  specific component  of 75%  coupled 
with an ad ~lorem component  of 25%,provided the amount  of the specific 
component  and the rate of the ad valorem  component  were the  same  in a 
given Member  State for all categories of cigarettes.  In other words, 
a  Member. State may not differentiate the  excise between categories Qf 
cigarettes. 
4.3.7.  The  final provisions (Articles 11  to 13)  stipulate that Member 
States are to bring into  force the provisions of the Directive not  later 
than 1  July 1973.  However,  during the consultations before they  joined 
the  Community,  the United Kingdom  and Ireland requested a  derogation for 
a  period of five years.  This derogation,  which allowed those.two  countries 
to defer implementation until 31  December  1977,  was  incorporated into the 
Directive.  This delay offered Ireland and the United Kingdom  time to 
replace their own  systems of taxation,  ~sed on  the weight of raw  tobacco, 
by the  Community  system,  based on the finished product. 
1  Copncil Directive of 19  December  1977 
4.4.1.  This Directive established a  second  stage of harmonization and  · 
amends  one of the general principles laid down  in the basic 1972 Directive. 
1oJ No  L  338  of 28  December  1977,  PP•  22  and  23. 
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4.4.2.  With effect from 1-July 1978, .the specific component  of the mixed 
excise on cisarettes has had to be determined,  not by reference to the 
total excise burden,as provided for in the basic Directive,  but by 
reference to the total tax burden (excise plus VAT) •  This  change was 
necessary because VAT,  which had meanwhile been introduced in all Member 
States,  bas the same  effect as a  proportional excise in the taxation of 
cigarettes. 
4.4.3.  The  second stage of harmonization initially covered  ~he period 
from  1  July 1978 to  31  December 1980.  It bas  since been extended three 
times and now  runs until 31  December  1982. 
4.4.4.  During this stage,  the amount  of the specific component,  calculated 
by  reference to  cigarettes in the most  popular price category,  may  not 
represent less than  5%  or more  than  55%  of the total tax burdenJ Member 
States are required to  reVise their calculations at least once a  year in 
order to take account of price changes. 
4.4.5~  Although the % figure bas not been altered,  inclusion of VAT  in 
the calculations  from the start of the  second  stage has accentuated the 
incidence of the specific component at its lower level.  To  take an 
example:  ass'Qllling a.  total tax burden of 75%  (including VAT  at 15%), 
during the first  stage a  specific component  of  5%~xpressed as a  proportion 
of the excise)  was  equivalent to  3%  of the retail price,  while during 
the  second  stage a  specific component  of 5%  (expressed as a  proportion 
of the total tax burden)  is equivalent  to  3.73% of the retail pric~. 
4.4.6.  The  5-55%  bracket has maintained the trend towards a  predominantly 
ad valorem  system a.nd  is in keeping with the 1970  entry in the Council 
minutes and with the First Directive of 1972. 24 
4•4•7•  The  special provisions in force during the first  stage,  concerning 
the option to exclude  customs duties from  the basis of calculation and 
the level of the minimum  excise  {which may  not  exceed  90%  of the  excise on 
"popular" cigarettes), were  retained. 
4.4.8~  For reasons of public health policy the United Kingdom  was 
authorized to charge,  initially until 31  December  1980  and then until 
30  June 1981,  an additional excise on cigarettes with a  tar yield of 
20  mg  or more.  The  United·Kingdom made  use of this possibility until 
14 March  1981,  when  it abolished the surtax, at the  same  time raising 
the cigarette excise across the board. 
4·5·  Coppcil Directive of 18  December  1918  1 
4.5.1.  On  18  December  1~8, the  Council adopted a  Directive defining 
the different types of manufactured tobacco and classifying them  into 
five main categories.  The  Directive defines the  .:scope  of the excise 
·in particular by establishing a  precise distinction between cigars 
and cigarettes. 
4.6.  Effects of the first two  stages: tax structures 
4.6.1.  As  mentioned in Chapter 2,  the levels of cigarette tax are 
generally high in all Member  States,  ranging at present  from  56%  to 
88%  of the retail selling price.  The  harmonization measures to date have 
not affected these levels, which are still free~ determined by Member 
States.  Moreover,  since the sole purpose of harmonizing cigarette 
excises is to achieve gradual alignment of excise structures,  no  Member 
State has reported ~  effect on tax receipts that  could have  been 
attributed to measures taken during first two  stages. 
l  OJ No  L  10  of 16  January 1979,  PP•  8-10. _)  - .. 
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4.6.2.  As  regards the excise  structures,  (see Table 9.4) at present three 
Member  States  (Belgium,  Luxembourg,  Fr.ance)  app~ specific components  close 
to the permitted minimum  of 5%  of the total tax burden.  Italy continues 
to  app~ a  specific component  of lees than ~  and the Commission has as 
a  result instituted infringement proceedings against this Member  State.1 
4.6.3.  On  1  January 1980,  the Netherlands introduced a  specific  component 
equal to  10%  of the total tax burden,and Greece  introduced a  specific com-
ponent of 12%  immediately upon  joining the Community.  These  two  countries 
have  thus made  an effort considerably greater than the minimum  required 
of them,  but  in the six Member  States referred to above,  the proportional 
component  r~in  markedly predominant. 
4.6.4.  In contrast,  three Member  States  (United Kingdom,  Ireland,  Den-
mark)  apply specific components  close to the permitted maximum  of 5~ 
of the total tax burden.  At  the outset,  Germany  applied a  specific 
component  to the permitted maximum  but it now  applies a  lower specific 
component  (around 41%)  which  constitutes a  greater effort than has been 
required.  In these four Member  States,  the proportional components are 
thus lower than those found  in the six other Member. States. 
4•7•  Effects of the first two  stages  :market strucjures 
4.7.1.  Turning to the effects of the first two  stages on the markets for 
-
cigarettes,  tables showing the evolution of cmEUmption,imports and exports 
in each Member  State during the period 1970-1980  are set out  in Chapter 7.-
However,  when  analysing these tables,  it should first be noted that  each 
stage consisted of relative~ modest  changes  in the tax structure, with  · 
no  direct  effect on tax rates or on the level of cigarette prices overall. 
Secondly,  the  seven years between the introduction of the first stage in 
1 On  16  May  1980,  the Italian Government  tabled in Parliament a  draft law 
for bringing this infringement to an end.  As  this draft  law had still 
not been adopted,  the Commission decided on  15  July 1981  to refer the 
matter to the Court  of Justice. 26 
July 1973  and the submission of the proposals for the 3rd  stage in July 
1980  were  marked by major economic  changes.  In particular,  the rapid and 
sustained infl.a.tion suffered by all the Member  States had a  radical  impact 
on the economies of the Member  States,  from  which the  ci~rette market  was 
by no  means  ~e  and to which it was  on occasion especially sensitive. 
4.  7 .2,  The  impact of inflation on major detenninants of the cigarette 
market  - such as taxation,  producer costs,  disposable incomes  - did not 
take place evenly or in unifonn fashion.  On  some  markets at some  periods 
(e.g. France,  1973-1979)  subs~ialincreases in incomes  in response to 
generally increased prices were accompanied by unchanged taxes on 
ci~rettes and unchanged  producer prices for certain categories of 
cigarettes.  Inevitably,  subsequent adjustments in tax incidence and in 
prices to  recover lost ground had very  considerable  impact on demand  over-
all and on market  shares.  In other instances,  tax incidence was  first 
allowed to decline rapidly,  then restored and substantially increased 
(e.g. BelgiUJD.  1973-1980}.  In these  cirCUJD.stances,  separately to quantify 
the effects on the markets of either or both stages during this period 
is impossible. 
4.7.3.  However,  in accordance with Article 1(4)  of the first directive, 
the  Commission  consulted the Member  States following the introduction 
of both the first and  second  stages and prior to making further proposals. 
In the first  instanc~, the seven Member  States which  implemented the first 
stage  (the United Kingdom  and  Ireland having exercised their dero~tion} 
reported that it had not appreciably affected either tax revenues or 
market  conditions. 
4•  7 •4•  Six of these  seven Member  States 1  (Italy has not yet  implemented 
1  Greece  implemented the  second stage on 1  January 1981,  on eccession to 
the  Community,  by the  introduction of a  mixed  system with a  specific 
element of  1~  of total tax.  This system is very similar in its effects 
to the degressive system previously applied by Greece.  So  far as the 
Commission is aware,  implementation of th<;;  harmonised  system  changed  the 
price structure only marginally,  and disturbed neither revenue  flow nor 
the smooth  functioning of the market. ~ ·~ 
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the second stage- Bee  paragraph 4.6.2.)-reported similar conclusions 
following the  second· stage and that market  interpenetration had  imprcrved 
only  slightly (although in the  case of France·;a declining market  sha.re 
of the State producer, as a  result of a  sharp trend away  from dark cigarettes, 
had led to  increased imports both before and after implementation of the 
second stage in July 1978  (1) -see Table 7.2.).  Of course,  all seven 
of these Member  States had,  before harmonization began,  applied either an 
ad valorem or a  specific tax to the finished product.  On  implementing the 
harmonized system, all seven had  chosen the specific/ad valorem mixture 
which came  closest to their original system.  It is therefore not  surprising 
that the effects of the first two  stages were  in all cases modest,  both 
as regards changes  in the price range and  interpenetration of markets. 
4.7 .5.  By  contrast,  significant  changes were  reported in the British and 
Irish markets  fo~lowing the implementation of the  second stage.  As  regards 
prices,  the bottom  sector of the price ranges,  before harmonization,  con-
sisted of small cigarettes with a  proportionately low tax bul'l!en  (this 
being due  to the pre-hannonization system of taxing the raw tobacco,  tax 
being thus broadly proportional to cigarette size).  On  moving  to the 
harmonized system,  both Member  States opted for a  5~ specific element. 
The  switah to a  high specific element meant that differences in price 
between these small brands and king-size brands became negligible;  the 
small brands were  gradually withdrawn from  the market and the price range 
on both markets was  substantially compressed as a  consequence.  These 
small brands accounted for a  large proportion of the market  share of the 
major British domestic producer,  whose  market  share  consequently declined 
from  roughly two-thirds to about  one half of the British cigarette market. 
It is striking,  however,  tha.t  imports were more  or less unaffected, 
remaining at a  low level, around  Zfo  of the total. 
1  On  4  JUne  1980,  the then Minister of the Budget,  addressing the French 
National Assembly,  recognized that French  oonsuJilers  were  smoking less 
of dark products and more  and more of blond;  that,  by reference to the 
1970 mean,  SEITA  had, lost,  in four months,  5%  of its market to  imported 
ciga.rettesJ and that to arrest this trend,  it was  necessary to  launch new 
products, acquire essential know  how,  and to  develop sales of tobacco 
abroad. 28 
4.7.6.  These- admittedly severe- changes were due  to a  number of special 
factors.  The  5-year derogation meant  that the  impact  of both the first 
and  second  stages arrived ei  "~;her at once  (in Ireland) or spread over a 
relatively short time-spa.n (in 1m  United Kingdom,  which began  implementation 
before the derogation expired).  Moreover,  the previous system of taxing 
the raw tobacco,  (i.e. related to the weight  of tobacco  in the cigarette) 
contained a  significant proportional element,  in contrast to a  purely spe-
cific system based on a  fixed sum  per cigarette,  irrespective of size. 
Consequently,  the least disruptive move,  on implementing the harmonized 
system 1would have been towards a  specific element  considerably below the 
permitted maximum  of 55%·  However,  as stated above,  both Member  States 
opted for a  specific element  very close to the  55%  maximum.  Both markets 
were  therefore subjected, not only to a  relatively sudden adaptation but 
also to a  more  radical change  in system than the harmonization directives 
required. 
4•  7.  7.  The  severity of the  changes on these two  markets  cannot  therefore 
be attributed merely to the obligation to move  to the mixed  ~ystem, but 
also and in large measure to the national decisions to move  to the upper 
extreme of that  system.  Had  France,  Italy and the Benelu;x  countries made 
a  comparable  choice - that is, to move,  virtually in one  step,  from a 
wholly ad valorem  system to a  speci·fic element  considerably in excess of 
the permitted 5%  mimium  specific,  it is likely that their markets would 
also have been seriously disturbed. 
4.7.8.  In summary,  therefore,  the first and  second  stages can be said to 
have had no  untoward  effects and to have  imposed  only modest  changes on  the 
markets of the Member  States.  Such  market  distrubances as have been 
observed during the harmonization period - the  sharp trend away  from  dark 
cigarettes in France and Italy,  the  sharp  compression of price ranges  in 
the United Kingdom  and Ireland and changes  in market  share in the United 
Kingdom  - have  been largely due  to other factors  in the case of France and 
Italy and,  in the case of Ireland and the United Kingdo~,  to national 
decisions. 29 
4.8.  Proposal for a  Coypcil Directive concerning a  third stage of 
haromization 1 
4.8.1.  Neither the  Council Resolution of 1970  nor the basic 1972 Directive 
''  regard the ratio to be established between the specific and the ad valorem 
component as an end  in itself, but  simply as a  means  of striking a  fair 
relationship between the  ra.~e of retail selling prices and the  range of 
manufacturers'  deliver,y prices  (exclusive of tax). 
As  pointed out in paragraph  4.3.1~,this relationship will necessarily. 
depend on  the  construction put on the word  "fair" and must be a  matter 
for ne~tia.tion  •.  2 
4.8.2.  For the first stage of hannonization,  the six founder Member 
States agreed that the specific component  was  to be  equal to between 
5%  and  75%  of the total excise bu.-1"1ien.  This spread Wa.s  introduced in 
recognition of the disproportionate effect that incorporation of a  given 
speeific component  into an ad valorem  system has,  in comparison with 
the  incorporation of an identical ad valorem  component  into a  specific 
system.  :Bearing in mind that  VAT  has now  been included in the harmonization 
arr-angements,  the 5-55%  spread adopted for the  second  stage is roughly 
equal  to a  6-66%  spread if, as  in the first stage,  VAT  were  excluded. 
This  confirms a.nd  even accentuates the original 1 to  5 re4tionship in 
in the narrowing process. 
4.8.3.  For the third stage,  the  Commission  has proposed that the pennitted 
spread for the specific component  be  compressed once again,  to between 
10%  and  35%  of the total tax burden.  '!'his  further compression is another 
step along the path followed by Member  States in the first two  stagesJ 
and the new  spread lies exactly on the curve  joining the current  5-5~ 
spread to a  single specific component  of 20%,  the level which in theory 
would  entail the most  equitable distribution of efforts over all national 
price ranges and would  result inamea.n  range mid-way between the two  extrenes. 
1  OJ No  C 264 of 11  October 1980,  P•  6 
'- 2 The  ''multiplier" concept  loomed  large in the talks on future harmonization. 
It is discussed in detail in Annex  II. 4.8.4.  In the explanatory memorandtiJil  to its proposal  (pa.mgraphs  20  and 
21),  the  Commission acknowledges the  shortcomings of a  partial, theoretical 
approach,  but lists the practical arguments in its favour. 
4.8.5.  In addition to the main proposal for narrowing the spread for the 
specific component,  the  Commission also proposes the following for the 
third stage  : 
- abolition of the option of excluding customs duties from the basis of 
ca.lculationJ 
- lowering of the ceiling for the optional minimUJil  excise,, to  80%  of the 
excise  charged on cigarettes in the most  poupular price category; 
- examination of the problems arising in connection with the arrangements 
for collecting the excise  (e.g. tax credits). 31 
5.  RAW  TOBACCO 
5.1.  Current  situation in the raw  robacco  sector 
5.1.1.  Tobacco  accounts for 0.4% of the value of Community agricultural 
output. 
5.1.2.  Production of leaf tobacco  in the  Community  of Ten  covers about 
45%  of requirements.  In terms of individual varieties,  however,  there is 
a  large surplus of Oriental tobaccos  (for which  there is limited demand) 
and a·shortfall in other varieties,  (particularlyflue cured- see Annex 
IV,  Table 1).  Despite the fact that the  Community  does not  meet  its own 
needs,  this situation leads it to  export up  to  30%  of its own  output, 
(mainllf oriental tobaccos and certain grades of other varieties grown  in 
Italy and Greece). 
5.1.3.  The  total area under tobacco  has  remained  constant  for  some  time 
(Annex  IV,  Table  2).  Changes  in the  proportions of the different varieties 
grown  appear to  follow  changes  in demand.  Thus  the area devoted to  light 
air cured and  flue  cured tobaccos is increasing,  and that  devo~ed to  sun 
cured tobaccos  is falling. 
5.1.4.  The  number  of tobacco  growers has been falling steadily in all 
the producer Member  States in the  Community  (Annex  IV,  Table 3).  There 
are currently about  225  000,  and the  number  of permanent  farm  workers 
employed  in cultivation and  in operations prior to the industrial stage 
can be estimated at about  600  000. 
5·l·5·  The  average holding is not more  than 0.8 ha,although this figure 
has been rising slightly (Annex  IV, .Table 4). 32 
5.1.6.  Income  per hectare varies with  the variety grown.  But  income  from 
the  same  variety also varies from  one  country to another  (Annex  IV,  Table 5). 
The  average  income  per annual  labour unit  in tobacco  ;farming  stancE at about 
r:JJ%  of the national average  income,  but  the value of the gross yield per 
hectare is among  the highest.  Thus  the gross marketable production of very 
small  farms  would  not  be  sufficient to  provide an acceptable  family  income 
without the major contribution made  by tobacco. 
5.1.7.  The  geographical distribution shows  that tobacco  growing is 
localized at two  levels: 
(a)  within the  Community,  Italy and Greece  each produce about  40%  of 
total Community  outputJ 
(b)  within Italy,  the  regions of Apulia,  Campania  and Abruzzi produce 
about  80%  of Italian outputf  in Greece,  Macedonia  and Thrace 
produce over 60%  of Greek outputJ  in France,  practically all 
growing is concentrated in the departements of the South-West. 
The  tobacco-growing r,egions are among  the least  favoured  regions of the 
Community. 
5.1.8.  The  possibility of switching to other varieties or crops is fairly 
limited,  owing to  the small size of farms and the particular climatic and 
soil conditions.  Where  soil and climatic conditions are suitable for 
other crops,  farmers  may  be deterred from  switohing by the fact that 
income  per hectare of_ tobacco  is a  great deal higher than that  from 
possible substitute crops. 
5.2.  Production and  consueption trends 
5.2.1.  Total Community  dema.rui"for  leaf tobacco  is expected to  fall 
gradually,  declining from  630  000  tonnes  in 1980  to  570  000  tonnes by 
1988.  This forecast  is based on the following factors: (3) 
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(a)  the  growth in sales of filter cigarettes, at the expense of plain 
cigarettes, and the use of longer-filtersJ 
(b)  the diminution in the diameter of cigarettes, and the use of tobaccos 
with a  greater filling powerJ 
(c)  a  fall in cigarette consumption as a  result of anti-smoking 
campaigns and the steady rise in retail prices. 
5.2.2.  In terms of individual varieties,  given the  increase  in consumption 
of "American blend" cigarettes,  composed  mainly of flue  cured,  Burley and 
oriental tobaccos  (used in small quantities to  provide aroma),  flue  cured 
and Burley varieties can be  expected to be more  in demand,  at the expense 
of sun cured (oriental) and dark air cured tobaccos. 
5·2·3·  Production is currently relatively stable, but it is difficult to 
say what  level it will reach as a  result of the accesssion of Greece. 
However,  as stated above,  the main difficulty in production is not  the 
total volume  produced,for the  Community  is only 45%  self-sufficient, but. 
rather the crop  shares of the different varieties grown. 
5.2.4.  As  regards the  crop  shares,  the projected fall in the  production 
of sun cured and dark air~cured varieties should be offset by a  rise in 
the output of flue cured and  Burley tobaccos.  This would allow the  current. 
volume  of production to be maintained. 
5.3.  Rules soverning trade with non-member  countries 
5.3.1.  The  customs tariff on raw  tobacco  (Annex  III)  is bound under GATT. 
Clearance of tobacco  imported into the COmmunity  from  non-member  countries 
is subject only to the  Common  Customs  Traiff (tariff heading No  2401.  A: 
duty of 23%,  minimuJD.  28  EUA  and maximum  30  EUA  per 100  kgJ  and tariff heading 
No  2401.  B:  duty of 14%,  minimum  28  EUA  and maximum  70  EUA  per 100  kg). 
There are preferential rates for tobacco  imported from  ACP  countries, 
associated countries and GSP  countries: 
(a)  zero  duty on  imports  from  ACP  and associated countries, 
(b)  reduced rate on  imports  from  GSP  countries  • 
Imports  from  these two  sources amounted to about  140  000  tonnes ·in 1980, 
out of total imports of about  430  000  tonnes. 34 
5·4·  The  Premium  system 
5·4·1· 
(a) 
The  system of premiums  is the result of two  factors: 
customs duties on all products  subject to market  organization are 
bound  und,er  GATT; 
(b)  Community  prices are higher than world prices,  because of structural 
and  labour cost differences  (Annex  IV,  Table 6). 
5.4.2.  An  aid scheme  (following the deficiency payments  system)has there-
fore been established,  in order to ensure that the norm  price is maintained 
and to. guarantee a  market  for Community  produced tobacco.  Premiums are 
normally paid to buyers of leaf tobacco,  but  in some  cases to  farmers or 
associations of farmers if they themselves bale the tobacco.  The  recipient 
of the premium  must  sell the baled tobacco  for use in manufacture or for 
export,  unless  he carries out  these operations himself. 
5.4.3.  The  premium  is equal to the  ~ifference between the total cost price 
for Community  tobacco  in bale and the price of competing tobacco  imported 
from  non-member  countries.  A separate rate of premium  is established for 
each variety of tobacco. 
5·5·  Cost  of premium  scheme 
5.5.1.  The  cost of the premium  scheme  accounts for about  90%  of total 
Community  expenditure in the tobacco  sector  (Annex  IV,  Table 7). 
Guarantee  Section expenditure on  raw  tobacco is estimated at  327  million 
ECU  in 1981,  which is 3%  of Guarantee Section expenditure and  50%  of the 
value of tobacco  production.  Expenditure has risen as a  result of the 
accession of Greece,  and will probably reach 618  million ECU  in 1982. 35 
5.6.  Ob.iectives 1 
5.6.1.  The  long-term objectives area 
·-..  (a)  to maintain the  current  volume  of production; 
·-
(b)  to  increase the volume  of exports through a  more  active commercial 
policyJ 
(c)  to guide production towards varieties in demand  by  industr,y and 
trade,  notably through an inter-trade cooperation agreement,  which· 
is alrea~ being studied. 
1  Measures to be taken 
In order to attain these objectives,  the  Commission  has advanced 
the following measures: 
(a)  Intervention.  Action can already be taken under the present 
regulations to  reduce the  intervention price if the quantity offered 
for intervention by an enterprise exceeds  25%  of its output.  These 
measures  should be  continued and if necessar.y reinforced. 
(b)  Conversion.  Action can also be  taken under the present  regulations 
to pay aids for conversion to other varieties and to reduce the 
intervention price for certain varieties.  Use  should  continue to  be 
made  of these measures. 
{c)  Other measures.  The  element  of processing cost,  used in calculating the 
aids for tobacco,  should be adjusted.  There should be  research into 
1 
the  improvement  of tobacco  varieties. 
See  the Commission  communication  "Guidelines for European Agricultures", 
(OOM(Bl)  608  final,  paragraphs  95  and  96). 36 
6.  MANUFACTURED  TOBACCO  MONOPOLIES 
6.1.  The  first adjustments to the  systems 
6.1.1.  Two  Community Member  States,  France and Italy,  have  State 
monopolies of a  commercial  character coming under Article 37  of the EEC 
Treaty.  This Article requires Member  States progressively to adjust any 
such monopolies  so  as to  ensure that when  the transitional period has 
ended,  no  discrimination regarding the conditions under which  goods are 
procured and marketed exists between nationals of Member  States. 
I 
6.1. 2.  When  the  EEC  Treaty came  into force,  the SEITA  (Service d'Exploitation 
industrielle des Tabacs et des Allwnettes)  in France and the AAMS  (Azienda 
Autonoma  dei Momopoli  di Stato)  in Italy had  sole rights over the production 
of manufactured  tobacco;  and the wholesale distribution of domestic and 
imported manufactured tobacco.  In both countries, ,raw-tobacco-growing 
was  subject to the approval of the State monopoly;  in France,  retail 
marketing was  subject to  State authorization and constituted a  State · 
monopoly;  in I'tlay,  authorization for retailing was  granted by the  AAMS 
through the  issue of licences. 
6.1.3.  During the transitional period,  both France and. Italy took a 
series of measures to open their markets to manufactured tobacco  products 
from  other Member  States.  At  that time,  the products were  purchased firm 
by the State monopolies and resold at prices that were  fixed at the 
monopolies discretion.  On  ~he recommendation of the Commission,  Italy and 
later France  introduced excise duties on manufactured tobaccos and  imposed 
trade margins at wholesale and retail levels,  discontinuing the practice 
of firm purchase.  Both  systems of excise duties were ad va.loremJ  France 
in addition applied different rates to  dark tobacco and blond tobacco,  to 
the distinct advantage of the former. 
r 6.1.4.  Following action by the Commission,  this distinction was  gradually 
eliminated.  Italy was  obliged to reduce the r-ate  of proportional excise 
'f  duty  considembly~  in an attempt  to  combat  contmband.  Acting on:  recommen-
dations by the  Commission,  both Member. States also  opened  import  quotas 
for manufactured tobaccos from  other Member  States, and  gradually 
increased them. 
6.2.  Recent  developments 
6.2.1.  Although Article 37  of the EEC  Treaty requires Member  States 
progressively to adjust any State monopolies by the  end of the transitional 
period  (31  December  1969),  the  Council adopted a  Resolution on 21  April 
1970  under which Fmnce and Italy undertook to relinquish by 1  Januacy 
1976 the State's sole rights for the  importation and wholesale distribution 
of manufactured tobacco  from other Member  States.1  Fmnce passed a  law 
and the  implementing decrees in 1976,  but . Italy,  having adopted a  similar 
law before the end of 1975,  never promulgated the necessacy  implementing 
decrees. 
6.2.2.  Allowing for the different situations in the two  countries and  in 
the light of the new  case law ofthe Court of Justice in the field,  the 
Commission  has initiated infringement  p~ceedings against France and Italy 
since 1976.  These  proceedings referred also to other aspects of the 
monopoly  systems which the  Commissionconsidered  incompatible with the 
requirements ·under Article 37  of the  EEC  Treaty. 
As  regards Italy, mention should be made  of the  system for sett:il'lg up 
and oper-ating wholesale warehouses and the  s.y,stem  of payment  for tax stamps. 
6. 2.3.  As  regards the sole retailing rights, the Commission  has criticised, 
among  other things, the nationality requirements  imposed by the French 
and Italian monopolies on tobacconists,  the lack of autonomy of tobacconists 
in relation to the State, and the  compulsor,y  setting of uniform trade margins. 
1  It should be  noted that the Court  of Justice has  ruled that the maintenance 
beyond  the transitional period of the sole right of importation of products 
from  other Member  States is incomaptible with the provisions of Art.  37, 
which Article is directily applicable since 1.1.1970  (judgment of 3.2.1976, 
given in case  59/75, Mangham). 38 
6.2.4.  As  France and Italy were  not prepared to comply with its reasoned 
opinion,  the  Commission decided on 28  Ocotber 1981  to take the matter 
before the  Court  of Justice.  However,  this decision was  subject to a 
short delay in application,  in order to pemit -final efforts to find 
solutions to the remaining problems.  These  attemts having met  with largely 
positive results,  the  Commission therefore decided to  suspend the infringe-
ment  procedure against France.  This decision took into  CQnsideration under-
takings given by the French Government  that legislation and other measures 
would  put an end  to aspects of the monopoly  regime  considered by the  . 
Commission  to be  incompatible with Article 37  of the EEC  Treaty,  by the 
end of 1983.  It will be recalled that the aspects  covered  included fixed 
retail margins;  the  freedom  for tbe producer to  decide where  he will market 
his products; the ensuring of the  commercial  independence of the State-
licensed retail-outlets and the allocation of publicity space  in these latter. 
As  re~rds Italy,  undertakings were  obtained covering the  conditions for the 
payment  of tax-stamps;  the opening and operating of wholesale warehouses 
and the packaging of products.  The  sole question remaining to be brought 
before the European Court  is thus that  concerning the fixing of retail 
margins. 
6.2.5.  Against this background,  and in the light of the case  law of the 
Court  of Justice on monopolies,  in particular its judgment  of 30  March 
1979  in case  91/78  (Hansen),  the  Commission  has been examining the effects 
on  competition of the marketing policies of the French and _Italian 
manufacturing monopolies.  More  specifically,  the matters at issue are the 
retail selling price of Ga.uloise  cigarettes, distribution costs in Italy 
and the selling prices of MS  and Nazionali cigarettes,  the brands with the 
biggest  sales on their respective markets. 
6.2.6.  In the  case referred to,  the  Court  held that  "any practice by a. 
State monopoly which  consists in marketing a.  product with the aid of public 
funds at an abnormally low resale price compared  to the price before tax 
of products of comparable  quality imported from  another Member  State is 
incompatible with Article  37  (1) of the EEC  Treaty." 39 
6.2.7.  The  Commission has  found that the financial results of both 
monopolies,  which  showed  a  prcfit until a  few years ago.,  now  show  a 
substantial loss.  (According to the French Governnient,  this is largely 
due to the unusually heavy costs  imposed by the large nuJ]lber  of pensioned 
staff). 
Balances on the profit and loss accounts for the SEITA  have been as 
follows  :  (1)  (2)  (3) 
1973  :  +  FF  41  million 
1974  :  +  FF  0.4 million 
1975  :  + FF_0.5 million 
1976  :  - FF  7.6 million 
1977  :  - F.F  161.6 million 
1978  :  - FF  302.6 million 
1979  :  - FF  236.1 million 
1980  :  - FF  147.8 million (9 months) 
The  results of the AAMS  have been as follows  :  (2)  (3) 
1977  :  + Lit 8  500  million 
1978  :  +  Lit  23  200  million 
1979  :  - Lit  21  000  million 
1980  : 
1Source:  Annual  reports of the SEITA. 
2Source:  Annual  reports of the AAMS  and Libro bianco  sulla riforma. dei 
Monopoli di Stato. 
3  Given the different presentation of the finamcial  results of the  two 
monopolies,  it is probable that the  respective results are not  comparable 
from one  country to the other. 40 
6.3.- Market  trends 
6.3.1.  In this context,  it should be noted that the market  shares of both 
the  SEITA  and the AAMS  are steadily declining on their respective markets. 
6.3.2.  In France,  the share of national output  (including manufacture 
under licence)  in total national consumer sales has declined as follows:  1 
1974  :  91.6%  (91.9%  of value) 
1975  :  90.9%  (about  84~ of value) 
1976  :  89.6%  (83.3~ of value) 
1977  :  86.9%  (79.8%  of value) 
1978  :  83.9%  (72.8%  of value) 
1979  79·2%  (70.2%  of value) 
1980  :  72·4~ (60%  to  62%  of value) 
In 1980,  the  share  of baond and dark tobaccos in the French cigarette 
market was  as follows  :  2 
1 
manufacturer 
SEITA 
Others 
VolUJD.e  share of market 
Dark tobacco  Blond  tobacco 
%  % 
66.98 
(the remaining  3.7~ represents minor brands not  included in the 
calculations). 
Source:  Annual  reports of the SEITA 
2  Source:  Le  Nouvel  Economiste of 9 Februar,y 1981,  P•  43. 41 
6.3.3.  The  f1gures for Italy are as follows  (in volume):  (1) 
1977 .  70.9%;  including production under licence:  11·8%  • 
1978  :  67.8fo;  including production under licence:  75.0% 
1979  :  60.9%;  including production under licence:  71.3% 
1980. :  61.6%;  including production under licence:  71.7% 
The  cigarette with the highest  sales,  (MS)  introduced a  few  years ago  by 
the monopoly and accounting for 35.8% of consumption in 1980,  is 
manufactured  from  blond tobacco.  The  AAMS  recently introduced another 
blond tobacco  cigarette, the MS  internazionale,  intended to  compete  with 
high-quality foreign products. 
6.4.  Distribution and sales 
6.4.1.  The  distribution and  sale of manufactured tobacco  is organized 
along similar lines in the  two  Member  States with tobacco monopolies.  By 
virtue of exclusive  contr.acts with  pro~ucers from  the other Member  States, 
the  SEITA  and  AAMS  are virtually the  eole distributers and retailers of 
1 
both national and  imported  manufactured tobacco.  In this way,  they still 
have a  de  facto  m~mopoly at ·the wholesale  stage,  the retail monopoly being 
held de  jure by the  Stat~ in both countries. 
1  s  .  . ource.  Annual  reports of the  AAMS  and  "Libra bianco  sulla rifonna. dei 
monopoli  di Stato". -· 42  -
7•  PRODUCTION  AND  CONSUMPTION  OF  MANUFACTURED  TOBACCO 
7.1.  Production 
7.1.1.  Production of cigarettes takes place in all ten Member  States.  In 
Italy and France,  the State exercises a  production monopoly  (See  Chapter 6). 
Table 7.1  shows  the evolution of production from  1970 to 1980.  Between  1970 
and  1976,  production increased by about  25  ~ to about  560.000 mio  pieces, 
but has  since stabilised at this level.  However,  since 1976,  the pattern 
of production between the Member  States has varied considerably  (see also 
Section 2  below).  Production has fallen in Ireland,  France  and Denmark  by 
22.9 %,  16.3% and  5.8% respectively.  By  contrast,  production has  increased 
in the Netherlands,  Germany  and Belgium/Luxembourg by  31.5%,  8.9 % and 
6.1 %  respectively.  In the  remaining Member  States,  the  changes  since  1976 
have  been less than 5  %.  Nevertheless,  in all Member  States,  production 
in 1980 was  higher than it was  in 1970,  although in three Member  States 
(France,  Ireland and Denmark)  the present  trend is  sharply downwards. 
Importation/exportation 
The  evolution in the Member  States of total imports and exports, 
as well as  intra-Community  imports and exports,  is shown  in Tables 7.2 and 
7.3.  Taken  as a  whole,  the ten Member  States imported in total, 
including  intra-Community trade,  in 1980  about  5  times more  cigarettes than 
in 1970.  Total exports were  about  three times the  1970  level,  due  to the 
fact  that  exports to third countries,  which  accounted for more  than half 
of total exports in 1970,  only  increased by about  55 %. 
7.2.2.  Due  to the very high external tariff (see Annex  III) the  Community 
cigarette market  is virtually closed to third countr.y  imports.  (In fact, 
Table 7.2  shows  that the Netherlands in.l980 imported more  than 6.000 mio - 43-
TABLE  7.1  •.  : 
Production of cigarettes in the Member  States (in mio  pieces) 
19701) 
'J,  change  in 
1976  1978  1980  production from 
1976  to 1980 
mio  mio  mio  mio  '/o 
B  ~ 
LUX  )  20.800  24.942  24.695  26.454  6,1 
DK  8300  9794  9265  9223  - 5,8 
D  129700  147722  152400  160926  8,9 
F  69900  86546  80856  72478  -16,3 
GR  17000  229001)  249001)  21903  - 4,4 
'  96001)  76oo1>  74001)  IRL  5600  -22,9 
IT  71600  73645  71585  73105  - 0,1 
.NL  23100  30408  352001)  400001)  31,5 
UK  111100  159000  151525  156050  - 1,9 
ALL  MS  457100  564557  558026  567539  0,5 
Source  :  Members  States and  1 )EUROSTAT 
pieces.  However,  these figures relate to the  importation of cigarettes 
made  in a  third country from  temporarily exported materials.  This practice, 
which  ceased in 1980,  arose  from  a  temporary  shortage of Community  pro-
duction capacity).  Excluding the Netherlands figures,  imports  from  third - 44  -
TABLE  7 .2. 
Importation of cigarettes from  EEC  and other countries 
Member  Import 
19701) 
Change  from 
States  from  1976  1978  1980  1976  to 
1980  in  '/c 
mio  mio  mio  mio  '% 
:a  +LUX  EEC  2397  2249  2198  2047  - 8,9 
OTHER  2  5  0  8  60.0 
TOTAL  2399  2254  2198  2055  - 8,8 
EEC  324  461  444  159  -65,5 
DK  OTHER  468  281  3_0_5_  1  -99.6 
TOTAL  792  742  749  160  -78,4 
EEC  466  1382  1382  1651  19,5 
D  OTHER  175  88  121  370  320.5 
TOTAL  641  1470  1503  2021  37,5 
EEC  4467  8405  13347  22692  170,0 
F  OTHER  42  30  11  13  _;56.7 
TOTAL  4509  8435  13358  22705  169,2 
EEC  10  NA  NA  328  -
GR  OTHER  11  NA  NA  29  -
TOTAL  21  77  NA  357  363,6 
IRLl) 
EEC  84  356  . 318  293  -17,7 
OTHER  28  32  18  4  -e87.5 
TOTAL  112  388  336  297  -23,5 
EEC  3292  18.653  22.420  27863  49,4 
IT  OTHER  291  11  1  0  -100_._0 
TOTAL  3583  le.664  22.421  27ts63  49,3 
EEC  1799  8313  10843  12733  3)  53,2 
NL  OTHER  35  54~  262  6A40  1182_5 
TOTAL  1894  8367  11105  19173  129,2 
EEC  297  1400  2235  2408  72,0 
UK  OTHER  6_43  600  600  400  - :B.3 
TOTAL  940  2000  2835  2ts08  40,4 
EEC  13.136  41. 219~~ 
2 
70.1743)  69,52)  53.1872 
TOTAL  OTHER  1.755  1.101  l.  318,.,  7.265 
TOTAL  14.891  42~397 ..  54.505- 77.439  82,7 
Source  :  Member  States and  l)EUROSTAT 
2)  excl.  Greece 
3)  Almost  the whole  of the Netherlands figure  is accounted for by 
materials temporarily exported and  subsequently re-imported as 
finished cigarettes.  This practice,  which  ceased  in 1980,  was 
due  to a  temporary shortfall in Community  production capacity. 
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TABLE  7 .3. 
Exportation of cigarettes to EEC  and  other countries 
Member  Export 
19701) 
Change  from 
States  to  1976  1978  1980  1976  to 
1980  in  % 
mio  mio  mio  mio 
EEC  3.363  7.358  10o63  10297  40,0 
B  +LUX  OTHER  0  208  850  718  245.2 . 
TOTAL  3.363  7.566  10913  11.015  45,6 
EEC  100  419  509  646  54,2 
DK  OTHER  1666  737  786  754  2.3 
TOTAL  1766  1156  1295  1400  21,1 
EEC  3658  16194  22204  27783  71,6 
D  OTHER  1J4!t  2031  5620  3821  88.1 
TOTAL  5002  18225  27824  31604  73,4 
EEC  2833  2498  2175  3670  46,9 
F  OTHER  962  5119  4921  ·7149  39.7 
TOTAL  3795  7617  7096  10819  42,0 
EEC  6  NA  NA  2  -
GR  OTHER  28  NA  NA  16  -
TOTAL  34  52  NA  15  -75,0 
IRL1) 
EEC  153  470  379  983  109,1 
OTHER  677  1314  1247  1005  -23.5 
TOTAL  830  1785  1626  1988  11,4 
EEC  80  68  19  141  107,4 
IT  OTHER  34  130  304  253  94.6 
TOTAL  114  198  383  394  99,0 
EEC  4543  9776  19814~~  295831)  202,6 
NL  OTHER  1_430  351  587  534  52.1 
TOTAL  5973  10127  20401!)  301171 1  197,4 
EEC  3036  7000  8510  13687  95,5 
UK  OTHER  17750  19000  20160  23230  22.3 
TOTAL  20756  26000  25670  36917  42,0 
EEC  17.772  43.783  ~<  63.733  ~  86.792  98,2 
TOTAL  OTHER  23.891  28.890  34.475  "  37 .48o  ~9,7 
TOTAL  41.663  72.755  98.208  ~. 124.272  71,0 
.  1),  Source.  Member  States and  EUROSTAT 
l)Excl. Greece 
Discrepancies between the  import  and  export  figures for trade between 
Member  States are  in large measure  due  to exports to third countries via 
other Member  States being incorrectly regarded as  intra-Community trade 
and partly due  to duty-free traffic. - 46-
countries in 1980  represented less than 0.2 %  of total Community  consumption 
of cigarettes.  By  comparison,  in the  same  year,  exports from  the 
Community  to third countries accounted for  6.~ of total production. 
7.2.3.  The  footnote to Table 7.3. explains that export  figures from  one 
Member  State to another are not wholly reliable.  For this reason,  measures 
of market  interpenetration are based on  the  import  figures,  which are not 
_in general  subject to any  significant margin of error.  T.able  7 .4., which 
sets out  imports and exports as a  percentage of consumption,. shows  that 
intra-Community trade in cigarettes has increased considerably in recent 
years.  This now  accounts for about  13.7%  of total consumption,  as  compared 
to about 7.9 %  in 1976.  Imports  in. 1980  of cigarettes by Member  States 
from  elsewhere  in the  Community  range  from  1.5% of consumption in Germany 
to 55·4 %  in the Netherlands.  (The  import  figures for France  should be 
qualified by a  reminder that the State production monopoly  prevents other 
manufacturers from  operating in France.  This is also the case  in Italy, 
althotigh AAMS  produces 10.1% of total consumption under licence for other 
producers.). 
7.2.4.  Also  expressed as a  percentage  of consumption,  1980  exports range 
from  zero in Greece to 128.8 %  in the Netherlands.  So  far as intra-
Community  trade is concerned,most  of the Member  States are net  exporters, 
led by the Netherlands,  Belgium/Luxembourg,  and Germany.  Italy is the 
biggest net-importer, with 28.3 %  of consumption  covered by  imports and 
exports of only 0.1'/o  of consumption.  The  pattern for France is very 
similar, with  imports at  26.5 %  and exports at 4.3 '/o  of consumption,  giving 
a  net-import figure  of 22.2 %. -47-
Market  interpenetration and  3rd Country exports 
Member.  Import  Import  Import 
States  from  1980  in% 
or  mio  of con-
export  su.mption 
to 
B  +LUX  EEC  2.047  10,4 
OTHER  8  o,o 
DK  EEC  159  2,3 
OTHER  1  o,o 
D  EEC  1.651  1,~ 
OTHER  :no  o, 3 
F  EEC  22.692  26,5 
OTHER  13  o,o 
GR  EEC  328  1,5 
OTHER  29  0,1 
IRL1)  EEC  2931)  3,9 
OTHER  41)  0,1 
IT  EEC  27 ._863  28,3 
OTHER  0  o,o 
NL  EEC  12. 7332)  55,4 
OTHER.  6.440  28,0 
UK  EEC  2.408  2,0 
OTHER  400  0,3 
TOTAL  EEC  70 .174-2)  13,7 
OTHER  7.265  1,4 
Source:  Member States and  1 )  ETJROSTAT 
2)see footnote  3)  Table 7.2. 
Export  Export 
1980  in% 
mio  of con-
sumption 
10.297  52,4 
718  3,6 
646  9,2 
754  10,7 
27.783  21,7 
3.821  3,0 
3.670  4,3 
7.149  8,3 
2  . o,o 
16  0,1 
9831)  13,1 
1.0051)  13,4 
141  0,1 
253  0,3 
1)  128,8  29•5831) 
534  2,3 
13.687  11,2 
23.230  19,1 
86.792  16,9 
37.480  7,3 
!ABLE  7 .4. 
Net  Export 
in%  of 
consumption 
42,0 
3,6 
6,9 
10,7 
20,4 
2,7 
- 22,2 
8,3 
- 1,5 
- 071 
9,2. 
13,3 
- 28,2 
0,3 
73,3. 
- 25,7 
9,3 
18,7 - 48  -
7.3.  Consumption 
7.3.1.  The  number  of cigarettes taxed in the Member  States is taken as 
the measure  of consumption.  These  figures are given in Table 7.5.  They 
show  that the trend of consumption is  steadi~ downwards  in the United 
Kingdom  and Denmark.  These  are also the countries with the highest price 
levels (see Chapter 10).  The  Belgian and Luxembourg  figures are misleading, 
because it is believed that a  substantial proportion of cigarettes taxed in 
Luxembourg  are  in fact  consumed  in othft' X/S.  The  combined figures. show  a 
slight~ downwards  trend.  Consumption  in Germany  has  changed ver.y  little 
between the two  years 1976  and  1980,  but fell somewhat  in 1978.  In both 
Italy and France the trend is upwards  considerab~ - see also Chapter 10 -
with the  relative~ low  price levels in these Member  States.  The  Irish 
and Dutch  figures,  whilst  inadequate to establish clear downwards  trends, 
nevertheless  show  that both markets have  ceased to expand  in recent years. 
7.3.2.  The  consumption of cigarettes per head in 1970,  1975  and 1980 is 
shown  in Table 7.6.  Substantial increases took place between 1970  and 
1975,  but  thenbecame  more  or less stabilised at the 1976  levels.  In six 
of the Member  States,  consumption decreased between 1975  and  1980  (and 
fell  sharp~ in Ireland) whereas a  substantial increase took place in 
Greece  and in Ita~.  It is striking that,  although the United Kingdom  had 
the  second-highest tax level in 1980,  it also enjoyed the  second-highest 
cigarette consumption per head,  the highest  consumption being in Greece, 
which has the  lowest  tax incidence (see Chapter 9). 
Finally,  Table 7.7  shows  the evolution in the market  share of 
filter cigarettes.  In all Member  States,  there  is a  pronounced trend 
towards filter cigarettes,  although the filter share differs  considerab~. 
At  present,  the filter share is lowest  in France  (61%  in 1980)  and highest 
in the United Kingdom  (93 %).  It seems  like~ that the trend over time will 
be for filter cigarettes to account  for almost  the whole  of the  Community 
cigarette market. 
.. - 49  -
Taxed cigarettes in the Member  States 
1976  1978  1980  Change  from 
1976  to 
1980.in  'to 
l  mio  - mio  mio  fo 
B  19.630  15.980:1)  16.9561)  - 13,61). 
DK  7.820  7.401  7.026  - 10,2 
D  129.097  123.342  128.353  - o,6 
F  81.268  82.478  85.651  5,4 
GR  NA  NA  22.260  -
IRL  NA  7.656  7.518  -
IT  89.737  88.821  98.608  9,9 
LUX  579  1.9721)  2.6801)  362,91) 
NL  22.523  23.463  22.975  2,0 
UK  135.000  125.690  121.931  - 9,1 
ALL  M.So  513.958 
Source:  Member  States 
!)Although no precise figures  can be given,  it is believed  that a 
substantial proportion of cigarettes· taxed in Luxembourg are in 
fact  consumed  in neighbouring Member  States (in particular, 
Belgium). -50-
Cigarette consumption per head 
1970  1975  1980  ~  change 
from  1970  to 
1980 
% 
B  +LUX  2000  2150  2040  2,0 
:QK  1490  1710  1630  9,4 
D  2069  2090  2160  4,4 
F  1390  1660  1650  18,7 
GR  1930  2400  2720  40,1 
IRL  1630  2470  1680  3,1 
IT  1400  1640  1800  28,6 
NL  1460  2260  2140  46,6 
UK  1640  2580  2450  49,4 
vleighted  1653  average  1996  2037  23,2 
Source  :  EUROSTAT 
.. .,· 
B+.J.UX 
DK 
D 
F 
IRL 
IT 
NL 
UK 
GR 
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Consumption  of filter c;«arettes as  ~  of total 
consumption of cigarettes 
1974  1976  1978 
72,2  77;2  79,1 
52,6  56,6  60,6 
84,8  86,4  87,2 
53,8  59,3  58,3 
80,1  81,3  .  85,0 
87,5  85,0  86,7 
49,0  54,0  57,9 
84,5  88,1  90,5 
84,4  86,9  NA 
Source  :  Maxwell  International Estimates - Fedetab>Seita 
1980 
81,7 
62,1 
88,2 
61,2 
87 ,o 
N.A.. 
65,0 
93,0 
NA - 52  -
7.4.  Consumer  expenditure  on  manufactured tobacco 
Table 7.8 below  shows  the proportion of consumer  expenditure devoted to 
manufactured tobacco. 
TABLE  7.8 
Tobacco  expenditure as  %  of consumer  expenditure 
1970  1975  1979 
~  %  'ft 
B  2.1  1.8  1.7 
DK  4.7  3.6  NA 
D  2.4  2.9  1.8 
F  1.2  1.1  1.0 
GR  3.5  2.9  2.4 
IRL  6.8  5·5  NA 
IT  2.8  2.3  2.0 
LUX  le8  1.5  NA 
NL  2.8  2.3  2.5 
UK  4.6  3.6  3.3 
Source:  EUROSTAT 
The  table  shows  that notwithstanding substantial variations between 
the Member  States in the tobacco  elements in consumer  expenditure, 
there is a  steady downwards  trend in eight of the ten Member  States, 
and  in the remaining  two  countries (Italy, Netherlands) the proportion 
in 1979  was  somewhat  lower than in 1970. -53-
8 •  l!J4PLOlMENT  ASPECTS 
8.1  Introduction:  statistical problems 
8.1.1  While  ideally an examination of employment  statistics at Community 
level should be based on  harmonized data,  in practice the difficulties in 
collecting such data at  Community  level for all Member  States with a 
sufficient degree of accurao.y  and  contemporar,y  relevance make  this approach 
untenable.  statistics exist at the level of the International Labour 
Office, but these are more  widely based,  and  do  not  provide the degree of 
detail required.  The  Commission  has therefore been obliged to adopt  a 
more  pragmatic approach.  The  co-operation of trade unions and  industrial 
associations was  enlisted both at Community  and national level in order to 
collect the relevant data.  This method  natural~ involved certain risks 
regarding accuracy:  in many  cases the  information from  different  sources 
in the  same  Member  States conflicted,  depending  on  the reference month, 
regions covered,  inclusion of unemployed trade union members  or not,  etc. 
Similarly,  although the  same  source is used for data for each country  in 
reviewing past trends,  the  source may  vary from  country to country.  ·Overall 
data for the  Community  are therefore  subject to significant margins  of 
error,  and may  on~ be  used as indicators of orders of magnitude. 
8.2  Emplo;yment  trends in the  Community  tobacco industr;y 
8.2.1  Bearing in mind  the comments  above,  the pattern of employment  in the 
manufacture  of tobacco products can be said to have  shown  a  general decline 
in the latter half of the  seventies as reflected in the table: Year  B {a) DK{a)  ID  {c) 
1975  8  100  3 000  26  700 
1980  6  800  2  300  25  4001) 
change  -1 300  -700 ""'l  300 
1975-80 
'J,  change  -1&;&  - 23}  -;ffo 
l) est. 
- 54  -
F  {a)  I  (a) IRL(b)  NL·(b)  UK  (b)  EO 
11,700 13  10(  2  200  10 600  42  600  118  000 
10 200  14  20(  2  000  9  ooo1)  47  900  107  800 
-1 500  -fi  10(  -200 -1 600  . -4 700  -10 200 
-1~  +&}I  -f/lo  -15%  - 11~  - 8,6% 
Sources  !al Tobacco  trade unions 
b  Tobacco  industry associations 
c  Statistical Office of EO 
8.2.2  In the  Community  as a  whole  (excluding Greece  and  Luxembourg,  for 
which it was  not possible to obtain information) the number  of workers em-
ployed fell during 1975-1980 by a  total of 10  200,  representing an 8,6% drop 
in employment.  Most  Member  States registered a  gradual  fall in employment 
in this sector,  although fluctuations in an upward  direction took place in 
the Federal Republic  of Germagy  and ItalY during the reference period. 
However,  even in Italy (still showing  more  workers employed  in 1980 than in 
1975)  the current trend is downwards.  Discussions with trade union repre-
sentatives in November  1981  indicated that a  further decline in employment 
would be  recorded for 1981  varying from  1'/o  in Italy to as high as 1  ~  in 
Denmark. 
8.2.3  The  breakdown  of the  labour force by !!!  was  not available for every 
.-
country,  but the information provided showed  that in Be].gium,  for example, 
the drop  in employment  between 1975  and  1980 was  wholly at the expense  of 
women:  the number  of male  workers actually increased,  although women  still 
account  f'or  60 'fo  of the work-force  (mainly in manual  grades).  Similarly,  in 
the United Kipgdom  the number  of'  male  workers was  the  same  in 1980  as in 1975, 
while female  employment  dropped by  over  20  '%,  but still accounts for over 
50 'fo  of the work-force  (nearly 60 'J,  in 1975).  In Denmark  the proportion of -55-
female workers is over 80~.  One  is thus led to conclude that reductions 
in employment  in the tobacco manufacturing industry have been largely 
achieved at the expense  of women,  who  nevertheless still comprise  a 
substantial proportion of the labour force.  Whether  any further losses 
in employment  in the  industry would  affect women  more  than men  remains to 
be  seen. 
8.2.4  Given the  integrated nature of much  of the  industry in the Community, 
the precise proportion of the tobacco manufacturing workforce  involved in 
the production of  cigare~s and cigars is difficult if not  impossible to 
quantify.  However,  in Denma:rk  only 7,5 ~  of the workforce  is involved in 
cigarette production,  in Ireland and the Netherlands the proportion is around 
30  ~' in Belgium around  37  '/o,  while in the Federal Republic of Germap..y  it 
can be  assumed to be nearly 70 ~.  As  regards cigars,  in France between 
12 '/o  and 13% of the workforce is engaged  in their production (not  counting 
those  involved in administration,  research,  distribution, etc.).  In Belgium 
and the Netherlands approximately  20~  work  in cigar and cigarillo production, 
while  in Denmark  the proportion is 46 %  (over 90% of which is female 
employment). 
8.2.5  No  accurate statistics are available  on  the number  of people 
employed  in the distribution and  sale of tobacco products.  Few  industrial 
or trade union  sources were  able to  supply  any detailed information.  In a 
report prepared in 1979(l)it was  indicated that  in 1976/77,  6000  wholesalers 
were  involved in the distribution of tobacco products in the Community  with 
168  900  special retail outlets,  of which  almost  90 %  were  in France,  Italy 
and the United Kingdom  (respectively 46  000,  61  000  and 43 600).  A further 
complicating factor regarding Italy is the  special phenomenon  of smuggled 
(l)Agence Europ,enne de  11Information,  Brussels - 56  -
tobacco, which  in 1979  was  estimated to account  for  + 18 ~ of total turn-
over(l),  and 35  ~- 40~ of the internal market(2).  ~is situation consti-
tutes a  severe  problem for the Italian authorities since  several thousand 
families in the Mezzogiorno earn their living in this w~. 
In the 1976/77  period it was  estimated that  over 500  000  people were 
employed  in the distribution network(3),  but there has been some  thinning 
out  of specialised retailers since then (in the Netherlands there has been 
more  than a  20% reduction in the number  of specialised retailers since 
1976,  and  in France  around a  5 %  reduction).  Such  employment  f~es  must 
therefore be treated with reserve.  Tobacco  products are sold in super-
markets,  newsagents,  kiosks,  restaurants, bars etc.,  in combination with a 
wide  range  of other goods.  Only by gathering statistics on the proportion 
of the outlets'  turnover accounted for by tobacco products could one  hope · 
to assess the degree  of importance  such sales represent for employment. 
For the present  purposes it is not  considered that  such an exercise would 
be  cost effective. 
8.3  Reasons for the decline in employment 
8.3.1  Various reasons have been advanced for the decline in employment  in 
the tobacco manufacturing sectors 
- The  general economic  climate and high levels of unemplo.yment  have  had a 
depressive effect, especially on  cigarette sales at  the  cheaper end of the 
market.  Slow  growth  in incomes,  or even negative growth,  especially 
among  the unemployed,  is a  considerable factor in the reduction in 
cigarette consumption among  individuals,  or a  total abstention from 
smoking  in an attempt to reduce  consumption of non-essentials. 
(l)La Voce  del Tobaccaio - November  1980 
( 2 )~arketing & distribution of tobacco" - United Nations - UNCTAD-1978,  p.74 
(3)Agence  Europ~enne de  l'Information, Brussels. -57-
- The  vigorous anti-smoking health campaigns run in maqy  countries a.e also 
believed to lower consumption,  coupled with a  growing recognition among 
the public of the medical  dangers associated with smoking. 
- In a  number  of Member  States,  and consistently with anti-smoking policies, 
tax incidence {see Chapter 9) has increased sharply in recent years, with 
consequential effects on  prices,  consumption,  production and  employment. 
- At  the  comp~ level,  a  frequent  response to tax increases has been 
increased price competition,  leading to plant re-organisation,  the  increas-
ing use  of new  technologies,  more  modern  equipment,  faster maohines(l)  and 
smaller crewing(2);  these have all contributed to plant  closures and 
employment  cut-backs.  In general,  average wages  in tobacco manufacturing 
.  I 
have  at best kept  pace with,  or fallen behind,  the overall level of wage 
increases in manufacturing industry in recent years. 
8.3.2  However,  the  Commission notes {See  Table 7.1- Production) that the 
overall level of Community  production of cigarettes,in faot  increased by 
23,5 '/o  between 1970  and 1976  and.  marginally between 1976  and  1980.  This 
suggests that the factor immediately above  has been· principally responsible 
for the reduced level of emplo.yment  in the  industr,y. 
8.4  Measures to deal with reduced employment 
8.4.1  The  reduced employment  prospects in the  industr,y have been dealt with 
in various w~s in the Member  States for which  information is available. 
8.4.2  A measure  commonly  used is that of early retirement which is used in 
one  form  or another in most  countries.  In the Federal Republic of Germanvt 
the national  scheme  for early retirement at 63  for men  and 60  for women  is 
(!)Machines producing up  to 10  000  cigarettes per minute are now  becoming 
available.  This  compares with an average production rate for the 
Community  of 5 000 per minute. 
(2)Virtually automatic machines are also under trial. - 58  -
supplemented in the tobacco  industry by the opportunity to leave two  years 
earlier.  This can be done  either by  continuing to work half-time on  fUll  . 
PS\1  ( 20  hours per week  instead of 40)  or by  leaving completely with a  pre-
pension equal to 75  ~ of the final wage,  maintenance  of sooial security 
contributions and the normal  retirement pension after 2 years.  Whenever  a 
plant  closure is envisaged,  national legislation requires schemes  to be 
negotiated between trade union and  employer representatives in order to fix 
redundancy  compensation.  In France it is possible to retire at 56  years and 
2 months with a  2-year bonus.  The  scheme  is particularly popular with women, 
but the eligible age  range  is almost  exhausted and to oontinue the  scheme 
much  fUrther would require a  drastic reduction in the age  range.  In the 
United Kipgdom,  early retirement  is possible at 60 but without  aQY  State 
support.  In Belgium,  in addition to general early retirement  provisions 
{62  for men  and 58  for women),  some  company  agreemen~have provided for 
early retirement at 60  for men  and  55  for women;  however,  such agreements 
have been little used in the tobacco  industry.  In Denmark,  there is a 
national early-retirement scheme  in the form  of a  voluntar.y extra wage  (ATP), 
a  soheme  run b,y  the trade unions.  It provides for early retirement  from  60 
onwards  on  relatively generous terms. 
8.4.3  In addition to early retirement,  the decline in tobacco employment 
has been handled in Member  States through various other methods;  natural 
wastage  and no  new  recruitment,  shorter working hours,  part-time and  short-
time work;  however,  it is not possible to give  any detailed indication of 
the extent of such  schemes. 
8.4.4  As  regards the diversification of production and employment  out  of 
tobacco products,  experience varies between Member  States.  In the Federal 
Republic of Germagy,  tobacco multinationals have  in the past  extended their 
base(£ operations by buying-up firms  in other sectors;  textiles,  food -59-
processing, breweries.  However,  this has not created m~  employment  pros-
pects for ex-tobaooo workers,  large~ due  to poor employment  opportunities 
in the sectors concerned,  but also because· of t·obacoo  workers'  lack of 
mobility and relevant qualifications.  In the United Kirgdom  manpower  planning 
agreements have been negotiated between trade unions and  the four major 
tobacco firms which  in theory enable  ex-tobacco workers to undertake train-
ing and re-training with a  view  to finding  employment  in one  of the firms' 
subsidiaries.  In practice,  due  to the  economic  climate,  the  lack of  job 
opportunities in the non-tobacco  subsidiary firms have  made  the agreements 
somewhat  ineffective.  In Belgium,  previous attempts at diversification by 
tobacco  firms were  not  successful,  although currently experiments are being 
undertaken in the pharmaceutical  sector and in the production of filters. 
In France,  diversification is at present  impossible given the statute of the 
French tobacco manuf'acturing  concern (Un.til recently a  monopoly  and now  a 
public compa.rzy-).  The  French trade unions are  in favour  of broadening the 
production base,  possib~ by the extraction of protein from  tobacco for human 
and  animal  consumption. 
8.4.5  There  is in general a  reluctance among  tobacco trade unions to 
countenance diversification into other sectors ·or types of product  in view 
of the likely outflow of investment resources from  the tobacco  sector, 
resources which,  in the trade union view,  should remain within the sector. 
8.5  Tax  harmonization and tobacco employment 
a) Tax  rates and tax structure  --------------
8.5.1  As  a  preliminary comment,  a distinction has to be  drawn between the 
effect  on  employment  in the tobacco manufacturing industry of policies 
relating to the absolute levels of taxation and  those relating to the 
establishment  of a  harmonized tax structure. - 60 -
8.5.2  As  regards tax rates, the policy aim  of the majority of the Member 
States,  and of the  Commission,  is in particular to maintain or to increase 
the  incidence of taxation on  cigarettes,  in order to reduce  smoking  overall. 
This  policy (quite apart  from  the effect of any other polia,y measures or 
economic factors) is likely over. time to reduce the Community  market  for 
cigarettes and  implies, all other things being equal,  some  reduction in 
the overall levels of emplo,yment  in the  industry as a  whole.  (Such a  down-
wards trend has been demonstrated,  and its underlying reasons discussed,  in 
Seotions 8.2 and 8.3 above). 
8.5.3  B,y  contrast,  harmonization of the tax structures leaves Member  States 
free to fix the tax rates they consider appropriate.  Obvious~, as a 
major aim  of harmonization is interpenetration of markets,  structural 
harmonization m~  well  lead to changes  in the shares held by individual 
producers,  whether in national markets,  or in the  Community  market  as a 
whole.  But harmonization of the tax structures will not materially affect 
the size of the Community  market  and should not  therefore affect the overall 
level of employment  in the industry. 
8.5.4  It is difficult to quantify the effects on  employment  of individual 
tax increases, but  one  example  is in the Federal Republic of Germany  where 
the  last excise duty increase  in cigarettes took place  on  1.1.1977•• 
Cigarette consumption fell in 1977,  which was  estimated to have  an effect 
on  production and employment  in 1976  and 1977;  between 1976  and 1977 
employment  in the cigarette industry regressed by 0,7 %..  In the 
United Kingdom  a  7t~ increase in tax on  cigarettes in 1975  (prior to aqy 
harmonization of tax structure) was  followed by a  4,2 %  reduction in 
emplo.yment.  Large tax increases in 1981  are expected to depress 1981  sales 
by 9 ~  below those  in 1980,  with a  further consequent  reduction in employ-
ment.  Reports from  other countries have  suggested that  consumption is 
sensitive to price increases, by as much,  in the case of cigars,  as a 
1,5 ~ fall for a  1 %  increase.  (The  effects of price changes  on  demand 
are more  fully discussed in Chapter 11-Market stability). - 61-
b) Harmonization of the excise structure  ---------------------
8.j.5  The  trade union organisations reiterated their support  for tax 
harmonization.  However, no  comm.Gn  view emerged from  oensultations with trade 
unions as to the effects which further harmonization would have  on 
consumption,  production or employment.  Moreover,  none  of the trade union 
or producer organisations consulted were  able to provide quantitative 
indications,  either of continuing with the present  approach of harmonizing 
on  the basis of fixing the  specific element as a  proportion of total tax, 
or of following the alternative approach of harmonizing the ad valorem 
element  as a  proportion of retail price.  Nor was  it possible for them  to 
provide  any  information as to the  like~ impact  on  employment  of a 
suggested range  of multipliers. 
8.5.6  The  trade union organisations nevertheless placed on  record that the 
introduction of a  tax based on  a  percentage of the retail price could serve 
as an  alternative approach and expressed doubts whether the harmonization of 
excise duties could remain  in line with the principle  of neutral competition 
by a  lev,y  on  the retail price or an increase  in the proportional taxation. 
8.6  Conclusions 
8.6.1  Employment  in the manufacture  of tobacco products (including sales 
and distribution} represents approximately 0,6 "/o  of total employment  in the 
Community  {excluding Greece},  although,  as  indicated,  the sales network is 
by no  means  wholly dependent  on  tobacco products  •. Employment  in t}l.is 
sector has  Shown  a  steaqy decline in recent years,  in a  climate of public 
concern over the effects of smoking  on  health,  increases in tax incidence 
and above  all in response to a  very rapid technical evolution. - 62-
8.6.2  It will doubtless be  argued that  in a  situation of high and growing 
unemployment  the Community's  prime  concern must  be to help maintain employ-
ment  wherever possible in individual  sectors rather than presiding over its 
decline.  However,  as regards the tobacco  sector,  the noxious effect  on 
health,  not  only of smokers  themselves but also of those  subject to 
secondary inhalation cannot be  ignored.  Public health considerations must 
be the major priority,  and in this vein the  Commission  espouses policies 
aimed at reducing the  level of tobacco  consumption,  particularly cigarettes. 
Ideally,  the Commission would prefer to see employment  maintained in 
tobacco manufacturing companies while these  companies  diversified into other 
less harmful  products.  However,  experiencES to date have  not been 
encouraging;  in the  current  economic  climate diversifying to  a:ny  sector 
runs certain risks and  is by no  means  certain to provide  comparable 
employment  opportunities.  This is as true for other manufacturing sectors 
as it is for the tobacco  industr,y.  The  Commission is not  convinced,  though, 
that sufficient effort or research has been allocated to the  search for new 
product  ranges;  in at least  one  country there are legal restrictions on 
diversi~ing out  of tobacco products.  More  progress needs to be made  on  the 
problem  of training and retraining tobacco workers for other occupations, 
and  of tobacco firms assini.J8them to find alternative. employment  outside 
the tobacco  sector.  The  high proportion of female  workers in the sector, 
and their consequent  employment  vulnerability,  is a  cause for concern and 
should obviously bear heavily on  the type of training or retraining needed. 
8.6.3  Against this background,  the  impact  of harmonization of the tax 
structure can  on~ have  a  marginal effect, if any,  on the overall level of 
employment  in the sector.  The  relative  importance  of the  ad valorem and 
the  specific element  (i.e. the  size of the multiplier) could perhpas 
affect the ability of tobacco firms to fund additional research,  training/ 
retraining schemes,  diversification,  etc.,  in order to lessen the dependence 
of employment  on  the manufacture  of tobacco products.  For high-cost - 63-
producers,  a  high specific s,ystem would exercise relatively less pressure 
on  costs than a  high ad  valorem  s,ystem 1  and could therefore arguably leave 
these manufacturers with more  resources to fund  such operations.  However, 
the Commission would point  out that the reverse would be true for low-cost 
producers.  Moreover,  there  could be no guarantee,  even if a  relatively 
high specific  ~stem were  chosen,  that tobacco firms would follow  such  a 
course  and  indeed trade union opposition_has alreaqy been voiced to the 
notion of·diversif.ying externally (see paragraph 8.4.5 above). - 64  -
9.  TAX  INCIDENCE,  RECEIPTS  AND  PRESENT  TAX  STRUCTURES 
Incidence 
9.1.1.  "Tax  incidence"  on  cigarettes means  the total tax (excise +VAT) 
as a  percentage of retail price.  The  mixed  taxation system for cigarettes 
has the effect  (see Chapter 11)  that tax incidence on  cigarettes more 
expensive than those  in the most  popular price category will be lmver than 
the incidence  on  cheaper cigarettes.  For the purposes of this study, 
therefore,  the most  appropriate guide to the evolution of tax incidence is 
that  on  the most  popular price category in each  of the Member  States. 
9.1.2.  In Table 9.1.  is set  out the tax incidence  on  cigarettes in the 
most  popular price category in all Member  States - except  Greece - since 
1.7.1973 and  every second year.  In the last column  is shown  the change  in 
the tax incidence during the 8-yeal:' period.  The  same  information is shown 
in the form  of a  graph  on  the follotrJing page. 
In the period from  1.7.73 to 1.7.79,  changes  in tax incidence 
were  modest,  compared  with those which  took place in the next  two  years. 
The  trend has not been the  same  in all Member  States.  In the two  countries 
with  state production monopolies - Italy and France - and  in Germany  the 
incidence fell by up  to 5.9 % points in Italy, whereas it increased in all 
the other "old" Member  States, by up  to 6,9% in Ireland and up  to 7,1% 
in Belgium. 
The  general level of tax  incidence  followed the same  trend. 
From  July 1973  to July 1979,  the average tax incidence  (excluding Greece) 
was  between 70,0  and  70,7 %.  By  August  1981  this average had  increased 
to 72,7% (71,1% including Greece- ·where  tax incidence is 56,2 %). - 65  -
TABLE  9.1. 
·; ..  (  TOTAL  TAX  AS  %  OF  RETAIL  PRICE  ON  CIGARETTES  IN  MOST  POPULAR  PRICE  CATEGORY 
1. 7. 73  1.7.75  1.7.77  1.  7. 79  1.8.81  Change  1.7.73 to 
1.8.81 in %  points 
%  %  %  %  % 
BELGIUM  64,6  67,2  68,7  71,3  71,7  7,1 
DENMARK  83,3  85,4  86,2  88,5  87,7  4,4 
GERMANY  72,5  70,3  70,6  70,3  70,3  - 2,2 
FRANCE  75,3  72,5  72,5  72,8  72,8  - 2,5 
IRELAND  62,0  62,0  62,0  60,6  68,9  6,9 
ITALY  78,8  74,4  73,7  73,1  72,9  - 5,9 
LUXEMBOURG  61,0  60,8  61,1  61,5  63,5  2,5 
NETHERLANDS  67,5  67,1  66,7  69,2  72,7  5,2 
UNITED  KINGDOM  70,0  70,0  70,0  69,0  74,1  4,1 
Average  9  70,5  70,0  70,2  70,1  72,7 
old MS 
Standard  7,63  7,31  7,40  8,06  6,45 
deviation 
GR  (1)  (1)  (1).  (1)  56,2 
Average  all  NjA  N/A  N/A  NjA  71,1 
MS 
Source  :  !liember  States 
(1)  The  Community  system was  introduced in Greece  on  1.1.1981. 
(S) 9G  · 
80 
70 
JIL 
IR 
60 
LUX. 
50 
--~--:- ---~--r·-~--~--T-~1~~--g:~·--~---r·-~~-·  -~---~--- -:- --
1 
-:·----,,- •  •  •  i  I  "  '  I"  '•  ••  '! 
i ---.  ;  i  ...  -·- . --···  --i--. ____ ;  ___  ----~-- -- j -- .. : ·- -~  ----;--~---~·  ...... 
i'  :.  I  ~O~UTIO! OF  '  I T~  tJJCI  CEI-Oll  IIG,  S·  ' 
.  !  .  I  c  1h .. ot r-:llri"l  ont·~t) 1- - .. ____ --- --
···········  I  '  • .  'i  T . I  I  I 
I  ..  '  I I  I  f ;- !  I  I 
- -~- +  -~- .. 
-~-.J ...... . 
! 
! 
i  - .. , . -j . 
.  I 
I 
I. 
; 
!' 
,. 
! 
J:lr , J·,  i'  I  ··J  ·jll  I 
;  <  '  .1  ·  I 
.!  i.  . .  .  t.  I  I  .  I 
.  ~- .J ..  I  I  .  I  ! 
LUX 
. !. 
j 
. I 
I 
I 
I 
•  1  • 
! ' - 67-
I 
The  present  economic  situation and health policy considerations suggest that 
this level of tax incidence will be at least maintained and probably increased 
9.1.5.  One  important result of the successive enlargement  of the Community 
in 1973  and  1981  was  a  marked  increase  in the range of tax incidence between 
the !~~ember States.  Immediately prior to the 1973  enlargement,  the range for ;th 
Six was  from  61,0 %  (Luxembourg)  to_ 78,8 %  (Italy).  The  accession of Denmark 
increased the upper figure considerably to 83, 3 %,  which has since further 
increased to 87,7  %.  The  accession of Greece in 1981  reduced the lower figure 
to 56,2  %.  Consequently,  the Greek and Danishtax incidences have markedly in-
creased the overall range  ( 1).  lh:cludiDg the Greek and Danish figures,  the 
rqe of inoiclenoe would be. much  narrower than in 1973,  fro~ 63 15 tfo 
(Luxembourg)  to 74,1 ~ (llnited Kingdom). 
9.1.6.  The  standard deviation in tax incidence  as  indicated in Table 9.1. 
shows  the effect of the changes in tax incidences which  have taken place in 
the last 8 years,  in leading to convergence  or divergence  of tax rates.  The 
trend has been markedly convergent  since 1979,  with a  standard deviation 
reduced from  8,1  to 6,5. 
9.2.  Tax  receipts 
9.2.1.  Consumer  expenditure on  tobacco and the tax incidence are the two 
.  . 
factors determining tax receipts. In Table 9. 2.  are  shown  the total receipts 
from  manufactured tobacco for 1970  and 1978. 
(1) In Spain, ·the tax incidence is currently 52%  at most. - 68  -
TABlE  9. 2. 
·Tax receipts from  manufactured tobacco 
1970  1978 
Tax  receipts .  As% of total  Tax  receipts  As  % of total 
in nat  • . currency  tax receipts &  in nat.  currency  tax receipts & 
mio.  social Jlontrib.  mio.  social~ontrib. 
B  7679  1,75  16445  1,23 
DK  2141  4,48  4043  3,03 
D  6536  2,79  10459  2,06 
F  4351  1,56  5915  0,71 
GR  N.A.  N.A ..  N.A.  N.A. 
IRL  50,5  9,83  88,77  4,23 
IT  771.709  4,46  1497700  2,06 
LUX  283  1,68  984  1,81 
NL  886  1,91  1620 
. 
1,23 
me  1150  5,96  2153  3,85 
9.2.2.  As  the table shows,  the excise duty on  tobacco products is a  valuable 
revenue source for government  in all the Member  States,  although its relative 
importance varies considerably - in 1970  about  10  %  of Ireland's total tax 
receipts came  from  the tobacco duty,  whereas  in France it only represented 
1,6 % of the total. Between  1970  and  1978,  the tobacco  excise in all Member 
States except  Luxembourg fell in importance as a  revenue  source but still 
counted for 1 %  to 4 %  in all the Member  States except France,  "'rhere  the figure 
was  o, 7 %.  It. is of interest that in general the tax receipts from  the tobacco 
excises account  for a  greater·part of revenue  in the Member  States with 
relatively high  specific elements  on  cigarettes than tD  those where  the 
specific element  is low. - 69  -
\ 
9.2.3.  In ~able 9.3.  is shown  the percentage of total revenue  from 
tobacco products yielded by the excise and  VAT  on  cigarettes. In 1980,  82 % 
to 99 %  of the revenue  came  from  cigarettes,  a  part which  seems  to be 
grol'Iing in most  Member  States.  Also  shown  in the  same  table is the 
evolution of revenue  from  cigarettes betl'Teen  1976  and  1980,  together with 
the evolution of the consumer  price index.  Although  the growth of receipts 
from  cigarettes exceeded the price index in four Member  States,  it is 
striking that in other cases the growth  in receipts fell behind the price 
index,  notwithstanding declared policies to limit  smoking.  In most  Member 
.  ' 
States the  1980-revenue  was  within 5 - 10  %  of the 1976  revenue  ~xcept 
in Luxembourg  and  the Netherlands where  it increased by more  than 50  % 
and  20  %  respectively.  Consumption  of cigarettes is of course also a 
relevant factor (see Chapter 7). If the figures were  adjusted for the 
evolution in cigarette consumption,  then the situation would  have been as 
indicated in brackets in the final column. 
Table  9.3.  shows  the uneven effects of inflation on  tax receipts 
from  cigarettes between the Member  States. In its report  on  the  scope 
for convergence  of tax systems in the Community  (l), the Commission 
dre>'T  attention (in paragraphs 84-86)  to the fact that all the Member 
States,  in the period 1973-79,  had allol-ved  some  or all of the1.r excise 
rates to fall,  relative to the general price level.  As  shown  in the table, 
the cigarette exoiae was no exception.  :tt  is sometimes arped that  such erosion 
of the excise base in an  inflationary situation can be countered by 
ensuring the highest possible ad  valorem  component  in the harmonised excise. 
In fact,  this is a  considerable over-statement. By  its very nature,  the mixed 
system must  result  in some  erosion of tro:  receipts if rates are unchanged 
i"''hen  prices increase.  Of  course,  the degree of erosion will be  less,  the 
louer the speicific element  in the tax total  :  nevertheless,  the erosive 
effect Nill always be present  and  l'rill  require regular increases in the 
(1) Builetin,  Supplement  1/80. Tax  receipts:cigarettes and  all manufactured tobacco 
1976 
Total tax receipts 
from  manufactured 
tobacco  incl. VAT 
nat.  currency 
(1) 
B  17131 
DK  4010 
D  11.118 
F  7538 
GR  N.A. 
IRL1)  97,538 
IT  1424698 
LUX  1,131 
NL  1.642 
UK  2.040 
- ---------- ~--- ---- ~--------
!  Commission  estimate 
1)  exc1. VAT 
Tax  receipts 
from  cigarettes 
incl.  VAT 
in nat.  in  ."/o 
currency  of.  (1) 
(2)  (3) 
15639  91,3 
3470  86,5 
10.784  97 ,o 
6679  88,6 
N.A. 
.:!::  89,7  92,0 
1381957  97,0 
1086  96,0 
1300  79,2 
!1795  88,0 
---------- ·- - L___  ___ --~-
1980  ' 
Total tax receipts  Tax  receipts 
from  manufactured  from  cigarettes 
tobacco  incl.  VAT  incl. VAT 
nat.  currency 
in nat.  in-~ 
mio  currency  of (1) 
(4)  (5)  (6) 
22.286  20.505  92,0 
5682  5044  88,8 
13605  13125  96,5· 
12102  11117  91,9 
15399  15281  99,2 
147,6  137,1  92,9 
2579511  2502126  97,0 
2109  2056  97,5 
2366  1940  82,0 
2934  2640  90,0 
------ ------L__ ____ -~·  ----- --
Consumer 
price 
index 
1976  1980 
(7)  (8) 
109  136 
109  164 
104  122 
110  165 
113  213 
118  193 
117  213 
110  134 
109  135 
117  196 
TABLE  9.3. 
Tax  receipts on 
cigarettes 1980 
deflated by  ( 7) 
(8) in  ~ of (2) 
and  in brackets 
regulated for 
consumption 
105  ( 
97  ( 
104  ( 
111  ( 
-
93  ( 
99  ( 
155  ( 
120  ( 
88  ( 
123  ) 
108  ) 
105  ) 
105  ) 
- ) 
83  ) 
33  ) 
118  ) 
97  ) 
-.::J 
0 
. - 71-
tax rate,  proportionate to price  increases,  if the tax yield is to be 
maintained over time.  If maintenance of' tax yield is the prime  consideration, 
the appropriate solution,  in the Commission's  view,  lies in some  form 
of indexation of the tax rate. 
9.3,  Present tax structure 
9.3.1.  The  total tax on  cigarettes consists of three components  : 
a  specific amount  per unit,  a  proportional excise levied on  tax-inclusive 
retail price,  and  VAT.  At  present, Ivlember  States are free to fix each of 
the three components  as they see fit, but are obliged to ensure that at 
least 5 %  and not more  than  55  %  of the total tax is expressed as a  specific 
amount  per cigarette.  The  tax structure applied on  1.8.  81  in all the Member 
States to the most  popular price category of cigarette is shown  in Table 9.4, 
broken down  into the three tax elements. 
Table 9.4.  also  shows  the part of the retail price going to the 
producer and distributor.  The  table sho'l'rs  that the relationship between the 
production and distribution share of the non-tax portion of retail price 
tends to vary 'l'ri. th the tax incidence.  vJhere  the total tax incidence is about 
70  %  of retail price,  the non-tax portion is broken down  into roughly 
tt-10-thirds  (about  20  %  of retail price) for producers and  on-third 
(about  10  %  of retail price) for  distri~utors. vfuere  tax incidence is 
substantially above  70  %,  the distribution share rises as a  proportion of 
the non-tax portion.  (In Denmark,  the extreme  case,  with  a  tax incidence of 
about  86  %)  the split between production and distribution is roughly equal). 
vJhere  tax incidence is substantially below 70  %,  the distribution. share falls. 
In Greece,  at the bottom extreme,  the distribution share is less than one 
quarter of the non-tax portion, Table 9.4. 
"Popular" cigarettes (20)  1  Price and tax structure  1  Situation at 1.8.1981 
Kember  Retail selling 
State  price  Excise duty 
in  in EUA  fWo• 
Ad. val 
national  00  (  ~ of' 
currency  cigs.)  retail 
in nat.  price 
currency 
(ECU  at MondS¥ 
3.8.1981) 
BElGIUM 
(AA  .lAAl')  38  0,861  68  62,42 
LUXEMBOURG 
(44,1441)  27,20  o,616  53  57,55 
liE'l'BERLAliDS 
(2  8oo:L1)  . 2,60  0,929  9,45  50,72 
~11)  3,40  0,568  6,19  43,56 
~.B. GT  2,52346  (~7  -~~~ce  1,132  41,00  30,10 
I'l'ALY  700  0,560  518  56,20  (1250,39) 
~8)  17,10  2,154  410,00  21,68 
u.x. * 
(o.5s3070)  0,95  1,718  19,03  21,00 
IBELAHD  0,89  1,287  16,80  22,10  (0,691718) 
OBEECE 
('61.6072)  27,00  0,438.  82,08  50,16 
*at 7.9.1981  z Commission  estimate 
Sou~ce: Member  States 
\ 
TAX  PORTION 
Total  VAT 
Excise 
duty 
%  '/. 
66,00  5,66 
61,45  2,00 
57,99  14,7 
47,20  25,6 
58,80  11,50 
57,68  15,25 
69,63  18,0 
61,06  13,04 
59,78  9,1 
56,24  -
TAX  TO'l'AL  Spec. 
comp~ 
nent 
of exc. 
duty as 
%or 
~  EUA  tot.tax 
71,66  0,617  4.99 
63,45  0,391  6,14 
72,69  o,675  10,00 
72,80  0,414  5,00 
70,30  0,796  40,82 
72,93  0,408  2,03 
87,67  1,888  54,70 
74,10  1,273  54,06 
68,88  0,886  54,81 
56,24  0,246  10,81 
NON-TAX  PORTION 
TOTAL  Share 
accounted 
for by 
manu-
facturer 
~  EUA  ~  EUA 
28.34  0,244  18,89  0,163 
36,5'  0,225  25,95  0,160 
27,31  0,254  17,31  .:!;0,161 
27 ,2(  0,154  19,20  0,109 
29,7C  ; 0,336  19,75  0,224 
"7 ,07  0,152  19,07  0,107 
12,3  0,26l  6,1~  0,13~ 
25,9<  0,44"  17,31  0,298 
31,1<  0,401  ~  22,1< ~,285 
43, 7l  0,192  33,76  0,148 
Share 
accounted for 
by distribution 
(wholesale + 
retail) 
" 
9.45 
10,60 
:!:,10,00 
8,00 
9,95 
8,oo 
6,19 
8,54 
.:! 9,00 
10 
BOA 
0 081 
0,065 
.! 0,093 
0,045 
0,112 
0,045 
0,134 
0,147 
z o,116 
0,044 
-.J 
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10,  :pRICE  RANGES  Alill  !l'lARKNr  STRUCTURES  .. 
10.1.1.  The  price range for cigarettes is determined by: a  number  of 
factors - such as the relative and absolute price differences in 
ex-factory prices,  the tax structure  ( ··  hi@l  or low  specific component  as 
a  proportion of total tax)  and the tax incidence. 
10,1.2.  Table 10.1.  shows  in national currency three price ·categories 
- cheapest,  most  popular and most  expensive-for each Member  State. 
Column  (4),  which  shmvs  the most  expensive price category as a  percentage 
of the cheapest  category, is intended as an  index of the price ranges.  Only 
price categories l·lhich  represent  more  than 1 %  of the market have been 
taJcen  into account  in prepari.ng this column..  The  figil.res clearly show  the 
\vide  variation bet\·Teen  Member  States;  Ireland and Italy are at the  tlvO 
extremes,  the most  expensive cigarette costing respectively 10 %  and  500  % 
more  than the cheapest. It is striking that the price range  indez is 
in general  lower for the high-specific countries  (DK,  UK,  IRL  and  D)  than 
for the high-ad  valorem countries  (the rest). 
10.1. 3.  Column  5 shows  the total multiplier (see Annex  II) for each  of 
the Member  States.  The  correlation between the_total multiplier and  the 
price range  index is shown  in Graph  10.1. Italy and  Greece  apart,  there is 
a  significant correlation between the two  variables.  (The  correlation 
coefficient is 0,77 if Italy and  Greece are excluded from  the calculation 
and 0,55 if they are included.)  The  graph also indicates the existence 
of two  broad groups.  One  group  manifests narrow price ranges and  small 
multipliers,  and  the other,  much  wider price ranges and  considerably 
higher multipliers. - 74-
TABLE  .  10 .1. 
Price range for cigarettes 
:Member  Price categories1J in national currenqy  Highest  price  Total 
State  (3)  in  ~ of  multiplier 
Lowest  :M~st popular  Highest  lowest price 
(1) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4}  (5} 
B  38  38  50  132  4,45 
DK  16,90  17,10  20,90  124  1,85 
D  2,75  2,85  3,20  116  2,06 
F  3,40  3,40  5,70  168  4,32  -
GR  19  27  37  195  2,51 
IRL  o,83  o,89  0,91  110  +1,69  -
IT  200  700  1200  600  4,87 
LUX  25,60  27,20  39  155  3,35 
NL  2,28  2,60  .3,25  143  4,07 
UK  0,90  0,95  1,10  122  1,74 
~ Commission estimate 
1}  Price categories with a  market  Share less than l%  are 'not taken into account. j. 
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10.1.4.  Also  shown  on  Graph  10.1.  is a  regression line for all the 
Member  States except Italy and  Greece.  The  regression line offers  some 
indication of the likely area of encounter between the two  groups, 
in terms of the total multiplier and price range  index. It can be seen 
that this area lies around  a  total multiplier of 3  and  a  price range 
index of about  135. 
10.1.5.  This picture of the price ranges in the Member  States ignores 
both the relative market  shares of particular price categories within each 
price range,  and  the position of the most  popular price  cat~gory, relative 
to the two  extremes  of the price range.  This  information is set out  in 
Graph  10.2 and  10.3. 
10.1.6.  Graph  10.2.  shows,  in ECU,  the price range  in each Member 
State with an  indication  (x)  of where  the most  popular price category is 
placed within this price range.  The  Member  States are  shown  in ascending 
order from  the lowest  absolute price category.  The  graph  provides an overall 
picture, both of the price ranges within the Community  and  of the relative 
prices of cigarettes sold on  different markets.  For example,  the cheapest 
cigarette in Denmark  costs about  four times the most  expensive cigarette in 
Greece. 
10.1.  7•  The  market  shares and  distribution of individual price categories 
are set out  in Graph  10.3.  With  the exception  of Italy, all th8 Member 
States show  a  tendency for the greater part of the market  to be claimed, 
either by the most  popular price category alone,  or by this category and 
those very close to it in price.  The  effect is most  pronounced  in the 
"high  specific" Member  States (Denmark,  Ireland,  Germany,  and  the United 
Kingdom)  where  almost the whole  market  is found  at,  or close to,  the most -71-
popular price category.  The  effect is in general  considerably less 
pronounced in "high-ad valorem" Member  States,  such as Belgium,  Netherlands, 
Luxembourg,  Greece  and France,  where  not  only the price range overall, 
but also the distribution of different price categories over the price 
range is considerably greater. Italy shows  a  considerable number  of 
distinct price catego:des,  all with a  certain market  share.  (As  regards 
prices charged by the French and Italian state producers,  see also Chapter 6, 
section 6. 2.). 
10.1.8.  In so  far as price range and  substantial market  shares for 
different price categories are a  guide to consumer  choice,  the implication 
of this pattern is that  c~sumer choice is in general  relatively greater 
on  those markets at present  subject to relatively high ad  valorem tax 
structures. Retail p:dces 
in ECU 
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GRAPH  10.2. 
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11.  AN  ALTERNATIVE  APPROACH  TO  HARMONIZING  THE  CIGARETTE  EXCISE 
11.1  The  proposals of the Economic  and Social Committee 
11.1.1  In'1976(l) and 1981(2),  in its opinions on the  Commission  proposals 
for the  second and third stages, proposals for an altemative approach were 
put  forward by the Economic  and  Social Committee.  For ease of reference, 
these proposals are  set  out  in extenso in Annex  I  together with the 
arguments  on  which they are based and the reactions to the proposals of 
the Commission  and of the Economic  and Monetar,y Affairs Committee  of the 
Parliament. 
11.1.2  In essence,  the alternative proposals would  replace the present 
approach to harmonizing the cigarette excise  (which consists of arriving, 
at the final  stage  of harmonizing the excise structure,  at  a.  fixed ratio 
between the specific and ad valorem  components  in the tax total) by an 
approach which  consists of fixing the ad valorem tax components  as  a. 
proportion of retail price. 
11.1.3  The  central difference between the two  approaches is as follows:-
- The  present  approach, whilst harmonizing the ratio between the 
specific and ad valorem elements in total tax,  does not 
harmonize  the tax multiplier(3);  this will continue to var,y, 
with the overall tax incidence in each Member  State,  until.tax, 
rates are fully harmonized. 
(l)OJ C 240  of 30.8.1976,  P•  1 
(2)0J C 138  of 9.6.1981-,- P•  47 
• 
(3)A  detailed explanation of the tax and total multipliers is set  out  in 
Annex II.  This difference between the present  and alternative approaches 
is also examined  later in this chapter,  in Sections 11.5 and i1.6. (6) 
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- The  alternative approach harmonizes the tax multiplier, 
whether or not tax rates are harmonized.  Once  the ad valorem 
elements are harmonized as a  fixed percentage of retail price 
then,  whatever the differences in tax incidence at the time  and 
whatever changes in incidence take place in the future,  the tax 
multiplier will  invariab~ remain the  same.  This is due  to the 
fact  that differences in total tax incidence and future  changes 
in incidence will only be  possible via different  specific elements. 
As  the specific element  is included in retail price and as the 
relationship between retail price and the  ad valorem components 
is a  harmonized constant,  the tax multiplier is also a  harmonized 
constant,  whatever the total tax incidence.  {As  the distribution 
margin,  which is also included in retail price,  varies from  one 
Member  state, and from  one  commercial  situation, to another, the 
total multiplier cannot become  a  harmonized constant, unless the 
distribution margin were  itself to be harmonized.  In the view of 
the Commission,  auoh  harmonizati-on of the diStribution margin is 
neither desirable,  nor permitted by the Treaty). 
11.1.4  The  Commission  has  indicated in its third stage proposals that it 
envisages that the present  approach  should result in a  specific element  of 
the  order of 20% of total tax and an average total multiplier of about  3. 
No  f~  has as yet been proposed by the Economic  and Social Committee  for 
the ad valorem components  as a  percentage  of retail price (although see also 
Section 11.7 below). 
11.1.5  Before commenting  in detail on  the  specific conclusions of the 
various opinions,  it is perhaps useful to consider the  issues raised by the 
two  approaches in rather more  general terms.  (It should be made  clear from 
the  outset that the discussion which  follows is confined to the relative 
merits of the present  and the alternative approach as means  of achieving a 
harmonized mixed .s,ystem,  and does not  seek to consider whether other - 82  -
~stems - such as a  wholly ad valorem or a  wholly  specific - are more,  or 
less,-· desirable  from  the  competition standpoint,  since any  other system has 
been excluded by the adoption of the mixed  system as the basis for 
harmonization). 
11.2  Competition 
11.2.1  Much  of the debate  on  harmonization of the cigarette excise, 
partiouarly in recent years,  has focussed  on  whether the approach followed 
to date,  or the alternative approach,  could be expected to achieve a 
greater degree  of competitive neutrality. 
11.2.2  Five preliminary comments  should be  made  on  the  oompetition issue. 
First, no  tax achieves competitive neutrality: whatever s,ystem  or structure 
is chosen for the taxation of a  categor,y  of substitutable goods,  the mere 
imposition of the tax inevitably alters in some  degree the preferences of 
consumers  from  those which existed in the non-tax situation.  Consequently, 
the  structure of any given tax will,  in strictness,  favour certain goods 
within a  taxed categor,y relative to others in that  categor,y (e.g. a 
specific excise tending to favour expensive products relative to .cheap,  or 
an ad valorem excise tending to favour  cheap products relative to dear). 
The  direction and degree  of bias in a  given tax structure is not  a 
theoretical but  a  political choice,  reflecting collective social and 
economic priorities. 
11.2.3  Secondly,  by  far the greatest contribution made  by  tax harmonization 
(both of structure and rates) in reducing distortions of competition (see 
Annex  V)  is that made  by  the establishment  of a  single tax structure.  This 
is not to  s~ that  any tax structure will be as neutral  in its effects as 
any  other:  nevertheless,  the  competitive neutrality offered by any  one 
harmonized tax structure relative to any  other is marginal,  by comparison 
to the neutrality offered by the establishment  of either one  as the basis of 
a  single harmonized  system. - 83-
11.2.4  Thirdly,  as regards the  choice  of tax structure to apply,  it should 
be  remembered  that cigarettes are probably one  of the most  homogeneous  pro-
ducts in international trade and the  scope  for free-of-tax price competition 
is therefore relatively limited.  In the typical case,  70~ of the retail 
price of a  cigarette is accounted for by tax and roughly  10~  by  t~e 
distribution margin.  T.ypical  production costs are therefore  20~ or less 
of retail price(l).  There are of course variations in the price of raw 
tobacco,  cigarette paper,  filters,  packaging etc.,  and there are  in addition 
variations in the relative efficiency of production plant and  in labour 
costs.  Nevertheless,  differences in the ex-factor.y costs of cigarettes 
produced in the  Community  rarely exceed a  factor of 1 to 2.  These 
differences between the production costs of cigarettes are ver,y  small, 
relative to differences between the production costs of other heavi~ taxed 
consumer  goods,  such as,  for example,  spirits. 
11.2.5  In the case of spirits, the  production costs of a  quality cognac 
are up to 10 times those  of grain whiksy.  There are,  in addition, 
considerable variations in production costs even between different brands 
and varieties of the  same  drink - for example,  between brandy and  cognac, 
between cognacs  of different quality,  and between blended and malt 
whiskies.  These  differences in production costs reflect,  not merely 
differences in packaging or in the brand image  of the product,  but 
substantial differences in the raw  materials used (ranging,  for example, 
from  potatoes to maize  and to grapes),  in the methods  of production 
(ranging from  continuous, virtually industrial  processes to traditional, 
labour-intensive  methods  involving the production of small quantities at 
a  time)  and  from  substantial differences in the ageing to which the 
products have  been subjected.  Consequently,  the application of a  wholly 
(l)Untypically low  ex-factor,y prices have  been notified to the  Commission 
in respect  of cigarettes produced in France  and Italy.  The  prices are 
under examination by the  Commission  from  the  standpoint  of Article  37 
of the Treaty (see paragraphs6.2.5 - 6.2.7). - 84  -
specific excise to spirits (as proposed by the Commission  in April 1972(l)), 
although tending to favour the more  expensive product,  nevertheless results 
in a  wide  range  of retail prices,  thus ensuring  v~orous price competition. 
11.2.6  By  contrast,  the relatively narrow range  of production costs of 
cigarettes, if similarly subject to a  wholly  specific tax at the high tax 
rates generally prevailing,  would result  in a  ver,y  narrow retail price 
range.  Moreover,  producers would have  only limited incentives to compete 
via price, as reductions in production costs would have  only a  marginal 
effect  on  consumer  choice between one  retail price and another.  Consequently, 
the application of a  tax with a  significant multiplier effect is desirable 
so that  a  satisfactor,y range of retail prices m~  be possible. 
11.2.7  It is not  therefore surprising that there has throughout been 
agreement  on  the priciple that the cigarette excise  should be based on  a 
mixed  specific/ad valorem  structure.  This principle has been confirmed by 
the Member  States on  the occasion of both enlargements of the  Community. 
Moreover,  it has been endorsed by both the Economic  and Social Committee 
and the Parliament  in all their opinions to date  on  tobacco excise 
harmonization.  This principle is not therefore  in dispute. 
11.2.8  Fourthly,  whether the present  or the alternative approach  is 
followed,  the specific amount  and ad valorem percentage have to apply to 
all price categories.  The  relative  incidence of the  combined  specific and 
proportional elements will thus be different for each price categor,y 
within the price range.  This is due  to the specific element.  Moreover, 
the absolute tax amount  falling on  each price categor,y will also be 
different.  This is due  to the ad valorem tax. 
11.2.9  Consequently,  the inevitable effect  of any mixed  ex~ise structure, 
whatever the proportion of ad valorem and  specific components,  whether 
(1)  OJ  No.  C 43  of 29.4.1972,  P•  23. - 85  -
the  structure is based on  fixing the ratio of specific to ad valorem  (as at 
present) or of fixing the ad valorem components  as a  percentage  of retail 
price  (as suggested by the Economic  and  Social Committee)  is to benefit  one 
price categor,y of cigarettes at the expense  of another. 
11.2.10  Fifthly, as is shown  in Annex  V,  the effect of the mixed  system  in 
favotiring  certain price categories relative to others is unaffected by 
harmonization of tax rates.  Of  course,  if harmonized tax rates were  to 
app~, then the  incidence of the mixed  system on  a  given  price categor.y 
would  be uniform throughout the  Community.  But  this would mean  no  more 
than the uniform application,  throughout the  Community,  of the effect of 
the mixed excise in favouring certain price categories relative to others. 
11.3  Market  stability 
11.3.1  Onecriticism levelled at the present  approach,  by those who  support 
a  high specific element,  is that at existing. tax rat'es,  a  relatively high 
ad valorem  component  (as is implied by a  specific element  at the final 
stage of about  20 '%)  must  inevitably destabilise the market. 
11.3.2  The  argument  runs that a  total multiplier in excess of  (a~) 2 
offers powerful  incentives to manufacturers to cut prices, because the 
greater part of the retail price cut falls on  the tax authorities,  rather 
than on  the producer.  Price cuts of this kind,  it is argued,  will then be 
matched by other producers,  resulting in a  generally lower price level. 
Unless the fall in prices were  matched by an equal  increase  in demand,  tax 
revenues would. decline  and Government  would be  obliged to increase the tax 
rate.  This would  in turn increase the multiplier,  and thus increase the 
incentive to competitive price cutting,  leading to a  downwards  spiral in 
prices and tax revenues.  Alternatively,  the decline,  or potential decline, 
in tax revenues,  would tend to encourage Government  to concert  price control 
measures with the  industr,y. - 86-
11.3.3  It is argued that ~  such effect  could be  avoided,  were  the  ad 
valorem tax elements,  as a  proportion of total tax,  equal to the price 
elasticity of demand  for cigarettes.  (In that event,  tax revenue would be 
relatively insensitive to changes in prices}.  It is moreover  suggested 
that  such evidence  as there is on  the price elasticity of demand  indicates 
figures of the order of minus  0.5  or less (that is,  for every 1  ~ change  in 
price,demand changes by 0.5 %).  If the price elasticity were  taken to be 
minus  0.5,  then the matching ad valorem rate,  for a  tax incidence of 10%, 
would be 0.5  x  7Q%  = 35  %.  Such  an ad valorem rate gives rise to a  tax 
multiplier of about  1.5,  and  a  total multiplier,  assuming  a  retail margin 
of 10% of retail price,  of about  1.8. 
The  Commission wishes first to make  clear that it ful~ accepts the 
effect of a  predominantly ad valorem  system  in encouraging producers to 
reduce  ex-tax prices to a  minimum  (whether by  reducing production costs, 
distribution costs,  publicity,  or profit margins)  in order to obtain an 
enhanced  competitive  advantage,  via the multiplier effect of the tax,  at 
the retail stage.  This effect is common  to all ad valorem taxes,  and  is 
indeed  one  of their attractions,  in that it encourages both increased 
efficiency and  competition,  with the  added benefit  of generally lower 
prices to consumers. 
Secondly,  it should be noted that multipliem of up to  2  are 
accepted by all the  cigarette producers;  the state producers  support  the 
highest  possible multiplier and the private sector producers accept  a 
total multiplier of 2  or thereabout  (equal to a  tax multiplier of about 
1.8 - see Annex  II). 
11.3.6  Thirdly,  in proposing a  mixed  system as the basic principle of the 
first directive adopted  in 1972,  the  Commission nevertheless accepted that, 
given the generally high rates of cigarette excises,  it was  desirable to 
avoid excessively high multiplier effects.  In judging the effects of 
individual multiplier figures,  it is necessar.y to compare  such figures - 87  -
with the multipliers applying in the Member  States.  At  present, the tax 
multiplier figure for the Member  States ranges between 1.7  in Ireland to 
4.9  in Italy (which is in fact  in breach of the harmonization directives). 
The  present  approach being followed by the  Commission  implies at  the final 
stage,  on  the assumption  of a  tax incidence of about  70~ of retail price, 
a  total multiplier of about  3,  which of course  implies  considerable 
reductions in the multiplier in the majority of Member  States. 
11.3.7  In essence, therefore,  the destabilisation argument  rests on  the 
contention that whereas a  total multiplier of 2 will give rise to healthy 
price competition,  a  ·total  multiplier  of 
the  order of 3 will so  intensify this competition that the market  and tax 
revenue  can only be  stabilised by imposing artificial constraints on 
competition in order for the cigarette industry to remain viable.  The  fact 
that downwards  price and  revenue  spirals are not a  feature  of the market  in 
those Member  States where  total multipliers greatly in excess of 3  currently 
apply,  suggests that  such  a  phenomena  is more  theoretical than real (see 
also the following  section). 
11.3.8  The  linking of the tax structure to the price elasticity of demand 
for cigarettes raises a  number  of oonsiderations.  Price elasticities are 
notoriously difficult to estimate,  the major difficulty being to isolate the 
effects of changes  in price from  other factors,  such as  changes  in other 
prices and  changes  in disposable  incomes.  The  problem  is especially difficult 
for cigarettes, where  anti-smoking campaigns are a  further complicating 
factor,  the effects of which are not  easily quantified.  And  it goes without 
s~ing that no  such factor has been established,  or can be established,  for 
the  Community  as a  whole. 
11.3.9  Even  the results of different  studies for  a  single market(!) have 
indicated a  wide  range  of elasticity estimates,  varying with time  and with 
(l)See Metra Consulting Report,  October 1979,  on  cigarette advertising in 
the United Kingdom,  page 4.  (Metra themselves  endorsed a  figure for the · 
United Kingdom  of -0.42 to -0.52). - 88  -
the  study,  from  virtual~ zero to unity.  This range  of demand  price 
elasticity could as well be used to justify either a  100% ad valorem tax 
(demand elasticity of unity) or a  wholly specific tax (zero demand  elasticity) 
as a  means  of ensuring stable tax revenues. 
11.3.10  Moreover,  it must  be pointed out  that the  likelihood of demand  price 
elasticities,  even if precisely measurable,  proving to be  the  same  in all 
Member  States and remaining so  over time,  is so remote  as to be discounted. 
Consequent~, even if it were  accepted that the harmonized  s,ystem  should seek 
to secure  revenue  stability, there is no  satisfactor,y means  whereby the 
appropriate harmonized ad valorem rate could be  determined,  nor  indeed 
could any  single rate guarantee  such stability, whether in all Member 
States,  or over time.  In any  case,  it should be pointed  out  that tax 
revenues are also subject  to income  elasticity. 
11.3.11  Final~, it is of interest to apply the stability argument  to the 
present  approach,  current~ leading towards an ad valorem element  of 80 % 
of total tax,  giving rise, with a  tax incidence of 7Q%,  to a  total multiplier 
of about  3 at the final  stage.  Thus,  applying the  same  arguments,  the 
present  approach would also give rise to revenue  stability in response to 
price changes,  if the price elasticity of demand  were  to be,  not -0.5, but 
-o.B.  This latter figure is well within the range  of possible demand  price 
elasticities for cigarettes.  The  evidence  is therefore  insufficient for it 
to be  concluded that the present  approach must  result  in revenue 
instability. 
Restrictive practices 
other criticisms of the present  approach go  further,  and argue 
that  large-scale competitive price-cutting,  resulting in the downwards 
spiral,  does not  take  place  on  those markets where  high multipliers at 
present  apply,  only because  of a  variety of fiscal measures  intended to 
restrict competition,  or of competitive restrictions exercised by the 
producers themselves. - 89-
11.4.2  In this context,  particular reference has been made  to the Court 
ruling of 29  October 1980,  in cases 209-215/78 and  217-218/78.  In giving 
its decision on  these cases,  the  Court,  in findings 127  to 130(l), held 
that.a combination of factors,  including fiscal measures,  rendered price 
competition virtually non-existent  on  the Belgian market.  This observation 
by the Court has been quoted as  evidence  of the distorting effects of a 
predominantly ad valorem tax structure for cigarettes. 
11.4.3  As  regards the fiscal measures,  the Court  drew  attention to two 
tax provisions:  the high ad valorem  system  and the minimum  excise amount 
applied by Belgium.  Both these measures are  in conformity with the 
harmonization directive(2),  although both are at the maximum  authorised; 
the ad valorem element being 95  1o  of total tax and the minimum  excise being 
90 % of the tax levied on  the most  popular price categor,y.  In fact,  it 
would be permissible to have  an ad valorem  element  of 4~  of the total tax 
and no  minimum  excise at all.  Consequently,  neither of these measures,  nor 
this combination of measures,  is an obligation under the present directives. 
The  Court  explicitly recognised the essentially ad valorem  ~stem as working 
in favour  of the  consumer.  As  regard~ the minimum  excise,  however,  the 
Court  noted that this was  fixed at  such a  level as to limit the effects on 
retail price which would  otherwise  flow,  b,y  virtue of the essentially ad 
valorem system,  from  changes  in the prices of the lower-priced products. 
11.4.4  However,  the essential point to note is that, were the Commission's 
third-stage proposals to be  adopted by the  Council,  the ceiling for the 
minimum  excise would be  reduced,  from  90% to 80% of the tax falling on  the 
(l)see Annex  VI 
(2)The  minimum  excise,  authorised as a  faculty by Article 10(b)(5)  of 
Directive 77/805/EEC,  is intended as a  safeguard against too great a 
fall in tax revenue  as a  consequence  of the  sale of unusually cheap 
cigarettes. - 90  -
most  popular price class(l).  Moreover,  the present  upper limit for the ad 
valorem element would also be  reduced,  from  95  fo  to 90 '/o  of total tax. 
Subsequently,  in further stages,  the Commission  envisages a  final objective 
of an ad valorem element  of 80 1o  of total tax,  and whether a  minimum 
excise would be necessar,y at the final  stage remains to be  seen. 
11.4.5  To  illustrate this point,  the total multiplier (i.e. tax and 
retail margin)  in Belgium is currently 4.4.  Were  the tax system wholly ad 
valorem - as was  the  case before harmonization began - the multiplier would 
be 5.2. By  contrast,  the  Commission's third stage proposals would  reduce 
this figure to 3.8 and the final  objective of a  20  .tj,  specific/So% ad 
valorem would further reduce this figure to 3.0. 
11.4.6  As  regards the minimum  excise,  the third stage proposals,  as has 
been said, would  reduce the  ceiling from  90~ to 80 '/o  of the tax on  the 
most  popular categor,y,  and this could well be  reduced further,or abolished, 
at the final  stage.  Comparable  changes would  also come  about  in the  other 
Member  States which  originally applied wholly ad valorem taxes and high 
minimum  excises.  It follows that the effects of harmonization policies have 
alrea~ been to reduce the highest  ad valorem  components  (and the highest 
multiplie~ and the minimum  specific excises,  and would in the future  reduce 
them  ver,y  much  further.  In fact,  therefore,  the tax harmonization process 
can be  seen to be  moving  in the direction (as sought  by  private sector 
producers) of reducing· the multiplier effects of the previously wholly  ad 
valorem  systems.  It is of course at the  same  time  inducing modest  multiplier 
effects in those  systems which were  previously wholly specific. 
As  regards the other measures referred to by the  Court,  the 
Commission would  point  out  that 
(!)Notwithstanding the  implied criticism of too high a  minimum  excise in 
the cases in question,  both the opinion of the Economic  and Social 
Committee  (paragraph 22  of CES  242/81)  and the draft resolution of the 
Economic  and Monetar,y  Affairs Committee  of the Parliament  (point 8  of 
PE  66.992) have  rejected as premature the  Commission's proposal to 
reduce the minimum  excise .during the third stage. - 91  -
it remains to be  demonstrated that these measures are  an 
inevitable result of the tax regime; 
the particular combination of tax provisions at present  in force 
in Belgium is not,  as has been  said,  imposed by the harmonization 
directives. 
llo4.8  Furthermore,  as has been said,  the present  approach to harmonization, 
if continued, will substantially reduce both the  ceiling for the ad valorem 
element  and for any  minimum  excise~  · 
11.5  Approach  of the Economic  and Social  Committee  :  Commission  comments 
llo5.1  The  preliminary comments  above  are necessary in order to provide a 
context within which  comments  can be  made  on  the arguments advanced  in 
Annex  I  in favour  of the alternative approach.  It is in the  Commission's 
view desirable that detailed comments  be made  on  each of these arguments, 
the essential elements of which appear below,  notwithstanding the  fact  that 
this involves  some  repetition of earlier parts of this chapter and of 
Annex  V. 
(i)  "Because  of the multiplier effect,  the conditions of competition 
induced by the taxation s.ystems  are  ••••• determined by the rates of 
proportional taxation on retail  pric~s and not by the ratio relation-
ship between the  specific and proportional taxation".  (paragraph 3.3.3 
of  CES  691/76). 
"At  •• •• very high levels of tax,  the rate of ad  valorem taxation has 
a  greater influence  on  the  conditions of competition than aqy  other 
element  in the fiscal  structure".  "Since the objective is to 
eliminate  ••• distortions or restrictions on  competition,  it is 
desirable to move  towards harmonizing the element  6f ad valorem 
taxation  •••  "  (paragraphs  13  and  14  of CES  242/81). - 92-
Commission  comment  on  (i)  : 
11.5.2  The  implication of the  reference to distortion or restrictions on 
competition is that tax harmonization is aimed  at the  removal of!!! 
distortions and restrictions - that is,  at  some  concept  of  strict~ neutral 
competition.  As  has been stated earlier in this chapter, this is not  so, 
and  cannot  be  so.  In particular,  it has been  shown  that a  mixed  excise 
structure (whatever its precise form)  invariably favours  certain price 
categories relative to others.  Harmonization of the  ad valorem elements 
as a  percentage of price, which will in turn harmonize  the tax multiplier, 
will merely ensure the general application of this effect, but will in no 
w~  modify  it 1  or make  it more  neutral between one  price categor.y and 
another. 
(ii)  "  ••• 
X  X  X 
significant differences exist between Member  States in the 
incidence  of the total taxation burden on  cigarettes.  The  achievement 
of a  fixed relationship between the  specific duty and proportional 
taxes on  the most  popular price class ••• would  •••  only go  some  w~ 
towards  •••  uniform  conditions of competition within the Community. 
This would be  achieved only when  a  subsequent  harmonization  •••  of 
the rates of taxation on  cigarettes would also have  been completed 
(paragraph 3.3.3 of CES  691/76). 
"  ••• 
To  "fix the  incidence (i.e. the rates) of proportional taxation on 
maximum  retail prices ••• would  ensure the earlier realisation of 
uniform conditions of competition in the  Community  as a  unified 
market"  (paragraphs 3.3.3 and  3.3.4 of CES  691/75 ). 
Commission  comment  on  (ii) 
11.5.3  What  is meant  ~y "uniform conditions of competition with the 
Community"  is not defined.  The  Commission  presumes that the term is - 93-
equated with the  establishment  of a  harmonized tax multiplier,  since this is 
the essential difference between the present  and alternative approaches. 
11.5.4  A harmonized multiplier would  indeed result  in more  or less uniform 
competitive conditions.  As  pointed out  in the  comments  under (i) above, 
h~rever, it should not be  assumed  that uniform competitive conditions will 
also be neutral. 
11.5.5  The  effects of the mixed  excise tnfavouring certain price categories 
relative to others  alw~s remain,  whether the present  approach  or the 
alternative approach is followed.  The  alternative approach,  by anticipating 
to  some  degree the harmonization of tax rates, would  move  more  rapidly 
towards uniform  (not neutral) conditions of competition than the present 
approach,  by its partial anticipation of the harmonization of the  excise 
rates.  However,  as pointed out  in Annex  V,  the  improvement  of competitive 
neutrality offered by rates harmonization (over and  above  that 'offered by a 
harmonized  structure) is uncertain and probably marginal.  Consequently,  arJY 
competitive advantage  offered by the alternative approach is, at best, 
limited.  Moreover,  even with the alternative approach,  absolute differences 
in tax rates will  remain,  because the specific elements will vary until such 
time  as tax rates are harmonized. 
11.5.6  The  advantage  offered by the alternative approach and its 
harmonized multiplier is not  therefore that  competitive conditions will be 
significantly more  or less neutral than under the present  approach but that·, 
whatever the tax rates in the  individual Member  States,  the extent to which 
differences in ex-factory prices will be  enlarged at the retail stage will 
become  a  constant.  Under  the present  approach,  because the multiplier will 
vary with the tax rate,  a  harmonized multiplier will not  emerge  until tax 
rates are themselves harmonized.  By  contrast,  the alternative approach will 
fix,  from  the outset and  once  and  for all, the degree  of bias in the 
harmonized  system for or against certain price categories. - 94  -
The  attraction,  relative to the present  approach,  is therefore of offering 
certainty to cigarette producers for the future,  irrespective of present 
differences in tax rates,  or of future  changes. 
X  X  X 
(iii) ''Member  States would remain free to fix their own  rates of specific 
excise duty  ••• at whatever level they  judged necessar,y to meet  their 
national fiscal needs.  (paragraph 15  of CES  242/81)." 
Commission  comment  on  {iii) 
11.5.7  It is of course true that harmonisation of the ad valorem  components 
alone would  leave Member  States free  (at least Until the time  of harmoniza-
tion of tax rates) to fix the  specific element  as they chose.  This is self-
evident.  However,  from  the  standpoint  of the Member  States, this offers no 
greater revenue flexibility than the present  approach,  which is focussed 
solely on  harmonizing the ratio of the  components  in the. tax rate~  th~s 
leaving Member  States completely free to adjust the overall tax level as 
they please. 
X  X  X 
{iv)  "this approach  •••  seems  likely to provide a  more  flexible  approach in 
the  conditions of an enlarged Community". 
Commission  comment  on  (iv) 
11.5.8  Whether the alternative approach would  prove more  flexible than the 
present approach,  and whether or not  in relation to an enlarged Community, 
is open  to doubt.  The  maximum  ad valorem tax,  expressed as a  proportion of 
retail price,  is limited by the  lowest  tax incidence  amongst  the Member 
States.  In Greece,  the  incidence  is at present  about  56%  (and in Spain and 
Portugal it is even  lower).  Consequently,  the  range  of choice  in fixing the 
final  objective is already limited by the nature of the alternative approach. - 95  -
11.5.9.  In any  case,  so far as Greece  is concerned,  and as has already been 
pointed out  (see paragraph  4.7.4~) Greece  on  accession immediately  introduced 
a  specific element which  exceeds that which would  be required under the 
Commission's third stage proposals.  As  regards Spain,  the present  final 
stage objective  implies  a  total multiplier of 3.  This  in turn implies a 
minimum  ad valorem tax rate of about  56~.  Consequently,  if the alternative 
approach of harmonizing the  ad valorem rate were  followed,  the implication 
would be either that  Spain would have to  increase tax incidence from  its 
present  level of about  52  ~ at most  (levied on  imported blond cigarettes) to 
at least 56'%,  or - if that result were  to be  avoided - that a  multiplier 
lower than 3 would have  to apply in all Member  States. 
11.5.10.  As  regards the present Member  States,  attached at Annex  VII is a 
table,  showing  the  implied changes  in prices in moving  from  the present 
situation to 
a)  a  third stage  (whether expressed as a  specif~c element  of 
10 - 35%  of total tax,  as at present,  or as its equivalent, 
under the alternative approach,  of an  ad  valorem rate of 44 %  -
66%  of retail price); 
b) a  final  stage  (whether expressed as a  specific element  of 20%, 
as at present,  or as its equivalent,  under the alternative 
approach,  of an ad valorem rate of 56%  of retail price); 
c) a  final  stage expressed as an  ad valorem rate of 40% of 
retail price (this latter being the figure  supported by 
private sector producers,  and  equivalent to a  specific element 
of about 44 %  of total tax). 
11.5.11.  The  table  shows  that moving  from  the  present  situation to a), b) 
or c) has much  the  same  effect on  prices in each  of the Member  States, 
whether the present or the alternative approach is followed •. The  degree 
of adaptation for the Member  States is broadly the  same,  whichever approach - 96  -
is followed.  Consequently,  so far as flexibility is concerned,  the  two 
approaches do  not  significantly differ. 
11.5.12.  Further comments  on  the  implications of a  move  to c) - a  final 
stage  of a  40% ad valorem rate - are given in section 11.7 below. 
X  X  X 
(v)  "Experienoe has  shown  that  a  low  multiplier permits healthy price 
competition"  (Economic  and Monetar,y  Affairs Committee  6f the Parliament, 
paragraph 14,  PE  66.992/Fin). 
Commission  comment  on  (v) 
11.5.13.  This viewpoint  has alrea4y been discussed in the earlier comments 
(see  in particular paragraphs 11.2.4. - 11.2.6.)  ~d  those  on  market 
stability (see  Section 11.3.). 
X  X  X 
The  Commission  has the further additional comments  to make  on  the two 
approaches. 
11.6.  Effects on  the  two  approaches of harmonization of tax rates 
11.6.1  The  abolition of fiscal frontiers will ultimately require 
harmonization of the excise rates,  either at  common  levels,  or within 
narrow  ranges.  Consequently,  the effect  on  the cigarette excise will then 
be that the  specific element will be  fixed at  a  uniform amount,  or at 
amounts  differing only by  small margins.  At  that time,  the  approach based 
on  harmonization of the ad valorem  components  as a  percentage of retail 
price will of necessity revert to the present approach,  in that  ~oth the 
specific and ad valorem  components will each account  for a  fixed proportion 
of the total tax.  This is precisely the final objective of the present 
approach. 
; (7) 
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It is therefore apparent that,  in reality, the 
alternative approach is an  intermediate phase  on  the road towards 
achievement  of the present  approach.  The  difference between the two 
approaches could be  expressed,  either as being that the fixed relationship 
between. the specific and  ad valorem components would be  deferred unil the 
· time  of harmonization of excise rates,  or that the harmonization of the ad 
valorem  component  (which would,  under the  present  approach,  be  deferred 
until the time  of harmonization of rates) will take place at the time  of 
structural harmonization. 
It is thus apparent  that the alternative approach carries the risk 
of drawing  into the discussion on  harmonization of the  excise structure, 
problems which would  not  otherwise be  encountered until attention was 
turned to harmonization of tax rates. 
11.6.4.  The  present  approach  implies a  final objective for the  specific 
element  of 20 fa  of total tax, giving, with a {typical) tax incidence of 70 "'' 
a  total multiplier of about three{l).  Assuming  the total multiplier of three 
is retained,  then the alternative approach would give rise {see Annex  VII) 
to an ad valorem tax rate of 56 %  of retail price. 
11.6.5.  If the alternative approach were  followed,  all Member  States would 
be  obliged to ensure a  tax incidence at least  equal to ·the  5&.%  figure  (see 
paragraph 11.5.8.).  {In fact,  to permit  some  specific element,  the tax 
incidence would  have  to be  rather higher than the  ad valorem percentage). 
As  the  lowest tax incidence (in Greece)  is at present  about this figure,  a 
total multiplier of three  could-just-be reached via the alternative approach, 
without  obliging any  of the Member  States to increase tax incidence  in order 
to conftrm  to harmonization of the tax structure. 
(l)That is - see Annex  II - a  multiplier taking account  of both the tax and 
the distribution margin.  On  this basis,  the average tax multiplier 
would be  about  2.3. - 98  -
11.6.6.  However,  multipYier figures higher than three would certainly 
require  an  increase in tax incidence  in Greece beyond its present  level. 
Moreover,  in the event  of further enlargement  of the Community,  even a 
multiplier of three would require an increase in tax incidence  in new  Member 
States (see paragraph 11.5.9.). 
Consequently,  the alternative approach implies,  either constraints 
on  the minimum  level of tax incidence, ~  constraint  on  the maximum  total 
multiplier.  A need to increase tax incidence  in some  instances could be 
avoided  on~ if the ad valorem component  were  fixed at  a  figure  lower than 
the tax incidence  imposed by  any present  or prospective Member  State.  Such 
an ad valorem percentage - of 50 ~ or less - implies a  multiplier considerably 
below three.  At  this stage  in the process of tax harmonization,  the 
Commission  regards  such constraints as undesirable,  particularly in relation 
to further enlargement  of the  Community. 
Objectives 
11.7.1.  In this context,  it should be  stressed that the Economic  and 
Social Committee  has not itself put  forward a  figure  for the  ad valorem 
components  as a  percentage of retail price.  Consequently,  as it stands, 
the alternative approach  could as well be  directed towards the  same 
multiplier objective as the present  approach.  However,  if the alternative 
approach were  linked to an ad valorem rate of substantially less than 56% 
of retail price - for example,  as proposed by the private sector producers, 
40 ~or less,  equal to· a  total multiplier of 2  or less- then the  two 
approaches would diverge.  But  the  same  result would be  obtained if the 
final  objective of the present  approach were  changed  from  a  specific 
element  of 20  ~ of total tax to a  specific element  of the  order of 44%. 11.7.2. 
..  70 ~:-
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Put  in other words,  and  on  the assumption of a  tax incidence of 
- the present  approach,  ending 
in a  specific element  of  = 
20 'fo  of total tax 
- the alternative approach,  if 
the  ad valorem rate were  = 
fixed at 40 'fo  of retail price 
the alternative approach,  with 
an  ad valorem rate of 5~  of 
retail price; 
the present  approach,  with a 
specific element  of about 
44 %  of total tax.  · 
11.7.3.  It is therefore clear that, were  the alternative approaCh  to be 
applied,  any significant departure  from  an ad valorem rate of 56% would 
involve,  not·mere~ a  change  in the modalities of operating the harmonized 
excise, but also a  radical departure from  the final objective implied by the 
two  stages of harmonization alreaqy adopted by the  Council. 
11.8.  ''Fairness" 
11.8.1.  The  Commission  has  repeated~ stated that the balance to be  struck 
between the specific and  ad valorem components  is essentially a  matter for 
pragmatic negotiation.  The  on~ guideline is still that  set out  in 
Article 4(3) of the first directive (72/464/EEC)  which provides 
11.8.2. 
"the  same  ratio shall be established for cigarettes in all 
Member  States between the proportional excise duty and the 
specific excise duty,  in suCh  a  w~  that the range of retail 
selling prices reflects fairly the difference in the 
manufacturers'  delivery prices". 
By  definition,  there is no  objective means  by which the fairness 
or otherwise of the  s.ystem  can be  measured and the final choice  remains a 
political one.  Nevertheless,  pure~ for illustrative purposes,  Annex  VIII 
sets out  one  possible measure  of the relative "fairness" of differing 
approaches in striking a  balance between the specific and ad valorem 
components  for a  tax incidence  ranging from  50 %  to 90 'fo  of retail price. - 100-
11.8.3.  Graph  2  attached to Annex  VIII has been prepared on  the arbitrar.y 
assumption that "fairness",  in the  sense  of Article 4(3) of the first 
directive, would be  achieved if half of the relative price difference between 
the producer price of the most  popular price categor.y and  those  of a  high-
cost and  low-cost  product  is reflected in retail price.  The  Commission 
stresses that this is a  wholly arbitrary measure  of fairness:  other 
measures - for example, reflection in the retail price of more  than half, 
or less than half of the relative price difference could equally be  regarded 
as fair.  However,  as the graph  shows  both a  wide  range  of tax incidence and 
all the positions between full reflection and no  reflection of relative 
price differences, it has the  advantage  of permitting a  comparison,  on  the 
basis of a  variety of assumptions as to "fairness", between the present 
approach  and the alternative approach put  forward by the Economic  and 
Social Committee. 
The  graph  shows  that  aqy  increase  in existing tax incidence will 
tend to improve  the relative competitive position of high-cost producers, 
whichever of the two  approaches is followed. · However,  the effect in favour 
of high-cost producers. is relatively greater if the alternative approach is 
followed.  This  stems from  the fact that under the present  approach,  both 
the specific and ad valorem  components  change  in response to any given 
change  in tax incidence,  whereas under the alternative approach,  once  the 
ad valorem  component  is fixed as a  peroentage of retail price,  only changes 
in the specific element  are possible. 
11.8.5.  It is not  suggested that this graph is in any w~  decisive for 
determining future  stages.  However,  it is striking that the present 
approach  (assuming a  20% specific at the final state) offers a  "fair" 
solution over a  wider range  of tax incidence than does the alternative 
approach,  whatever the assumed  ad valorem tax rate (in fact,  in the graph, 
40 '/o,  50 '/o  and 60% ad vabrem  tax rates are  shown). - 101  -
Certainty 
11.9.1.  It is acknowledged  in paragraph 11.5.6 that the alternative 
approach has the attraction (not  enjoyed by the present  approach)  of 
permanently  harmonizi~the tax multiplier;  once  structural harmonization 
has been completed,  since the tax multiplier thereby established will be 
unaffected either by  subsequent  changes  in tax incidence  or ~  measures 
to harmonize tax rates. 
The  certainty offered by the alternative approach,  in fixing the 
tax multiplier,  independently of any  further changes in tax rates,  is at 
first  sight attractive.  It has to be  recognised that,  under the present 
approach,  an agreement  on  a  total multiplier of 3 to apply at the final 
stage  of structural harmonization would be  subject to variation on  two 
counts: 
a)  the figure  of 3 would  apply only where  tax incidence was  of 
the  order of 70 %.  Tax  incidence  in most  Member  States in 
fact falls close to that figure,  so  that the variations from 
the  figure  of 3 would  in their.cases be  relatively small. 
But  Greece has a  tax incidence  (56%)  well below  70~, and 
Denmark,  an  incidence  (87  %)  well. above  it.  For these two 
Member  States,  the multipliers implied by  a  20% specific 
would be  - Greece  2.2 
- Denmark  4.2 
Moreover,  as both these Member  States have  currently multipliers 
of 2.5  (Greece)  and 1.8 (Denmark),  the effect of the present 
approach would be  to take Greece  further  aw~ from  the 
objective of about  3,  and  Denmark  first to 3  and then 
considerably beyond it. - 102  -
b) Once  structural harmonization is completed,  it will presumably 
be  desirable to maintain the multiplier broadly at  or in the 
region of 3.  However,  as the multiplier is in fact  a  function 
of tax incidence,  future  changes  in tax incidence will change 
the multiplier.  Given the tendency (see Chapter 9) for tax 
incidence to rise,  and given also the need eventually to 
harmonize tax rates,  it is possible that the average total 
multiplier could be  increased,  either by  individual tax 
increases,  or by harmonization of tax rates. 
As  regards a) 
the  problem  does not arise in relation to the third stage 
proposals.  Greece  has  alrea~ chosen of her  own  accord to 
apply a  specific element  of 11  %,  which  exceeds the 10 % 
proposed.  If Denmark  were to move,  as proposed for the third 
stage,  to a  specific of 35%,  the total multiplier (2.7)  would 
still be short  of 3.  The  special problem presented by Greece 
and Denmark  therefore arises only in relation to subsequent 
stages; 
so  far as Greece  is concerned,  and whether the present or the 
alternative approach is followed,  the problem  remains the  same, 
since it stems,  not  from  the  approach followed,  but  from  Greece's 
relatively low  tax incidence.  Whether the final  stage consists 
of a  2q%  specific,  or an ad valorem tax of 56%  of retail price, 
the total multiplier in Greece  (about  2) will still be 
significantly lower than the present multiplier of 2.5 and even 
farther 811~ from  an average  of 3  • 
the Danish problem  could more  easily be  solved by  a  special 
Danish provision,  rather than by a  general  change  of approach. 
It would  (for example) be possible to provide that,  once  the - 103-
structural harmonization had produced a  multiplier of 3  in 
Denmark,  then that multiplier should be broadly maintained by 
deferring further reductions in the specific element until  such 
time  as tax rates were  harmonized. 
11.9.4.  As  regards b),  the present  approach offers no  solution.  In the 
event of a  general agreement that,  once  the final  stage of structural 
harmonization is reached,  a  total multiplier of about  3  Should be retained, 
notwithstanding future  changes  in tax incidence,  it would be  .. 
possible  to. consider converting from  a  harmonized specific/ad valorem 
ratio to a  fixed ad valorem component  as a  percentage of retail price. 
It might  well be  asked why  the  Commission  could envisage making 
such a  change  once  the final stage of structural harmonization is reached, 
but not before.  The  reasons lie in the disadvantages inherent  in the 
alternative approach which have  alrea~ been mentioned in sections 11.6 and 
11.81  which  seem  likely to make  agreement  on  further stages more,  rather 
than less, difficult. 
11.9.6.  For these reasons,  and given that the alternative approach · 
of'f'ers  no  · advantage  from  the standpoint of competition {see Section 
11.2) the  Commission  considers it undesirable to switch to ~he alternative 
approach prior to achievement  of the final excise structure.  It would not 
at that  stage rule out the possibility of "freezing" the multiplier  thu~ 
achieved,  by then converting the  specific/ad valorem ratio into a 
harmonized ad valorem element.  However,  on th._one hand,  it.would_be 
desirable also _to  examine  other possible  solutions and, 'on  the. other hand, 
whether it would be desirable to do  so at that time would depend upon the 
overall-situation then obtaining- in particular on the differences in tax 
incidence then  a.pp~ing between the Member  States and  on  the agreed period 
of tax credit.  This latter point is discussed in Chapter 12. - 104-
12.  HARMONIZATION  OF  RULES  FOR  COLLEOI'ION  OF  THE  EXCISE 
12.1.  General 
12.1.1.  In all its proposals  for harmonization of the other major 
excises,  (on mineral oils, wine,  beer,  alcohol) the  Commission  has  included 
provision for  a  period of credit before  p~ent of the excise.  The  aim  of 
these provisions is to avoid imposing a  financing cost  on  production and 
distribution. Article 6 of the first directive provides that harmonization 
of the rules of collection of the excise must  be  completed not later than 
the final stage.  Major  elements  of the harmonized excise have  of course 
alre~  been determined and  are no  longer under discussion. 
i) 
ii) 
iii) 
12.1.2. 
systemJ 
a  mixed specific/ad valorem structure (first directive) 
excise to apply to the retail price of the finished 
product  (first directive) 
field of application:  definition of manufactured 
tobaccos  (second directive). 
These  elements  already determine in large measure  the control 
and  the revenue  interest of the Member  States is such that,  although 
formal  provisions to oblige the Member  States to control the excise in 
adequate  fashion should for  good  order be  included,  it m~  nevertheless be 
assumed that effective fiscal  control  can be relied on.  Consequently,  of 
the rules of application still to be formulated,  · · ·  the means  by which 
the tax should be  collected  (whether by a  tax stamp  or in monetary p~ent), 
and the period of credit for  p~ent of the tax are the only ones  likely 
to have  a  significant impact  on  the industry. 
12.2.  Tax  stamps 
12.2.1.  As  regards the means  of collection,  the Commission  is aware  that 
the tax stamp  system can be applied in a  discriminatory fashion.  However, -· 
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the Treaty offers  adequate provision for Article 169  action by the 
Commission in such cases.  The  Commission  is also aware  that the tax:  stamps 
system,  even when  applied in a  non-discriminatory w~, is inherently 
inflexible,  both from  the standpoint of intra-Community trade  (in that it 
makes  the switching of cigarettes from  one  market  to another difficult) 
and from  the standpoint of price competition {in that the price o'f retail 
stocks  cannot readily be changed).  On  the other hand,  the system of tax: 
stamps is, in several  Member  States,  linked to more  general  questions  of 
tax:  enforcement  and certainty of revenue receipts.  It is a  matter of 
judgement  whether the inclusion of issues such  as  these will  accelerate or 
del~ the process of harmonizing the tobacco excise structure.  However, 
it is in the  Commission's  view preferable to leave open the question of 
whether or not to retain tax stamps until such  time  as  a  decision is 
essential to the harmonization process.  Neither the Parliament nor the 
Economic  and  Social  Committee  has  suggested that this is yet the case. 
12.3.  Tax  credit periods 
12.3.1.  As  regards the effects on  competition of differences in 
collection rules,  the situation is by no  means  clear-out.  Indeed,  the 
Economic  and Social  Committee  has itself put  forward differing views  on 
this issue in its 1976  opinion on  the second stage(l) and its 1981  opinion 
on the 3rd stage(2). 
(1) 
(2) 
"Of particular note  are widely varying practices between Member  States 
concerning funding  arrangements by w~  of extended tax credit  and 
other current  or potential subsidized sources of capital.  Clearly, 
such arrangements  have  a  major bearing upon the cost structure of the 
cigarette industry in the different countries  and upon  an equitable 
choice of taxation structure in the final phase of the present 
programme  of harmonization~" 
"There  are however  differences of view  as  to whether the different 
credit periods  allowed in Member  States  amount  in practice to a 
distortion of competition in the Community  as  a  whole"  and "The 
Committee  considers that  fUrther  stu~ is required before  a  decision 
could be made  regarding the appropriate time  for adopting common  rules 
for collecting the excise  duty"  •. - 106-
12.3.2.  The  credit periods for the excise  and  VAT  in the Member  States 
are set out in Table 12.1.  It can be seen that the periods differ 
considerably.  There  are two  basic arguments  on the effects on competition 
of differences in deferment  periods  from  one  Member  State to the other. 
The  first is simply that,  so  long as  the same  period is accorded on  a 
given market to national producers  and to importers,  competition in 
unaffected,  since national  and other Community  producers  compete  on that 
market  on equal terms. 
12.3.3.  The  second argument  goes  rather further,  by comparing the tax 
credit period on  a  given market  with that  accorded by producers to the 
distribution chain,  and is illustrated by the following example: 
Tax  oredit  (d~) 
Commercial  credit  (d~) 
Credit period to producers'  advantage 
Market  A 
30 
15 
15 
B 
20 
20 
Nil 
12.3.4.  As  the example  shows,  differences between the tax and 
c 
50 
30 
20 
commercial  credit periods  give rise to different degrees  of advantage 
- in the form  of an interest-free loan of the tax due  - to producers 
(and to importers)  on  each of the three markets.  Let  it now  be  assumed, 
however,  that the different producers  on  markets A,  B,  and  C split 
their production as  follows: 
To  Market  A  B  c 
%  %  % 
Producer in A  50  20  30 
II  B  10  80  10 
"  c  70  10  20 - 107  -
To  these shares of production can now  be attributed the benefits of the 
difference between tax and  commercial  credit periods  on  the three 
markets(l),  thus 
Producer in A  50%  X  15  +  20%  X  Nil  +  30%  X  20  ..  13.5 days 
Producer in B  10%  X  15  +  80%  X  Nil  +  H>%  X  20  ""  3.5  dB\YS 
Producer in C  70%  X  15  +  10%  X  Nil  +  20%  X  20  D  14.5  dB\YS 
12.3.5.  Consequently,  the total operations of the three different 
producers benefit from  widely differing periods  of free financing.  The 
second argument  rests basically on  the contention that these different 
interest-free loan periods constitute a  distortion of competition. 
12.3.6.  As  regards  the first argument  - and notwithstanding the equality 
of competitive conditions  on  a  given market,  provided that the same 
deferment  period applies to both domestic  and  imported products -it is 
nevertheless understandable that many  producers  see some  link between the 
final  structure for the harmonized excise  (i.e. the size of the 
multiplier)  and  the harmonized period of tax credit. 
Existing periods  of tax credit may  or may  not  confer an 
element  of government  financing on  different producers.  What  is clear is 
that  any change  in existing tax:  credit periods,  whether up  or down,  will 
have  an impact  on  production costs,  which will in turn be  increased at the 
retail stage to an  extent which will  depend  on  the final multiplier effect 
of the harmonized structure.  As  a  general  statement,  harmonization 
implies  an  increased multiplier for high-cost  producers  and  a  lower 
multiplier for low-cost  producerso  Consequently,  in taking a  view  on 
what  constitutes  an  acceptable multiplier,  any producer will  also wish 
(1) This  simple model  could of course be  further elaborated by taking into 
account  the different tax rates,  the fact  that part of the tax is VAT 
subject to different  credit mechanisms,  that commercial  credit covers 
both tax and the delivered value of the goods,  differences in interest 
rates etc. The  basic argument  is unaffected. - 108  -
to have  some  indication of the likely effect on his costs of harmonization 
of the tax credit period.  In addition,  because of the mixed  tax 
structure, whatever  the harmonized tax credit period finally adopted,  it  · 
will tend to benefit lower cost  producers  relative to  high-cost~ since  any 
given financing benefit,  all other things being equal,  will  represent  a 
higher proportion of low  costs relative to high.  This relative advantage 
will vary,  either with the length of the tax credit period,  or with the 
extent to which the tax credit  exceeds  commercial  credit.  Consequently, 
the length of the harmonized tax credit period could be  a  factor in 
determining what  constitutes  a  fair multiplier. 
12.3.8.  It was  with this factor in mind that the Commission  expressed 
the view  (see paragraph 38  of the  explanatory memorandum  to the proposal 
for the 3rd stage) that harmonization of these rules could assist the 
process  of convergence  towards  the final  stage of harmonization.  The 
Commission  then proposed that  examination of this question should begin 
during the 3rd stage  and  that  a  separate directive  on the rules of 
collection should enter into force  by 1.1.1985. 
As  regards the second argument,  the  Commission  would point  out 
that the interest-free loans  accruing to producers  in the  example  given 
arise first,  from  the  fact  that the tax credit period exceeds the 
commercial  credit period and secondly,from the differences between 
commercial  credit periods.  Harmonization of the tax credit period would 
,not  resolve either of these problems.  The  first problem  could of course 
be  removed  by fixing a  harmonized tax credit period of very short 
duration,  so that  the commercial  credit period would  always  be at least 
equal  to the tax credit period.  However,  unless the commercial  credit 
period were  also harmonized - and  moreover  on  the same  figure  as  the tax 
credit period - the second problem would  always  be present,  and  it could 
even be the case that  another distortion would be created due  to ·' 
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commercial  credit periods in some  Member  States being necessarily longer 
than the tax credit period,  thus  imposing  a  financing cost for.the tax 
on the producer. 
12.3.10.  It would neither be desirable nor practicable to seek to 
harmonize  commercial  credit periods throughout the  Community.  First,  any 
such proposal would lie outside the scope of tax harmonization.  Secondly, 
given the very considerable  geographic,  demographic  and  economic 
differences  between the Member  States,  it is to be expected that 
commercial  credit periods will vary (whether  or not  taxes  are harmonized) 
to a  considerable degree.  These variations reflect differing factual 
and  competitive situations  and  are for this reason desirable on 
competitive  grounds. 
Summary 
12.4.1.  In these  circumstances,  the merits  of harmonization proposals 
for the tax credit period lie first,  in the certainty they would  offer to 
producers  of the extent to which  governments  of the Member  States would 
be prepared to assume  the burden of financing the ta.x  and  thus,  by 
removing uncertainty on this account,  to facilitate discussions  on the 
multiplier to apply at the final  stage.  Secondly,  a  harmonized tax 
credit period,  although sufficiently long adequately to cover  the 
commercial  credit period normally found in any Member  State,  should not 
be  so  long as to permit  the possibility deliberately to finance 
producers'  capital requirements,  thus  reducing to the practicable 
minimum  ~  risk of one  producer being favoured relative to another. 
Harmonization of the tax credit period in accordance with this principle 
is likely of itself to bring about  some  convergence between the 
commercial  credit periods.  Inevitably,  any such harmonized tax credit 
period could in theory offer some  margin of advantage  (not  on  a. 
particular market,  but possibly in relation to production overalL) - 110-
to those producers whose  sales, whether domestic or export,  are made  on 
markets with relatively shorter commercial  credit periods than are the 
sales of their competitors.  However,  as  stated above,  this  c~ld only be 
avoided by harmonization of commercial  credit periods. 
12.4.2.  In its proposals for the 3rd stage,  the Commission  envisaged 
adoption of harmonized rules for tax credit periods by 1.1.1985.  Even  on 
the basis of the 3rd stage proposals,  Member  States will  at that time 
have  moved  only as far  as  a  specific range of 10 to  35%  of total tax 
and will  thus be still some  w~  from  the final  harmonization of the 
excise structure.  In the light of the arguments  above,  and of the 
1981  opinion of the Economic  and  Social  Committee,  and without prejudice 
to the application of Article 37  of the  Treat~ this date for  adoption 
of a  harmonized tax credit period still appears  appropriate. - 111-
Table 12.1. 
Excise and  VAT  credit periods 
Member 
State  Excise  VAT 
B  15th day of the 3rd month  15th day of the  3rd month 
follo~ing the order of tax  following the order of  ~ax 
stamps  stamps 
(average  90  days)  (average 90  days) 
LUX  15th day of the  3rd month  15th day of month  following 
following the order of  the delivery or importation 
·tax stamps  . (average  30  days) 
(average  90  days) 
NL  Last  day of 3rd month  · Last  day of 3rd month  following 
following the order of  the order of tax stamps 
tax stamps  (average 105 days) 
(average 105  days) 
' 
DK  Within 3 months  following  One  month  and  20 days after the 
delivery of tax stamps  end  of the  )-monthly 
(90 days)  accounting period 
(average  95  days) 
GER  Between 28  and  42  days  National production:  loth day of 
following the delivery of  the month  following delivery 
tax stamps  for  consumption 
(average  35  days)  (average  2  5  days) 
Imports:  15th day of month 
following the  importation 
(average  30  days) 
'"'.  ·' 
FR  5th day of the second month  · 5th day of the  second month 
following production or  following production or 
clearance  clearance 
(average  50 days)  (average  50 days) 
GR  42  days  ·no VAT 
-
IRL  I 
Last  day of the month  Between the loth and  the 19th day 
following the delivery  of the month  following the end.of 
for  consumption  the bi-monthly tax accounting 
(average 45  days)  period 
(average :t 45 days) 
IT  State production:  No  No  credit 
credit period 
Imports:  payment  within 30 
days of purchase of the 
fiscal  stamps 
UK  15th day of month  following  In the month  following the  end 
the delivery :fbr consumption  of the  )-monthly accounting 
(average  30  days)  period 
(average 90  days) - 112  -
13.  HEaUTH  CONSIDERATIONS 
13.1.  Background 
13.1.1.  The  Commission  has  been active in the field of health aspects  of 
tobacco  and cigarette consumption.  A recent  report  (EUR  7531,  June 30,  1981) 
summarises  the various  measures  taken within member  countries  against 
tobacco  consumption.  An  extended report  on the same  topic dealing with 
prohibitive measures,  information measures,  educational  measures,  research. 
and studies,  and penalties  for  infringement  of the law,is currently being 
prepared. 
The  studies were  initiated after the meeting of the Ministers of Health 
of 16 November  1978  which  agreed,  as  regards  smoking: 
to exchange  experience concerning the measures  taken in the various 
Member  StatesJ 
- to establish common  methods  by which to compare  the results and to 
assess  the effectiveness of health education campaigns  on  smokingJ 
to carry out health education campaigns  of an experimental  nature,  in 
particular to determine the main  features  of cigarette smoking by young 
people  and to identify their effects on health and the family  and socio-
economic  factors which  m~  pl~ a  part in the  commencement  and  develoP-
ment  of cigarette smokingJ 
to seek a  common  attitude on  advertising. 
The  question of tobacco smoking has  also been included in the multiannual 
programme  of Medical  Research  and  Public Health which will  soon be sent to 
the Council  for discussion and  approval. (8) 
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13.1.2.  The  tax. policy of the Commission  and of individual  Member  St~tes 
has  been limited to maintaining high or increased tax incidence on cigarettes 
in order to discourage  consumption of pigarettes as  a whole.  Tax policy 
is very relevant to public health since several studies conducted especially 
in the United Kingdom  suggested that cigarette  consumpt~on shows  a  marked  . : 
responsivness  to price changes. 
13.1.3.  There is reliable evidence that  ~icotine and  tttar" content of 
. -
mainstream smoke  is an important predictor  (though the number  of oigaret.te!S 
smoked per deur  was  a  more  important variable) of lung cancer  morta;Lity''alJ.~,-
.  .  .  .  ·  ..... -. 
risk of coronary heart  disease mortality,  as  well  as  of mortality ratio•. · 
Other toxic  and carcinogenic agents  such as  carbon monoxide,  acrol~in, . 
hydrocyanic  acid,  notrogen dioxides,  ni  trio oxide phenols  and many  other~s 
are likely to contribute to the health hazards  of smoking.  However,  further.·  .  .  ·~  .  ' 
research needs to be  done  to assess whether smokers. compensate for  lowered  .. 
•  ••  '  ••  1  ...... 
"tar" and nicotine concentration by inhaling more  deeply,  by smoking a 
greater fraction of the cigarette and by smoking more  cigarettes.  The 
effect of passive  {or involuntary) smoking on the non-smoker should als·o 
be stressed especially in the elderly,  in the sick and in infants  and 
children.  ·A  study by the services of the  Commission  showed that children 
of parents who  smoke  are more  likely to-have respiratory tract diseases. 
{bronchi  tis and pneumonia)  during the first year of life. 
An  additional excise was  applied in the United Kingdom  for  a 
2-year experimental period from  1979-1980,  on cigarettes with  a  tar  yield 
of 20 mg  or more  per cigarette.  This tar surcharge had a  dramatic effect 
of eliminating higher tar cigarettes from  the market,  though it merely 
accelerated a  process which started in the 1970's, i.e.  a  stea4y fall  in 
the  average tar-yield of cigarettes.  \A.  similar trend is being observed in 
other Member  countries where  no surcharge was  applied. - 114-
13.2.  Impact  on  health policies of excise harmonization 
13.2.1.  As  regards  the choice between the present  and  the alternative 
approach,  Annex  VII  and  paragraph 11.5.11 show  that,  assuming the  sam~ 
multiplier objective,  both approaches  have  much  the same  effect on prices, 
so that they are unlikely to differ in their impact  on  health policy. 
13.2.2.  As  regards  the implication for health of the  choice of multiplier, 
it has  been  argued that  a  high multiplier,  by reason of its downwards 
pressure on  costs,  might  hinder research and  development  of less noxious 
cigarettes.  This  argument  rests  on  two  assumptions: 
that research and  development  of less noxious  cigarettes is expensive  and 
that high-quality filters  and  low-tar tobacco blends  are expensive.  The 
argument  concludes that a  low  total multiplier of 2  or less (i.e.  a  low 
ad  valorem element  and  conversely  a  high specific element) is better for 
health policy,  because it allows  for larger profit margins  on  more 
expensive cigarettes  and  consequently a  higher investment rate to develop 
them  further. 
13.2.3.  As  a  general  comment,  the Commission  regards  this  as  a  marginal 
aspect of the debate on  health policy and  taxation.  The  crucial  tax 
consideration is to ensure that tax incidence is maintained or increased, 
so leading to a  reduction in smoking overall,  rather than a  switch from 
one  cigarette to another,  the beneficial effecuof which  (see paragraph 
13.1.3.  above)  are by no  means  established.  Secondly,  the present  approach 
will  increase some  multipliers  from  about  1.8 to about  3,  but  in other 
Member  States it will  reduce multipliers  from  about 4.4 down  to 3. 
Consequently,  applying the  above  argument,  the present  approach will 
already make  it easier for producers  in a  number  of Member  States to 
research and  develop less noxious  cigarettes. - 115-
Moreover,  the cost  argument  is open  to question. 
the trend towards  lower tar cigarettes has  long been established, 
as  has  the swing from  non-filter to filter throughout  the  Community 
as  well  as  in the u.s.; 
as  trade publicity demonstrates,  competition between cigarettes is now 
based  as  much  on  health considerations  as  on  price.  For example, 
taking an extreme  case,  consumers  would  be unlikely to  choose  a 
high-tar, untipped cigarette solely on  the ground that is was  somewhat 
cheaper than a  low-tar filter cigarette; 
a  substantial element  in the cost  difference between  a  cheap  and  an 
expensive cigarette lies in packaging and publicity.  If a producer 
wished to  improve  research investment,  it would be relatively easier 
to  do  so by economising on  publicity,packaging or by reducing profit, 
than by economising on  the raw  materials,  which  do  not vary in price 
by  large margins.  'In any case,  it can hardly be  claimed that expensive 
packaging,for example,  makes  a  cigarette less noxious.  Moreover,  from 
the  commercial  standpoint  also,  it is likely that tar and nicotine 
content will in the future  outweigh the quality of packaging as  a 
factor in brand image; 
as_  regards publicity,  some  sectors of the industry have  argued(l) that 
publicity does-not  increase  demand  overall, but  merely affects market 
share.  Consequently,  a  producer devoting a  proportion of his  (often 
substantial) publicity budget to producing  relatively more  acceptable 
cigarettes from  the health standpoint  could,  even With  somewhat  reduced 
publicity,  improve  market  share. For those who  believe that publicity 
in fact  increases  demand,. or at least maintains  and  encourages  the 
social acceptability  of smoking,  such .a  trend would be doubly welcome; 
(l) Report  on the Relationship between total cigarette advertising 
and total cigarette consumption in the United Kingdom  - Metra 
Consulting,  1979. - 116  -
research on health effects of cigarettes,  on  tobacco carcinogenesis 
and  on  the chemistry and the biophysics  of tobacco smoke,is  for  a 
large part  conducted in universities  and in independent  research 
centres which  are financed by public  and private fundsJ 
the difference in effect on  downwards  pressure on  costs between a 
multiplier of 2  and one  of 3  is not  enormous.  Consequently,  even if 
the  arguments were valid,  the advantage offered by  a  multiplier of 
2  over one  of 3  cannot be decisive. 
13.2.5.  The  Commission  therefore concludes that the choice between the 
present  approach  and the alternative  approach put  forward by the Economic 
and Social  Committee,  is of no  relevance to health policy.  So  far  as  the 
choice between different multipliers is concerned,  this is of doubtfUl 
relevance.  If of relevance,  it can only be marginal,  by comparison to 
the importance  of maintaining a  generally high tax inoidenoe  and  thus 
reducing the overall level  of smoking. - 117-
14.  SYNTHESIS  AND  CONCLUSIONS 
Developments  since 1970 
14.1.1.  Since the  adoption of the  Council Resolution of 21  April 1970(l) 
(see paragraph 4.1.2.) the  Community  has twice been enlarged,  so that the 
process of transforming into Community  law a  resolution adopted by a 
Council of 6,  has  now  to be  completed by a  Council  of 10.  In addition, 
the sustained inflation und  unfavourable economic  climate since 1973 has 
brought  about  major  ohanges  in the general  economic  situation. 
14.1.2.  The  tobacco market  and the tobacco  industry have  by  no  means 
been exempt  from .these  economic  changes.  In particular,  the 1970s  have 
been characterised (see Graph  9.1)  by frequent falls in tax incidence 
(due to excise rates failing to adapt  to  rapid inflation),  by price 
controls {in the context  of anti-inflation policies),  and  by  subsequent 
sharp  corrections in both prices and tax incidence,  and in some  instances 
by marked  increases in tax incidence  (see paragraph 4.7.2.). 
In addition,  the dangers to health of smoking  (see  Chapter 13) 
although already known  in 1970,  had  not  then been as widely recognized 
as they are now.  Awareness  of health risks has  led to a  radical  change  in 
production  patterns~ with a  rapid trend towards filter cigarettes (see 
Table 7.7)  and  an  increasing preoccupation with lowering tar and  nicotine 
yields.  Demand  has been generally affected by a  variety of anti-smoking 
measures  - in particular,  educational  campaigns to inform the public of 
the risks,  more  or less severe restrictions on  cigarette advertising -
and  a  tendency at least to maintain tax incidence over time  and  in 
some  instances to  increase it considerably. 
(1)  OJ  No.  L 50,  p.  1,  28.4.1970 - 118-
14.1.4.  Community  consumption per head of cigarettes in 19ao (see 
Table 7.6)  was  about  23%  higher than in 1970,  but  at broadly the same 
level as that in 1975.  In addition,  the Community  market  has followed  a 
world-wide trend towards blond cigarettes,  leading to substantial changes 
in consumer patterns on the markets of those Member  States previously 
dominated  by dark cigarettes. 
14.1.5.  The  pattern of the  Community  cigarette market  is therefore one 
of rapid and  sustained change  in the product,  accompanied by a  level of 
demand  which,  if not declining,  is more  or less stagnant.  The  industry 
has reacted to these  changes  by intensifying competition,  both in terms 
of the characteristics of the product  (see paragraphs 13.1.3.and 13.1.4.) 
and  in terms of price  (paragraph 8.3.1). This intensification of 
competition has resulted in the industry becoming  increasingly capital-
intensive and  in particular in rapid technological  advance  in methods 
of cigarette production.  In addition,  the industry has turned increasingly 
to 3rd country markets  and  some  producers have  enjoyed  (see Table 7.3  ) 
considerable success in compensating for falling demand  within the 
Community  by increased third country exports.  Consequently,  the  industry 
has been able to sustain and  even to increase  somewhat  its total production 
(see Table 7.1  )  between 1976  and  1980. 
14.1.6.  Some  producers have  also sought to diversify out  of tobacco 
manufacturing,  although these efforts have  in general been on  a  limited 
scale and  have  tended to encounter opposition from the industry's trade 
unions  (see paragraph 8.4.5.). 
14.1.7.  During this period  (see Chapter 6)  the State monopolies  in 
France  and  Italy have,  in accordance with the Council Resolution of 1970, 
been considerably liberalized.  The  import  monopolies  have  been legally 
abolished,  and  other Community  producers now  in principle enjoy free access .  ' 
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to these markets;  Following examination by the Commission,  arid  subsequent 
discussions with the French and  Italian authorities,  the great majority 
of the discriminatory or restrictive measures have.been or will shortly be, 
removed  (see paragraphs 6.2.2.  - 6.2.4.). 
However,  (see paragraph 6.2.6.) the considerable losses incurred by both 
the French and  Italian State producers  in recent years have given rise to 
complaints that the prices of monopoly  products may  be  considered to be 
subsidized.  The  Commission  is currently investigating whether or not  the 
situation is compatible with Article  37  of the Treaty. 
14.1.8.  As  regards  employment,  the result has  been a  general decline 
over the period 1975  - 1980,  by  about  9%  overall (see paragraph 8.2.8.). 
In view of the  increasing degr~e of automation in the industry (see 
paragraph 8.  3o 1.), this downwards  trend in employment  is likely to continue. 
14.1.9.  As  regards raw  tobacco production,  there has been a  growing 
imbalance between the varieties produ.ced  by the  Community  and  those required 
to supply the  Community  market  for manufactured tobacco  (see paragraph 5.2.3.). 
So  long as this situation continues,  and  notwithstanding the fact that the 
Community  imports more  than half its total raw tobacco needs,  even· existing 
levels of raw  tobacco production can be maintained only with difficulty. 
The  situation has  be~n aggravated by  the accession of Greece,  which is a 
major producer of tobacco varieties which  are not  in general in demand 
within the  Community,  so that  expenditure in support  of raw tobacco has 
almost  doubled  since Greek accession (see paragraph 5.5.1.).  The 
long-term objective {see paragraph 5.6.1J  must  therefore·be a  radical 
change  in the type  of varieties of raw tobacco produced within the 
Community,  and  an increase in exports to third countries,  so as to maintain 
existing levels of production and  a  reduction in imports  of raw  tobacco 
from third countries. - 120-
The  enlargement  of the  Community  has also changed  somewhat  the 
overall pattern of tax incidence.  Tax incidence in the Community  of six 
ranged from  about  6C!fo  to rather less than 80%.  The  accession of Denmark, 
and subsequent tax·increases in that  Member  State,  increased the upper 
figure to more  than 87%  and the accession of Greece  reduced the lower 
figure to about  56%  (see paragraph 9.1.5.}. 
On  the other hand,  the other Member  States have  shown  a  markedly convergent 
tr~nd in recent years,  with tax incidence ranging from  about  63%  to 74% 
(see paragraph 9 .1.  6.}. 
14.1.11.  Against  this ·background  of change'  and decline,  it is not 
surprising that progress with excise harmonization has been both slow and 
difficult.  In particular,  given that the total tax burden represents so 
iarge a  p·roportion of retail price,  a.n;y  tax change  is bound to be of 
great  concern to producers of raw  and  manufactured tobacco alike. However, 
reports from the Member  States on  the effects of both the first and  second 
stages of harmonization make  it clear that the two  harmonization stages 
have  not  seriously disturbed either the markets or tax revenues  (see 
paragraphs 4· 7  •  3.  and 4. 7  .4.}. 
14.1.12.  In the  caee of the United Kingdom  and Ireland,  considerable 
market  changes did take place following implementation of the  second stage, 
but this seems  largely to have been due  ·.(see paragraph 4.  7.  1.}  to 
national decisions to change their tax systems to a  greater degree than 
that required by the harmonization directive.  As  regards the French and 
Italian markets,  the reduced price ranges arising from harmonization have 
certainly reinforced the trend observed in both those  countries from 
relatively. cheap dark cigarettes towards more  expensive blond cigarettes 
(see paragraph 4.7.4J.  However,  it has been recognized  (see footnote to 
paragraph 4.7.4)  that this trend is itself due  to other factors,  not  least 
of which has been a  failure of domestic producers to adapt  to changing 
consumer tastes. .• 
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The  Commission's  3rd stage proposals of course  imply further 
changes  which,  given existing pressures on the industry,  have  understandably 
provoked strong reactions both from  those with largely specific taxes, 
who  are  concerned at the implications of an increased ad valorem element, 
and  from those  with largely ad valorem taxes,  faced with an increased 
specific element. 
Harmonization:  the  a.greed  elements 
14.2.1.  Notwithstanding the acknowledged differences of view over the 
3rd stage and the final stage,  a  considerable degree  of consensus has been 
achieved  and maintained over the last 11  years.  The  desirability of and 
need for harmonization of taxes on tobacco is still generally accepted. 
Both the Economic  and  Social Committee  and the Parliament - whatever 
detailed reservations have  been expressed  on  the Commission's proposals 
- have  consistently endorsed  (see Chapter 2)  not  only the desirability of 
harmonization but  also the major elements in the harmonized system for 
cigarettes. This is also true of the manufacturing industry,  whether 
private or State producers.  In particular,  the principle of a  mixed 
specific/ad valorem structure levied on  the finished product by 
reference to the retail price has long been accepted  and is not  in 
dispute. 
The  increase in market  interpenetration (see Table 7 .4) during 
this period is also encouraging.  It cannot be  claimed that this is 
solely,  or even largely,  due  to tax harmonization,  since the process 
clearly owes  much  to the trend away  from  dark and  towards blond 
cigarettes.  Moreover,  the penetration of the high-specific markets 
by low-cost  producers has been very limited.  Nevertheless,  it is 
encouraging that the relatively modest  changes  in tax structure imposed by 
the first and  second stage do  appear to be  contributing,  albeit slowly, 
to the establishment  of the  Community  market. - 122-
14.2.3.  The  Member  States have  also done  much  to maintain the 
consensus of view on tax harmonization (see  Chapter 4).  Denmark,  on 
accession in 1973,  accepted the first stage of harmonization as it 
stood.  Ireland and  the United Kingdom,  although requesting - and  being 
accorded - a  5-year derogation,  also accepted the first directive.  The 
enlarged Community  of 9  was  subsequently able to agree on  a  second  stage 
whioh  significantly narrowed the permitted range of the specific element 
and  included VAT  within the system,  and  on a  directive to define the 
tobacco products  covered by the harmonized  excise.  Greece,  on  accession 
in 1981,  accepted all the harmonization directives without  any 
transitional period for adaptation.  Moreover,  Greece  at once  introduced 
a  specific element  of total tax (currently 11%)  which  was  in excess even 
of what  would  be required under the Commission's third stage proposals. 
Some  other Member  States have  also found it possible to go  further than 
is required under the existing second  stage obligations;  the Netherlands 
at present  apply a  specific element  of lo%  and  Germany,  an ad valorem 
element  of 6Q%. 
The  third stage proposals and their context 
14.3.1.  Seen within this context  of slow but  consistent  convergence, 
and as  Chapter 4  makes  clear,  the Commission  proposal for the 3rd stage 
cannot  be  characterized as  some  radical new  initiative,  or a  departure 
from  agreed policies.  On  the contrary,  it is no  more  and  no  less than 
a  relatively modest advance  on  the two  modest  stages of harmonization 
which preceded it, the proposals for which  were  approved by the 
Parliament(l)(2). 
(!)Opinion let stage OJ  C 2  of 11.1.1972 
(2)0pinion 2nd  stage OJ  C 178  of 2.8.1976 - 123  -
14.3.2.  Moreover,  these proposals are broadly consistent with the line 
of convergence  indicated by the first  and  second  stages,  as  adopted by 
the Council  (see paragraph 4.8.3.) •.  It should be  remembered  that the 
•  ~t  stage provided  a  permitted range for the specific element  of 
5 to 75%  of the total excise,  and  left VAT  (a proportional tax)  wholly 
out  of account.  The  second  stage permitted a  specific range  of 5%  to 
55%  of the total tax,  including VAT.  Moreover,  three Member  States, 
as stated above,  have  already found  it possible to go  beyond  the 
obligations of the  second  stage  and  even,  in the case  of Greece,  beyond 
what  would  be  required in the third stage as  now  proposed.  Given this 
orientation, it is of course possible to argue that the proposed range 
for the third stage of a  specific element  of lo%  - 35%  of total tax 
leans too heavily towards  one  extreme  or the other of the range.  It 
could also be  argued that the third stage  should advance  at  a  rather 
slower,  or faster,  pace.  But  in the  Commission's  view,  it is not 
possible to argue that the  Council decisions on  the first  and  second 
stages imply a  third stage in which  the relative proportions of specific 
and  ad  valorem  should be  radically different from  those  now  proposed. 
The  Commission  has also indicated that,  were  harmonization to 
be  continued in the direction put  forward  in its third stage proposals, 
the  implied specific element  at the final stage would  be of the order 
of 20%  of total tai,  which  in turn implies an average total multiplier 
of about  3. 
Differences over objectives and  over possible approaches 
This  implied final objective is the source  of divergent views 
within the  Community.  On  the one  hand,  there are low-cost  producers 
who  wish to retain the highest possible total multiplier (currently of the 
order of 4.5  or more).  On  the other hand,  there are high-cost  producers 
who  wish the total multiplier to remain at  a  level of about  1.8 and in 
any  case not  to exceed 2. 124  -
In addition,  the Economic  and Social Committee  (see Annex  I) 
has  suggested that consideration be given to an  alternative approach, 
consisting of harmonizing the ad  valorem  c_omponents  as  a  percentage of 
total tax.  This view has attacted some  support  from  the Economic  and 
Monetary Affairs  Committee  of the Parliament.  The  Economic  and Social 
Committee  does  not go  so far as to propose  a  specific figure  on  which 
the ad  valorem tax components  should be  harmonized.  However,  the private 
sector producers have  made  it clear,  not  only that they would  support 
such an approach,  but that  in their view the ad  valorem tax components 
should not  exceed 4o%  of retail price. 
14.4.3.  The  Commission has  sought  in its work to examine  the 
implications,  both of differing multipliers at the final stage  and of 
harmonization of the excise structure following,  either the present 
approach,  or the alternative approach,  in order to arrive at that final 
stage.  In fact,  although these two  issues have,  as far as possible,  been 
separately examined,  they are inevitably inter-related to a  considerable 
degree by the fact that the alternative approach explicitly seeks to 
achieve both harmonization of the excise structure and  a  partial 
harmonization of the tax rates.  As  tax incidence is one  of the functions 
which  determines the multiplier,  the two  issues are thus linked. 
Chapter  8  examines the implications for employment  of both 
approaches,  and  of differing multipliers.  It is concluded  (see 
paragraph 8.6.1.) that  employment  in the industry is likely to continue 
to decline in the future,  irrespective of further structural harmonization. 
The  major factors in this decline are  found  to be  increasing automation 
of the industry,  the tendency for tax incidence to be maintained or 
increased for reasons  of health policy and  the  impact  of increasing 
awareness  of  th~ health risks of smoking.  The  chapter concludes  (see 
paragraph 8.6.3.) that the impact  on this process of the present approach 
and  of the alternative approach would  not significantly differ. - 125  -
As  regards multipliers,  the chapter concludes that  the the.ory according to 
which a  low  multiplier,  exercising a.  lower pressure  on  coste, would make 
it relativeljr easier for certain producers to make  provisions for redundancy, 
.  .  ,;.  .  .  .  . 
..  retraining etc.,  is·  no  more  than an assumption. 
Chapter 13  concludes  (see paragraph 13.2.5.) that the choice 
between the present  a.nd  the alternative approach is of no  relevance to 
health policy.  As  regards differing multipliers,  the effect  of a  lower 
multiplier could be,  as claimed by some  producers, to facilitate 
commercial research and  development  of less noxious  cigarettes via 
reduced pressure  on their costs.  However,  as is pointed out in 
paragraph 13.2.4., much  of the research effort is conducted by 
independent  and  academic research centres.  .In addition,  it is not  certain 
that reductions  in tar and nicotine content  do  not bring about  changes  in 
smokers'  w~  of smoking,  or an increase  in their tobacco  consumption. 
Moreover,  given the  increasing  importance  of low  tar and nicotine yields 
in the marketing  of cigarettes, it seems  likely that the  incentives to 
develop  such cigarettes are  alrea~ very considerable.  Finally,  the 
possibilities for economising  in areas of production costs which  are  un-
related to the  smoking  characteristics of the  cigarettes (in particular, 
packaging)  are  probably  considerable  and  possibly greater than those  in 
relation to the materials from  which  the cigarettes are made. 
14.4.6.  Turning to competition,  Chapter 11  examines,  not  only the 
implications of different multipliers,  but  also the relative merits of 
the present  and  alternative approaches.  The  principal conclusions of 
that  chapter and  of its relat  ad  Annexes  V,  VI,  VII  and VIII  are as 
follows: 
(i) · the major  contribution made  by tax harmonization in reducing 
distortions of competition is that  offered by the establish-
ment  of a  single tax structure (see paragraph 11.2.3.  and 
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(ii)  the application of a  tax with a  significant multiplier effeot 
is desirable if a  satisfactory range of retail prices is to be 
possible  (paragraph 11.2.6.); 
(iii)  the inevitable effect of any mixed  excise structure,  whatever 
the relative proportions of ad valorem and  specific components 
and  whether the structure is based on  the present  or the 
alternative approach,  is to benefit  one  price category of 
cigarettes at the expense  of another  (see paragraph 11.2.9. 
and  Annex  V); 
(iv)  the effect of the mixed  system in favouring certain price 
categories relative to others is unaffected by harmonization 
of tax rates  (see paragraph 11.2.10.). 
The  effects of harmonization of tax rates on  competitive 
neutrality is dubious  and  in any  case marginal  (see Annex  V). 
Harmonization of tax rates,  or a  mechanism  for anticipating 
such harmonization - such as the alternative approach -
merely ensures the uniform application of the effect of the 
mixed  excise in favouring certain price categories relative 
to others (see paragraph 11.2.10.  and  Annex  V); 
(v)  the alterpative approach would  not  therefore add  to 
competitive neutrality,  particularly because of the inherent 
bias in the mixed  system  (see (iii) above)  in favour  of 
certain price categories relative to others  (11.2.10.,  Annex  V); 
(vi)  the Commission  fully accepts the effect of a  predominantly 
ad  valorem system in encouraging producers to reduce  ex-tax 
prices to a  minimum  (paragraph 11.3.4.); 
(vii)  there is insufficient  evidence to support  a  view that  a  total 
multiplier of the order,of 3·must  result ·in revenue  instability 
(paragraph 11.3.11.); .. 
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(viii)  no  "oausal link''  has been established between a  total 
multiplier of the order of 3,  and restrictive competitive 
practices (section 11.4.); 
(ix)  the present  approach - assuming a  2o%  specific - would  give, 
at the final  stage of structural harmonization,  an average 
total multiplier at present tax rates of about three,  an 
average tax multiplier of about  2.3,  with some  variation on 
either side of these averages,  and  a  harmonized tax multiplier 
at the time  of harmonization of tax rates, the multiplier figure 
then depending on  the harmonized tax rate  (paragraphs 11.1.3., 
11.1.4.,  Annex  II); 
(x)  the alternative approach would  give a  harmonized tax 
multiplier (at a  figure yet to be proposed)  at the final stage 
of structural harmonization and  whether or not tax rates are 
harmonized  (paragraphs 11.1.3.,  11.1.4.,  Annex  II)J 
(xi)  which~ver of.the two  approaches is followed,  the degree  of 
adaptation for the Member  States in order to arrive at  a  third 
stage or at  a  given final stage objective is broadly the  same 
(paragraphs  11.5.1~., 11.7.1.,  Annex  Vll)J 
(xii)  whichever of the two  approaches  were  followed,  and  even assuming 
harmonized tax rates,  the total multiplier will continue to 
vary somewhat,  because  of differences in distribution margins 
(Annex  II,  paragraph 7) J 
(xiii)  both approaches become  identical in all respects at the time of 
harmonization of tax rates (section 11.6.); 
(xiv)  the essential difference between the two  approaches is one  of 
timing,  in that the alternative approach (at the final stage of 
structural harmonization)  would fix a  harmonized tax multiplier, 
independently of harmonization of tax ra~es,  and the present 
approach uses the multiplier only as  a  broad guide  and  leaves 
the final figure to be  determined by harmonization of the 
excise rate  (paragraphs. 11.5.6., 11.6.2.); - 128-
(xv)  in view of (iv)  and (v)  above,  this difference in timing is of 
no  importance from  the standpoint  of competition,  but does offer 
the advantage of certainty,  in that the tax multiplier,  once 
fixed under the alternative approaCh,  is unaffected by future 
changes  in tax rates  (paragraph 11.5.6. h 
(xvi)  any  change  in the final objective frpm  a  total multiplier of 
about  3 (i.e. from  a  2o%  specific or 56%  ad valorem rate)  could 
as well be  expressed in terms  of a  different specific element 
(e.g.  a  specific element  of about  44%  of total tax,  broadly 
equal to a  4o%  ad valorem rate)  (paragraph 11.7.2.,  Annex  VII) J 
(xvii)  in terms of "fairness" the present  approach satisfies a  wider 
range  of degrees of reflection in retail prices of relative 
differences in ex-tax costs,  over a  wider range of tax incidence, 
than does the alternative approach  (paragraph 11.8.5., 
Annex  VIII,  Graph 2) f 
(xviii)  whichever of the two  approaches is followed,  an increase in tax 
incidence will invariably improve  the relative competitive 
position of high-cost producers.  This effect will be relatively 
greater if the alternative approach is followed  (paragraph 
11.8.4.,  Annex VIII,  Graph  2) f 
(xix)  in view of (iv),  {v),  (xii),  {xvi),  (xvii)  and  (xviii)  above, 
the  Commission  is of the view that adoption of the alternative 
approach for the establishment  of future stages is undesirable, 
and  is likely to make  agreement  on further stages more,  rather 
than less,  difficult  (paragraph 11.9.5., 11.9.6.)1 
(xx)  in view of (xv)  above,  the Commission  would  not  rule out the 
possibility,  once the final stage of structural harmonization 
has been reached,  of "freezing'' the multiplier by then 
converting the specific/ad valorem ratio  into a  harmonized 
ad valorem element.  However,  whether it would  be desirable 
,. (9) 
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to do  so  at that time - and without excluding other 
possibilities - would  depend  in particular on  the differences 
in tax incidence then obtaining and  on  the  agreed period of 
tax credit. 
14.4.7.  As  regards tax credit,  and  in the  light  of the  1981  opinion 
of the Economic  and  Social Committee,  the  Commission  is of the view that 
adoption of harmonized rules for tax credit by 1.1.1985 remains  an 
appropriate target  (paragraph 12.4.2.).  The  period of tax credit should 
be governed by the principle of it being sufficiently long to cover 
normal  commercial  credit periods,  but  not  so  long as to permit  financing 
of producers'  capital requirements  (paragraph 12.4.1.). - 130-
ANNEX  I 
1976  AND  1980  OPINIONS  OF  THE  ECONOMIC  AND  SOCIAL  COMMITTEE 
1981  OPINION  OF  THE:  ECONOMIC  AND  MO:Nm'ARY  AFFAIRS  COMMITTEE 
OF ~  EUROPEAN  P  AR~I.AMI!::NT 
In 1976,  the Economic  and  Social  Committee  (see  CES  691/76) 
"3.3.2.  • ••  noted that  a  specific excise duty (i.e.  a  fixed amount  per 
cigarette)  merely determines the level of retail prices over and above  the 
pre-tax manufacturers'  price and trade margin.  Differences in manufacturers' 
pre-tax delivery prices are not  enlarged by a  specific duty at retail 
level.  On  the other hand,  proportional  (or ad  valorem)  taxes based on  the 
final retail price multiply differences in the manufacturers·•  pre-tax 
selling prices into larger differences in retail prices.  Trade margins, 
which  are generally expressed as  a  percentage of retail prices,  further 
add to  thi~ multiplication effect.  It was  also noted that  as the incidence 
of the proportional  elements of the retail price structure (i.e. proportional 
taxation plus trade percentage margin)  increases above  50%  of the total 
retail price,  the  increments in the multiplication effect rise dramatically 
faster than each successive increase in the incidence of the proportioaal 
elements of the retail price. 
3.3.3.  Because  of this multiplication effect, the conditions of 
competition induced by the taxation system are thus determined by the 
rates of proportional taxation on retail prices and not  by the ratio 
relationship between the incidence of specific and proportional taxation. 
In fact,  significant differences exist between Member  States in the 
incidence of the total taxation burden on  cigarettes.  The  achievement 
of a  fixed relationship between the specific duty and proportional taxes 
on the most  popular price class in all Member  States,  which  is envisaged 
as the final stage of the harmonization of structure under the 1972  Directive, 
would  therefore only go  some  way  towards•  but  would still fall short of, 
achieving uniform .conditions of competition within the  Community. - 131-
This would  be  achieved only when  a  subsequent  harmonization programme 
of the rates of taxation on  cigarettes would also have been completed 
and when  other distortions of competition will have  been removed. 
Obviously,  the  impact  of such a  harmonization programme  upon  government 
revenues  and  expenditure,  and  the  consequential social policy effects, 
must  be  carefully examined. 
3.3.4.  The  Committee  suggests that the Commission's  examination of 
relevant  approaches to the final stage of this harmonization programme 
might  include an examination of proposals,  which might  fix the 
incidence (i.e. the rates)  of proportional taxation on  maximum  retail 
prices,  rather than the. ratio relationship between the specific and the 
proportional elements of taxation.  This would  involve a  departure from 
the approach envisaged in Article 1  of the draft Directive but it would 
ensure the earlier realization of uniform conditions of competition in 
the  Community  as  a  unified market,  leaving Member  States free to levy 
a  variable specific excise duty until such time as harmonization of 
excise rates overall can also be  agreed upon.n 
In 1976,  the Parliament,  whilst  noting the opinion of the Economic  and 
Social Committee,  did not  take up  its suggestions.  Parliament  approved 
the second stage proposals,  recalling only the principles which it had 
put  forward in its 1969  opinion:-
"that the aim  must  be  a  tax system that is neutral in its effects 
on  competition and promotes market  interpenetration,  optimum 
utilization of the tax source,  while maintaining the same 
quality and  range  of products".  (paragraph 3,  PE  .44.665). · - 132  -
In 1980,  in its proposals for the third stage,  the Commission  confined its 
comments  (paragraph 27  of COM(8o)69)  to the legal and political implications 
of following this approach:-
"•••  an approach of this kind is not  consistent with the method  laid 
down  by the Council in Article 4  of Directive 72/464/EEC:  and it is 
this method  which is still the keystone  of the harmonization process. 
In any case,  while  a  solution along these lines could be attractive 
for tobacco manufacturers,  provided the tax multiplier was  small 
(less than 2,  i.e. with the  sum  of the proportional components being 
less than 50%)  it would  hardly smooth the way  to agreement  between 
the Member  States,  who  hold quite different views  as to what  the 
common  multiplier should be." 
In 1981  (paragraph 13  - 1 of CES  242/81)  the Economic  and  Social Committee 
repeated its 1976  proposal,  as follows:-
"13.  •••  In all ten Member  States,  taxation absorbs  57%  or more  of the 
price of cigarettes;  in seven of  th~m, more  than 70%;  and in one  (Denmark) 
as much  as 88%.  At  these very high levels of tax,  the rate of ad valorem 
taxation has a  greater influence on the  conditions of competition than any 
other element  in the fiscal structure.  This is because  of the very strong 
"multiplier"  effect  of high ad valorem taxation on  manufacturers'  delivery 
prices.  Any  change  in the ex-factory price is multiplied up  several times 
in working through into retail prices. 
14.  Since the objective is to eliminate those elements in the fiscal 
system which  lead to distortions or restrictions on  competition,  it is 
desirable to move  towards harmonizing the element  of ad valorem t~tion 
rather than continue to follow the present  approach of trying to harmonize 
the ratio between the ad valorem and the specific elements. - 133-
15.  The  ad  valorem element  consists in part of the ad-·valorem  excise 
duty and  in part of value  added tax.  Harmonizing it would  imply that 
the combined  rate of these two  taxes would become  the same  on  cigarettes 
throughout the  Community.  Member  States would  remain free to fix their 
own  rate of value  added tax but  would  then have to fix the rate of the 
ad valorem excise duty so that the  combined rate of the two  taxes would 
be at the level agreed for the Community  as a  whole.  Member  States 
would  also remain free to fix their own  rate of specific excise duty, 
and this degree of freedom  would  enable them to impose  taxation on 
cigarettes at whatever  overall level they judged necessary to meet  their 
national fiscal needs. 
16.  Although not  disposing of all the problems  which have  so far impeded 
agreement  about  the final stage,  this approach would be better than the 
present attempt to harmonize the ad valorem/specific ratio•  Among 
other things, it seems  likely to provide  a  more  flexible approach in the 
conditions of an enlarged,Community. 
17.  The  Committee  therefore recommends  that Article 4.3 of the first 
Directive should be  amended,  to read as follows: 
"At the final stage of harmonization of structures,  the combined 
rate of proportional taxation (that is to say,  the  sum  of the rates 
of the proportional excise duty and the turnover tax calculated on 
the retail selling price)  shall be the same  on  cigarettes in all 
Member  States,  and shall be  such as  will not distort  conditions 
of competition in national markets nor impede  the free movement 
of cigarettes within the Community." 
The  Committee  went  on to propose  certain studies. 
"19.  Any  proposal  leading  towards  such a  solution must  be based on  a 
full social and .economic  study such as the Committee  called for in 1976. 134-
This study  9ught  to take .into accolll1t  at least the following aspects: 
(a)  The  effect of different mixture  of ad valorem and  specific 
taxation 
on  the pattern of employment  in cigarette  manufacturing 
and distribution 
on  the conditions of competition and  the profitability 
of these activities in national markets,  and 
- on  competition in intra-Community trade 
bearing in mind  the development  of competition policy at 
Community  level in relation to the cigarette industry. 
(b)  The  influence of the excise tax structure on  the range  of 
consumer  choice. 
(c)  The  special problem of import penetration in France  and Italy, 
and  its consequences  for tobacco farming in the Community 
including Greece,  bearing in mind  the existence of surplus 
stocks of certain varieties of Community-grown  tobacco. 
(d)  The  relationship between tax increases and price increases on 
cigarettes under different mixtures  of ad  valorem and  specific 
taxation;  the taxation structure which  would  be most  appropriate 
to provide Government  with a  stable revenue  in a  price 
competitive market;  and the effect of inflation on this aspect 
of excise taxation policy." 
Subsequently,  the Economic  and Monetary Affairs Committee  of the 
Parliament,  in its report  of January 1981  on  the third stage proposals, 
stated (page  11  of PE  66.992/Fin): 
"14.  The  purpose  of harmonization must  be to arrive at  a  taxation 
structure which  is as neutral as possible from  the point of view of 
competition.  Every,effort must  be made  to avoid limiting or distorting 
competition.  It was  for this reason that in the preparatory work  for the 
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second period of harmonization the Economic  and.  Social Committee  asked 
;~  whether  a  fixed relationship between the specific and the proportional 
tax components  was  really the most  neutral of solutions from  the point  of 
view of competition.  The  Commission  was  asked to conduct  a  thorough 
inquiry into whether it would  not  be better to base harmonization on  a 
different method.  However,  the Commission  never  carried_out the inquiry 
on the grounds that the principle of the harmonization process was  laid 
down  in paragraph 4  of the Council Directive 72/464/EEC  which did not 
provide for  any alternative. 
Previously the Economic  and  Social Committee  had suggested that  instead 
of establishing a  fixed relationship between the specific and  proportional 
components  of taxation on the extent to which proportional taxation 
increased retail selling prices should be  harmonized.  This proposal 
implies applying the same  fiscal multiplier(!) but does not  rule out 
differing rates of taxation.  Following the results of the third 
. harmonization period,  this proposal was  reiterated by tobacco 
manufacturers'  organizations.  In this connection,  the  explanatory 
memorandum  at'tached to the Commission's  proposal quotes  a  proportional 
tax rate of  5o%  ~r less of the retail selling price which  implies  a  low 
multiplier (less than 2).  Experience has  shown  that  a  low  multiplier 
permits healthy price competition.  This is the yardstick against  which. 
the tax system will ultimately have  to be measured." 
The  Committee  went  on  (point  6  of the draft resolution in PE  66.992/Fin) 
to request .the  Commission 
"to investigarte •••  whether  as regards the final  stage it would 
not  be  more  neutral from  the point  of view of competition to determine 
the effect of proportional taxation on retail prices than to fix the 
relationship between the specifio and  proportional  components  of  dut~·. - 136-
ANNEX  II 
THE  MULTIPLIER  AND  THE  TAXATION  OF  CIGARETTES 
1.  Council Directive 72/464/EEC  of  19  December  1972  stipulates that the 
tax on  cigarettes shall have three components: 
a  specific excise; 
a  proportional excise; 
- a  VAT  portion. 
The  specific component  is expressed as a  fixed amount  per unit of product 
(normally 1  000  cigarettes}, while the proportional (or ad valorem} 
component  is expressed as a  percentage of the retail price. 
2.  In the first stage of harmonization the rule was  that the  specific 
component  was  to be fixed,  at the discretion of each Member  State, between 
5 ~  and 75 %  of the total excise  charged on  cigarettes in the most  popular. 
price category.  At  present, i.e. during the second stage, the specific 
component  must  be fixed at between 5 ~  and 55  ~ of the total tax burden 
(including VAT)  on  cigarettes in the most  popular price category in each 
Member  State.  Accordingly,  the  sum  of the proportional  component  and VAT 
must  lie between 95 %  and 45 %  of the total tax burden. 
3.  The  basis of assessment  for the proportional component  is the retail 
price inclusive of all taxes,  that  is to s~  the  price to the  consumer 
inclusive of the  specific components,  the proportional component  itself 
and VAT. 
Like the proportional component,  VAT,  which is normal~ calculated on  a 
price net  of VAT,  is in practice calculated on  a  price  inclusive of all 
taxes (by transposing .  the rates). " 
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This means  that,  in the taxation of cigarettes, all proportional charges 
are  calculated on  the retail prices, with the charges themselves entering 
into the calculation.  This system of taxation is unique. 
4.  The  excise is p~able by the manufacturer or by the  importer and,  for 
reaons of tax administration and  control, it is collected in most  Member 
States by means  of tax labels affixed to the cigarette packets. 
5·  VAT,  which is normally paid in portions at each marketing stage,  is in 
some  Member  States charged only once,  "at  squrce",  i.e. it is levied on  the 
manu:f'acturer  or the importer,  like the excise, whether or not it is included 
in the price  shown  on  the tax label. 
It is to be  noted that,  even where  the arrangements for collecting VAT  are 
no~  exact~ the  same  as those for collecting the excise,  the proportional 
component  and the VAT  portion,  which  are both calculated on  retail prices, 
have  the  same  effect,  namely to multip~ manufacturers'  delivery prices. 
The  same  is true of the distributor's margin,  which,  in accordance with 
commercial practice,  is also calculated as a  percentage of the retail price. 
The  examples below  illustrate the  system for taxing cigarettes. 
Examples 
Assumptions  (a) .total tax burden equal to 70% (of which 10% is VAT) 
of the retail price; 
(b)  distributor's margin equal to 10 %  of the retail price. - 138-
I.  Minimum  specific component  = 5 %  of total tax burden 
Retail price 
Specific component 
(5 %  of 70) 
Proportional component 
((95%  of 70)  - 10  =  · 
56.5%  of 100) 
VAT 
(10% of 100) 
Distributor 
(10 %  of 100) 
Manufacturer 
Cigarette  in the most  Other cigarette 
_g_cm_ular  price category 
100 
'>- Tax  portion 
.  = 70 
56.5 
10  "" 
10 }  Non  tax portion 
20  = 30 
120 
Specific 
component  x  3. 5 
Proportional 
component 
(56.5% of 120) 
VAT 
(10  % of 120) 
Distributor 
(10% of 120) 
Manufacturer 
.. 
67 .8)  ~83.3 
12 
• 
12  }  36.7 
24.7 
II.  Maximum  specific component  = 55 %  of total tax burden 
Retail price 
Specific component 
(55 1o  of 70) 
Proportional  component 
((45% of 70)  - 10  = 
21.5% of 100) 
VAT 
(10% of 100) 
Distributor 
(10 %  of 100) 
Manufacturer 
Cigarette  in the most 
popular price  category 
100 
21.5  "-Tax portion 
= 70 
10 
"' 
10  ~Non-tax portion 
20  = 30 
Other cigarette 
Specific 
component 
120 
Proportional 
cmmponent 
(21.5 %  of 120)  25.8  ~76.3 
VAT 
(10% of 120) 
Distributor 
(10% of 120) 
Manufacturer 
12 
12  } 
I  43.7 
31.7 
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The  multiplier 
:.·  (a) The  total multiplier 
.~. 
6.  It will be  seen from  Example  I  that  an  increase of 4.7  units in the 
manufacturer's delivery price produces an increase of  20  units in the retail 
price.  Example  II shows  that the  same  increase  of  20  units in the retail 
price  increases the return to the manufacturer by 11.7  units~ 
In the first  case,  the difference between the manufacturers'  delivery 
prices is multiplied by  20  =  4.255 
4.7 
In the  second case,  the difference between the manufacturers'  deliver.y  prices 
· is multiplied by  20  =  1.  709 
ii77 
This multiplier effect  can be  expressed as follows:' 
M  =  retail selling price of cigarette x  - retail price of cigarette 4 
ex-works price exclusive of tax of cigarette x - ex-works price 
exclusive of tax of 
cigarette y 
7.  The  total multiplier thus reflects, to use the words  of Article 4(3) 
of Directive 72/464/EEC,  the ratio of the differences (range)  in retail 
prices to the differences in the delivery prices of cigarettes. 
The  multiplier m~  also be  defined as  follows: 
M  =  p 
p  +  s 
where 
P  =  retail selling price 
p  =  manufacturer's delivery price 
s  ..  amotmt  of specific component - 140-
The  value of M may  also be  calculated using the most  common  method  .  . 
M  =  1  (1) 
1  X 
'iOO 
where  x  is the  sum  of the proportional components:  (a) the proportional 
excise; 
(b)  VAT; 
(c) the distributor's 
mar~  in, 
these  components being expressed as percentages of the retail price. 
The  total multiplier thus takes into account all the proportional  components, 
I 
including the non-tax proportional component,  which is the  distributor~s 
margin. 
However,  this margin is not  fixed and is a  matter lying outside the tax 
sphere.  Consequently,  if a  new  harmonization method were  adopted,  based 
no  longer on  the ratio of the  specific tax component  to the total tax 
burden but rather on  harmonization of the multipliers,  introduction of a 
common  total multiplier lv-ould  not bring about  harmonization of tax rates. 
As  the total multiplier is partly a  function of the distributor's margin 
and  since,  under the Treaty's competition rules,  a  fixed level may  not be 
set for this margin,  the fixing of a  common  total multiplier is excluded. 
(b)  Tax multiplier 
8.  On  the other hand,  the tax multiplier takes into account  only the 
proportional components  induced by the proportional excise and VAT. 
(l) If  p  is the retail price  p  = p  +  s  +P  X 
ioo 
p  is the manufacturer's delivery price  :  1  = l2  +  s  +  X 
p  100 
s  is the  amount  of the  specific element .  1  X  =  12  +  s  . 
100  p 
x  is the  sum  of the proportional  •  1  =  p  =  M  • - components  1- X  'p  +s  - 100 
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As  a  result,  the figure given for the tax multiplier will  alw~s be 
lower than that for the total multiplier. 
It is self-evident that, for a  given specific component/total tax ratio, 
the multiplier (whether the total or the tax multiplier), which  is a 
function of the  sum  of the proportional  components  levied on  the retail 
price  ,  is also infl  uenc~d by  the total leva  1  of t a.xat ion.  Returning to · 
Example  I  above  and  assuming that the  level of taxation,  instead of being 
70 '/o,is 80 ·%: 
the total multiplier rises from  1 
4,255  to  1 
7.143  ]6.5  =  86  = 
1 - 1 -- 100  100 
while the tax multiplier rises from  1  2,985  to  1  4.167  66.~.  =  z6  = 
1 - 100  1  - 100 
9.  Regardless of the tax structure,  the  effect of ~  percentage  increase 
in the distributor's margin  and  in the proportional tax components  is to 
amplify the multiplier effect, with a  smaller share  of the retail price 
remaining for the manufacturer. 
10.  Assuming  a  total tax burden of 70% and  a  distributor's margin  of 
10 %,  the relationship between the mixed tax structure and  the multiplier 
is as follows: 
Specific component  in  Sum  of the ad valorem  Tax  Total 
total tax burden  tax components  levied  multiplier  multiplier 
On  ret  ail price 
5~  66.5 %  2.985  4.255 
10%  63  %  2.702  3·703 
20%  56  1o  ~.272  2.941 
35  ~  45·5 %  1.834  2.247 
55%  31.5 %  1.459  1.709 - 142-
11.  At  1 August  1981  the multipliers arising from  the tax s,ystems  in 
force  in the Member  States were  as follows: 
Tax  multiplier  Total multiplier 
Belgium  3.13  4·45 
Denmark  1.66  1.85 
Germany  1.71  2.06 
France  3.21  4.32 
Greece  2.01  2.51 
Ireland  1.47  1.69 
Italy  3.50  4·87 
Luxembourg  2.47  3.35 
Netherlands  2.89  4.07 
United Kingdom  1.52  1.74 
·• 
... ·" 
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ANNEX  Iii 
THE  TARIFFS  ON  UN!o1ANUFACTURED  TOBACCO  AND  MANUFACTURED 
PRODUCTS  IN  THE  COMMON  CUSTOMS  TARIFF  AND  THE  SUSPENSION 
OF  TARIFFS  GRANTED  TO  DEVELOPING  COUNTRmS 
1.  Unmanufactured tobacco and  tobacco waste  ( CCT  heading No  24.01)  are 
subject  to a  mixed  customs  duty:  an  ad valorem rate subject to a  specific· 
minimum  and  maximum  charge  (see table at the end  of the Annex). 
2.  The  autonomous  ad valorem rate of  30%  was  set by the Treaty (Arti_cle 
19(4)  in conjlUlction with Annex  I,  List F).  The  autonomous  specific rates 
of 29  EUA  minimum  and  70 EUA  maximum  per 100 kg net  were  introduced to correct 
the ertreoie effects Qf  the ad valorem rate at either end of the price range, 
thereby reconciling various requirements.  These  requirements  included the 
protection of Community  production (low-priced tobacco)  and  reducing the. 
extent  of protection against  tobaccos from  the United States  (high-priced 
tobaccos). 
3.  Similar considerations lay for the most  part behind the conventional 
rates.  These  have  been substantially reduced in successive GATT 
negotiations.  The  present  bound  GATT  rates are  shown  in the table to this 
Annex. 
4•  Raw  Virginia type tobacco originating in developing countries  and 
Yugoslavia is oovered by the generalized system of tariff preferences 
(GSP).  The  special arrangements  provide for a  reduced rate of duty on 
this product  within a  Community  tariff quota  (61.200 tonnes for 1981). 
Within this quota,  the duty is suspended at  7%  with a  minimum  charge of 
13  EUA  and  a  maximum  of 45  EUA  per 100  kg net.  and is totally susp~nded 
on  tobacco originating in the least developed countries  (Council 
Regulation No  3321/80 of 16  December  1980,  OJ  No  L 354). 
5.  Raw  or unmanufactured tobacco,  other than Virginia-type,  from  develop-
ing countries and Yugoslavia is also admitted at  a  reduced rate of duty 
up  to a  Community  ceiling (in 1981,  2.550 tonnes.)  Up  to this ceiling - 144  -
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duty is suspended at the rate of 7%,  with a  minimum  charge of 33  EUA  and 
a  maximum  of 45  EUA  per 100  kg net  and totally suspended for the least 
developed  countries  (Council Regulation No  3321  of 16  December  1980, 
OJ  No  L 354). 
A Community tariff quota (of 1.500  tonnes in 1981)  has been opened for 
"Prilep"-type tobacco originating in and  imported from  Yugoslavia,  within 
which  the  CCT  duty is suspended at the rate of 7%  ad valorem with a 
minimum  charge  of 13  EUA  and  a  maximum  of 45  EUA  per 100  kg net  (Council 
_Regulation  No  3504/80  of 22  December  1980,  OJ  No  L 367). 
6.  There is a  complete exemption from  duties for raw  or unmanufactured 
tobacco and  tobacco  waste  originating in Turkey  (Regulation No  2760/72, 
OJ  No  L 293)  and  in the African,  Caribbean and Pacific States  (·AOP)  and the 
overseascountries and territories  ("PTOM'')(Council  Regulation No  435/80, 
of 18  February 1980,  OJ  No  L 55). 
7•  Fixing the  CCT  duties for manufactured tobacco  (CCT  heading  No  24.02) 
presented a  number  of difficulties,  arising from  the problem of customs 
duties of a  fiscal nature,  the existence of State monopolies  and the 
internal taxation systems  in the Member  States. 
8.  In France  and Italy tobacco  imports were  the preserve of the State 
monopoly  and  were  free of duty.  However,  to consider the rate of duty in 
those two  countries as  zero for the purposes  of calculating the arithmetical 
average provided for by Article 19  of the Treaty ignored the protection 
actually afforded by the existence of the monopoly. 
9·  It was  therefore thought  better not to calculate the duties on 
manufactured tobacco strictly according to Article 19  but to fix them 
by a  unanimous  Council Decision under Article 28. .• 
(10) 
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l, 
10.  A further major difficulty was  the basic difference in internal 
taxation systems.  Whilst  in France  and Italy a  State monopoly  operated, 
in the Benelux  cou,nt~ies manufactured tobacco products were  subject to 
excise duties based on their retail pri_ces.  This  system greatly magnified . 
the impact  of customs  duties.  Hence,  an ad valorem rate of customs  duty . 
on  cigarettes in-the Benelux countries of 45%  belied an actual effect that 
was  much  greater because of the  internal tax structure.  Had  the Benelux 
countries accepted as high a  rate as that -of other Member  States, the 
result would  have been sharply to increase the overall tax burden on 
tobacco products from  outside the Community,  thereby significantly 
increasing their retail prices and thus limiting their importation. 
11.  To  overcome  these difficulties and  allow the Benelux countries 
temporarily to maintain their customs duties at their previous rate, it 
was  necessary to authorize them,  under Article 26  of the Treaty,  to 
postpone bringing the rates of duty on  manufactured tobacco into line vi  th 
those in the  Common  Customs  Tariff. _  Account  also had to be  taken,  whe~.-"'­
fixing the rates of duty in the  CCT,  of the requirements  of other members 
of GATT.  The  possibility of introducing specific duties  on  manufactured 
tobacco was  raised during the discussions  in the  Community  but  was  not 
taken up. 
12.  The  autonomous_ .rates of duty on manufactured tobacco were  finally 
set at the figuresshown in the Table to the Annex. 
13..  The  Commission  and the Member  States agreed that the decision taken 
on  the rates of  CCT  duty should not dictate the outcome  of the talks then 
taking place  on  the harmonization of taxation.  Indeed,  the Commission 
stated that if the studies in this area then under  way  resulted in an 
agreement  on  a  harmonized tax system which  was  incompatible with the level 
of duties proposed for manufactured tobacco,  those duties should be reVised 
in line with the  new  internal. tax arrangements that had  been decided upon 
(Doc.  III/COM(62)6  of 12  January 1962,  P•  9). - 146-
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14.  Again  in 1972  (see  OJ  No  L 166,  p.  5)  the  Commission  stated that 
if  the harmonization of the internal tax structures for manufactured 
tobacco proceeded as advocated in the proposed Regulation on  taxes other 
than turnover taxes affecting the  consumption of manufactured tobacco 
(subsequently issued as a  Directive in OJ  No  L 303  of 31  December  1972), 
the Council  would  probably be  led to make  significant  changes  to the 
OCT  duties on  thee products. 
15.  The  Commission's  remarks  concerned only the autonomous  rates of  OCT 
duty (for cigarettes,  18o%  ad valorem).  Later on,  manufactured tobacco 
was  the subject  of GATT  negotiations and  conventional rates of duty were 
introduced (see,  inter alia, Regulation No  2999/79,  OJ  No  L 341), 
halving the tariff on  cigarettes to its present  level of 9o%  ad valorem. 
16.  ·The  Commission  does  not have  any plans at present for negotiating or 
renegotiating the  c~stoms duties on  raw  or manufactured tobacco,  However, 
it is worth noting that  some  products falling within OCT  headings 24.01 
and  24.02  are on  the Federal Register,  which  means  that the United States 
Government  could enter into a  negotiation or renegotiation of the -tariff 
rates  (Section 124). 
17.  Under  the generalized system of p~ferences th·e  rate  a  C:Sf _  a4 valorem 
duty en manufactured: tobaooo are (1_981)  as follwaa 
A.  Cigarettes  87% 
B.  Cigars  42% 
c.  Smoking  tobacco  no% 
D.  Chewing  tobacco  and  snuff  45% 
E.  Other,  including agglomerated tobacco 
in form  of sheets of strip  19% 
The  partial suspension of duties at the above  rates also applies in 1981 
to manufactured tobacco originating in Turkey. 
A total exemption from  customs  duties is granted on manufactured tobacco 
originating in the African,  Caribbean and Pacific (ACP)  States (Council 
Regulation No  3225/80,  OJ  No  L 347)  and  the overseas  countries and 
territories ("PTOM'')(Council  Decision of 31  December  1980,  OJ  No  L 361). - 147  -
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CHAPTER  24 
TOBACCO 
Rue of duty 
Hada.,  Dnaiptioa  A~lonomoua  Convmt"'-1  DUmber  ~ 
or  l~vy  'II. 
/  (L) 
I  2  ~  4 
14.01  Unmanufactured  toba.:co~ tobacco refuse: 
' 
A.  Aue .:ured  Virginia  type  and  light  air wred Burley  type  tobacco  (including; 
Burley hybrids); light aJr wrcd Maryland type and fire  ~:ured tuha.:ro (a)  ••• ,  J()  Z.l 
with  11  min.  with a min. 
of 29 EUA  of 2K  f.UA 
and a mn.  ;md  11  mmx. 
of 70  EUA  of JU  EUA 
per  100 kg  per  IUO  kg 
net  net 
B.  Other ................................................................  JO  14 
with a min.  with a min. 
of 29 EUA  of 28  F..UA 
;  and a max.  and a mu. 
of 711  EllA  uf 711  EllA 
:  per  1011  kt~  ,,..,  I IJI)  kg 
noct  11<'1 
'  14.01  ManufiCtUrcd tobacco; tobKCo nlracts and  ciiCIIcr~:  ' 
A.  Cigarenc1 . , .••.... , .•••........ , ...............  : .......  , ...  , ••. , ...  , .  1811  90 
B.  Cigan  ....................................................  ·  ..........  80  52  ,, 
.  c.  Smoking robacro  ····················································  IRO  117 
I 
D.  Chewing tobacro and snuff  ···········································  100  6.~ 
E.  Other, induding aglomerated tobacco in the form of 1herts or strip .........  40  26 
., 
(aJ !*Y  tllldH chn. whtw.lt.lu'I:J 11  \ub,r'"'t 10 'oD!JrtiOftt co he dfttf'nurwJ tt~  rhc ...:umpdL"IU .JuthuratiC"'I. - 148-
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RAW  TOBACCOz  STATISTICS 
Table 1.  Breakdown  by variety 
PRODJCTION  ( t)  CONSUMPTION  ( t) . 
Variety  1980  1980 
I  F  GR  D  B  Total 
Flue cured  18649  288  58  402  19397  .  360000 
Light air cured  48784  4  13927  2457  65172  90000 
Sun cured  21854  88151  110005  55000 
Dark air cured  11505  37246  2875  1008  52634  100000 
Fire cured  8606  8606  15000 
Other  282  9  .  i  291  -10000 
TOTAL  109680  37538  102136  5743  1008  256105  630000 
Baled tobaocoz·  Source  Commission 
Table  2.  Area by Member  State 
AREA  (in hectares) 
D  F  I  B  GR  TOTAL 
1975  3 "332  20.485  56  193  490  97 ·090  178 -090 
1976  3 912  .21  822  63  756  460  114  190  204  140 
1977  3  760  22  181  55  173  469  104  610  186 193 
1978  3 589  20  509  57  871  479  101  340  183  788 
1,979  3 422  20  016  59  668  527  93  250  176  883 
1980  3 363  18  701  60 .. 684  423  89  306  172  476 
Source:  Commission - 149-
Table  :3~  Tobacco growers by- Kember  State 
..  •.. · 
GROWERS 
. 
I·  D  F  . I  B  GR  TOTAL 
.. · ..... 
93  650  1975  5  640  36  130  767  118  500  254.687  .  .,  ~  • 
1976  5  260  36  020  103  020  703  129  900  274  903  ., 
1977  4  770  35  360  96  170  659  124  900  261  859 
1978  4  333  31  903  85  600  619  115  692  238_147 
1979  3  728  29  870  83  693  601  106  784  224  666 
1980  3  567  83  393  559  106  059 
Source  Commission 
'!'_able  4•  Average  a.rea per grower by Member  State 
I  I 
HECT.ARFS/GROWERS 
D  F  I  B  GR  TOTAL 
1975  0,67  0  .. 56  0.60  0  .. 63  0,81  0,69 
1976  0  .. 74  0,60  0,.61  0.65  0  ... 87  0,74 
1977  0  .. 78  0  .. 62  0.57  0,71  0  ... 83  0,71 
1978  0  .. 82  0.6lt.  0,.67  0.77  0  .. 87  0,77 
1979  0,91  0  .. 67  0  .. 71  0.87  0  .. 87  0  .. 78 
1980  0  .. 93  0.74  0  .. 78  0  .. 84 
Source  Commission 
(II) la 
2 
3 
4a 
b 
5 
6a 
b 
7 
8 
9 
lOa 
lla 
12a 
b 
13 
14 
15 
16a 
17 
18 
.19 
20a 
20b 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
- 150-
Table  5·  Income  per heota.re and by variety 
1980 
FR  IT  B 
ECU  ECU  ECU 
Bad.  Geudertheimer  8077  6088 
Bad.  Burley  6017 
Virgin  5517 
Paragua.y  6558  3809 
Philipp  in 
Nijkerk  3180 
Misionero  5953 
Rio  Grande 
Bright  5874 
Burley  7709 
Maryland  7560 
Kentucky  3756 
Nostrano  3698 
Beneventano  1644 
Brasile Selvag.  3354 
Xanti-Yak'h  3521 
Perustitza  3828 
Erzegovina  3203 
Round  Tip  18.160  21.710 
Basma 
Katerini 
Kabalcoulalc  classic 
Kabakoulalc  non  classic 
Elassona,  Myrodata Smyrne 
M;yrOradata  agrinion 
Zicbnemyrodata 
Tsebelia 
Mavra 
Burley  ( Gr) 
Vil'ginia ( Gr) 
Total  6517  5312  7864 
ANNEX.  IV 
D  GR 
ECU  ECU 
6902 
7242 
. 4217 
27.308 
4253 
4818  . 
3914 
1699 
2'734 
4346 
5038 
. 4608 
2771 
4737 
3566 
6781  4oo8 . 
VI-E-3 
Table 6.  Raw  tobacco  :  calculation of premium 
Number  Community  varieties  Total cost  Competing prices  Difference 
price *  non-member  countries 
Min.  Max  (1  - 2)  (1  - 3) 
1  2  3  4  5 
4  Paraguay  4.072  1.225  1.789  2.847  2.283 
10  Kentucky  3.182  1.518  2.487  1.664  0.695 
8  Burley  3.356  . 1.538  2.344  1.818  1.012 
1  Bright  4.342  1.437  2.506  2.905  1.836 
13  Xanti-Yaka  4.746  2.302  3.062  2.444  1.684 
23  Tsebelia  5o757  2.101  2.503  3.656  3o254 
-- ·---------·------ ----- '-------- -
~- '-------------··-··  --- - - - - -- ---
* Total cost price =  norm  price x  coefficient  (specific for each variety) + processing costs. 
"' 
-
ANNEX  IV  contd. 
1981  premium 
(baled tobacco) 
6 
2.355 
1.560 
1.512 
2.119 
2.551 
3.254 
...... 
\J1  ...... - 152-
ANNEX  IV  contd. 
·i 
Table  7.  Raw  tobacco  breakdown  of expenditure  (million ECU) 
I  E:x.Penditure  Expenditure  Approps  81  Approps  82 
1979  .  1980  2nd  amend- letter of 
ing budget  amendments 
Refunds  3.7  4-4  5  19 
Premiums  208.7  274-9  280  587 
Storage  13.0  30.0  42  42 
TOTAL  225.4  309.3  327  648 
-
%  of Oaarantee Section 
expenditure  2~2 %  2.7%  2.8 %  4.8 % 
} .f 
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EfJ'liO'!S  Oll .OOIIPB'l'I'l':J:Oll  w·''l'BE  ~O'l'IO:tl  OF 
A.  BARMOlliZBID  l!DtOISE 
ADEX V 
1.  Assume  two  excise systems  for cigarettes•  an  market  A,  taxes are levied 
as a  proportion of retail price;  an  market  B,  the tax is a  fixed amount 
b.1  cigarette,  irrespective of price,  size,  weight  or other factors  (for 
control purp6ses,  a  maximum  cigarette size would have  to be fixed).  In 
both  instances,  although the tax  incidence differs,  it is relatively high. 
2.  All other things being equal,  the price range  an  market A will show  a  more 
or less even distribution from  the cheapest up  to the most  expensive 
cigarettes,  the tax being proportional to retail price.  On  market  B,  all 
cigarette price categories will be found at or close to the maximum 
cigarette size. 
3.  It is apparent that producers  on  market  A,  whose  product range  covers a 
wide  range  of prices,  will be  obliged to limit their exports to B to only 
part of their range.  Producers  an  market  B,  if they wish  to export to 
market  A,  will be  obliged,  either to limit their competition to one 
I 
sector of the market,  or to increase their product range beyond  what  is 
required for their own  market  B. 
4.  The  major tax distortion to competition arising ,from  this situation lies 
in the fact  th~t all the producers  concerned,  althoUgh well able to 
supply both markets,  are obliged to adapt their products and prices 
separately to each  of them,  and are thus denied the possibility of compet-
ing on  a  single market  AB.  Whatever  excise system is chosen to apply on 
both markets A and  B (whether  systems _A,  B,  or some  other system),  this 
particular distortion is removed. 
5·  If the structure chosen  is a  combination  of systems A and B,  the effect 
of combining a  specific amount  with an ad valorem rate will be  to produce 
a  tax incidence which,  although different for  each price category, - 154  -
nevertheless varies more  or less in proportion with the differences  in 
price. The  degree  of variation in incidence will be  less (i.e. the closer 
the approach to price proportionality) the smaller the specific part in 
the total tax mix.  Conversely,  the  larger the specific part,  the greater 
the variation in tax incidence between price categories.  However,  whatever 
the specific/ad valorem mix  chosen for  system AB,  it is bound  to favour 
certain price categories relative to others.  So  far as  the Commission  is 
aware,  there is no  objective basis on  which  any one  mix  could be  said to 
be more  neutral in terms  of competition than any other. 
6. It should be stressed here that the alternative approach  is favoured b,y 
the  Economic  and Social Committee  because,  b.y  harmonizing the tax 
multiplier,  it anticipates the harmonization of tax rates  (although only 
to some  extent,  since the specific element will continue to vary between 
Member  States until excise rates are harmonized).  The  benefits of this, 
in terms  of  improved competition,  are doubtful. 
1·  The .relative contribution to be made  to competitive neutrality by a 
harmonized structure on  the  one  hand and by  harmonized tax rates  on  the 
other depends  on  a  variety of factors  (all of which  inter-act) and on 
differences between these factors.  The  factors  concerned are the 
differences between the original tax structures, .the differences between 
the tax rates  (in this case,  on  cigarettes) and the differences between 
those tax rates and the taxes levied on  other goods  and services.  FUlly 
to evaluate the relative importance of each of these factors  on  the 
Community  scale would require an unusually complex model,  taking into 
account degrees  of substitution and price elasticity,  and would  in any 
case depend  on  a  variety of starting assumptions  (e.g.  on  demand  price 
elasticities) for which little reliable data exists,  and  none  on  a 
Community-wide  basis. 
8.  However,  some  qualitative assessment of the further contribution to 
competitive neutrality of harmonization of cigarette excise rates can be 
given.  First, it should be noted that the excise is charged on  the t 
-~· 
.1 
- 155-
destination principle - that is,  exports are wholly tax-free and imports 
charged at the same  rate as domestic products.  Consequently,  even with 
widely different rates,  and provided  alw~ that the tax structure is 
itself harmonized,  competition between  imports and natianal products  -
within market  A and within market B will be neutral.  Secondly,  although 
differences  in the excise rates may  tend to differentiate markets·A and  B 
(e.g.  high rates in A,  low  rates  in B,  oould lead to different parts of 
consumption going to cigarettes  in A and B,  to different price ranges, 
to market A declining whilst market B expands  etc.) most  of these 
differences could also arise from  a  variety of factors external to the 
cigarette excise  (e.g.  differences  in other tax rates,  differences  in 
economic  growth rates,  changes  in consumer  tastes). Thirdly,  although 
there are significant differences  in the levels of cigarette tax rates 
between the Member  States  (between  56%  and 87%  of retail price) the·level 
of taxation of cigarettes is generally high,  relative to taxes  on  most 
other consumer  items,  and the differences  in rates in reality reflect 
differences  in the  indirect tax systems as  a  whole.  Consequently,  the 
extent to which harmonization of cigarette excises alone  is likely to 
improve  competition,  over and  above  the  improvement  gained b,y  a  harmonized 
structure,  is certainly doubtful and probably marginal(l).  , 
9.  In any case,  even assuming a  harmonized structure and harmonized tax 
rates,  and whatever the proportions of specific and ad valorem elements 
in the total tax,  the mixed  system will invariably result in a  relatively 
greater tax incidence  on  certain price categories than on  others. This 
effect is inherent  in the mixed  system and is unaffected,  either by 
harmonization of the tax rates,  or b,y  devices to anticipate rates 
harmonization to a  greater or lesser degree. 
(1) Harmonization  of indirect tax rates is,  however,  a  pre-condition of the 
abolition of fiscal frontiers,  which remains  a  major,  if long-term, 
political objective of the Community. - 156-
10.  The  degree  of adaptation. to be made  by man.utacturers based in A and B 
will of course depend  cruoial~ on  the extent to which  the harmonized 
structure and rate departs from  the system under which  they previously 
operated.  Harmonization  an  the basis of  (s~) a  system A B tending more 
towards  A than to B could therefore tend to confer an  initial advantage 
on  producers based in A.  Once-for-all advantages  of this kind are an 
unavoidable consequence  of any harmonization process,  although it might 
be  regarded,  in political terms,  as initially unfair to producers based 
in B. , 
! 
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EXTRACT  FROM  THE  DECISION  OF  THE  COURT  OF  JUSTICE 
IN  CASES  NO.  209=215/78  AND  217-218/78 
121  In that respect  it  is  necessary to observe  in  the  first  place,  as  the  parties 
agree, that in a system of basically proportional excise duty, as  applicable in 
Belgium, any alteration in  the manufacturers' or importers' share contained, 
in the retail price  involves  an  alteration several times  greater in  the tax and 
ther~fore in  the retail price itself where the said alteration is  adjusted so as io 
be recovered in the price. That multiplier effect in  principle works as  regards 
IZI 
129 
. both increases  and reductions.  Nevertheless  in  the latter case  the decreasing 
effect of the multiplier which works in  favour of the consumer is  limited by 
the minimum excise duty laid down by  the Belgian State pursuant to Council 
Directives Nos 72/464 and 77/805 by  reason of the fact that the excise duty 
is  fixed  at 90% of the aggregate amount of the proportional and the specific 
excise duty levied by the Belgian State on cigarettes in  the most popular price 
category. 
It follows from this multiplier effect in conjunction with the minimum excise 
duty levied by the Belgian State to guarantee its  revenue that any competitive 
effort  in  relation  to  profit  margins  by  the  manufacturer  or the  importer 
having a repercussion on the retail price is limited. 
Further, although in principle the Belgian rules on consumer taxes and price 
controls  do  not prevent the  manufacturer or importer  from  choosing  the 
retail price desired by him for each of his  products, such liberty of choice is 
in practice subject to various constraints. As  has already been shown it seems 
that the practical application in  the. manufactured tobacco sector of the price 
control  measures  in  which  the  revenue  authorities  in  particular  take  part 
encourages  joint  negotiations  with  the  trade  associations  representing  the 
various  branches  of the  sector  even  if  the  system  does  not  exclude  the 
possibility of separate undertakings' giving  individual  notifications especially 
in  the case  of the  introduction of a  new  brand.  During such  negotiati~ns 
great influence on the fixing  of the· retail  price  is  exercised  by the revenue 
authorities whose concern is  above all  to guarantee the revenue arising from 
the  taxation  of  the  products  in  question.  It  also  appeared  during  the 
proceedings that the  Belgian State is  able by  using the range of tax bands to 
restrict the freedom of undertakings as  regards the choice of the retail prices 
for their products. In  that respect the  applicant BAT  stated that after intro-
ducing a new brand of cigarettes it was forced to increase the price by Bfr 6 
per packet in  order to  market them at a  price  corresponding to the lowest 
tax band available from  the authorities, who had abolished the tax bands for 
lower prices. 
uo  It follows  from  all  the  considerations  set  forth  above  that  in  the  manu-
factured  tobacco  sector  the  Belgian  rules  on . consumer  taxes  and  price 
controls and their application pursuant to the revenue policy pursued by the 
State  have  the  effect  of making  it  practically impossible  for  manufacturers 
and importers .to compete in  such a way that there would be  an  effect upon 
the amount of the retail selling price. - 158- ARNEX  VII 
EFFECTS  ON  RE!'AIL  PRICES  OF  MOVING  FROM  THE  PRESENT  TAX  STRUCTl.JRE  TO 
DIFFEREN.l'  THIRD  STAGE  AND  FINAL  STAGE  STRUCTl.JRES  (SEE  PARAGRAPH  11.5.10) 
HYPothesis 
I.  Specific 
duty not less 
than 10%  and not 
more  than 35%  of 
total tax 
(3rd stage pre-
sent  approach) 
Market  share2  )aken 
into account 
II.  Specific 
duty  20%  of 
total tax 
(final stage pre-
sent  approach) 
% price 
change. •  p 
p <  2% 
2%.!fP < 5% 
5%~p<  10% 
lO%~P<  20% 
20%~  p 
p  <.  2% 
2%~P < 5% 
5%~p<. 10% 
10%'S: p <  20% 
.  20%~ p 
Market  share.  2) 
taken·into account 
.  %  of market  where  prices change 
B  DK 
96,8  98 
1,2  0 
0  2 
0  0 
0  0 
D 
100 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1) 
F  GR  ffiL  IT  lUX 
60,5  96,8  98,1  49,0  97,5 
30,4  0  1,2  27,0  1,3 
7,1  0  0  15,9  0 
0  0  0  1,8  0 
0  0  0  3,3  0 
NL  UK 
99,1  97,8 
0  2,1 
0  0 
0  0 
0  0 
98,0  100  100  98,0  96,8  99,3  97  98,8  99,1  99,9 
82,9  94,7  56,3  60,5  74,5  91,9  45,1  69,2  96,6  89,8 
13,9  3,3  43,7  0  22,3  7,4  5,8  28,3  2,5  8 
1,2  0  0  30,4  0  0  0  1,3  0  0 
0  0  0  7,1  0  0  39,7  0  0  2,1 
0  2  0  0  0  0  6,4  0  0  0 
98,0  100  100  98,0  96,8  99,3  97  98,8  99,1  99,9 
III.  Ad  valorem 
duty not  less 
than 44%  and not 
more  than 66%  of 
retail price 
(3rd stage al-
ternative app) 
p < 2%  96,8  100 
2%!:;p  <.  5%  1,2  0 
100 
0 
0 
0 
0 
60,5  96,8  99,3  50,9  98,8  99,1  97,8 
37,5  0  0  39,7  0  0  2,1 
5%i p <. 10%  0  0 
lO%.ip.C.20%  0  0 
20%  .:S.  p  0  0 
Market  share  2) 
taken into account 
IV.  Ad  valorem 
duty 56%  of re-
tail price 
p < 2% 
2%S.P < 5% 
5%~P< 10% 
10%~P<  20% 
(Final stage al-
ternative ap-
proach) 
Market  share  20%  S.  P 
taken into account2) 
V.  Ad  valorem  p <  2% 
duty 40%  of re- 2%.S P <.  5% 
tail price 
98  0  100 
82,9  98 
13,9 
1,2 
0 
0 
2 
0 
0  0 
98.0  100 
81,2  100 
2,7 
(Final stage al-
ternative ap-
proach) 
5%Sp<lO%  12,9 
0 
0 
Market  share  20%  !..  P 
taken into aocount2) 
1,2  0 
0  0 
98.0  100 
0  0  0  1,3  0  0  0 
o  o  o  1 ,a  o  o  o 
0  0  0  3,3  0  0  0 
100  98.0  96  8  99  3  97  98.8  99.1  99.9 
56,3  60,5  72,7  91,9  42,9  97,5  83,2  94,2 
43,7  0  23,1  7,4  6,1  1,3  15,0  3,6 
0  30,4  1,0  0  1,9  0  0,9  2,1 
0  7,1  0  0  39,7  0  0  0 
0  0  0  0  6,4  0  0  0 
100  98.0  96.8  99.3  97.  98.8  99.1  99.9 
100  43,5  66,8  99,3  42,9  62,2  73,9  99,9 
0  17,0  11,8  0  2,2  32,5  22,7  0 
0  0  18,2  Q  5,8  2,8  1,6  0 
0 
0 
100 
30,4  0  0  25,1 
7,1  0  0  21,0 
98.0  96  8  99.3.·  97 
1,3  0,9  0 
0  0  0 
98.8  99  1  99.9 
~~Based on 5%  specific duty applied to-da.y.  Source:  Member  States 
Price categories which represent less than 1%  of market  not  taken into account. - 159- ANNEX  VIII 
FAIRNESS  GRAPH 
t  A substantial excise duty will  in one  w~ or another  influence competition 
between products.  A pure specific duty tends  to favour the most  expensive 
productsa  the absolute differen.ce  in ex-factory prices remains unchanged 
at retail level,  but the relative difference in ex-factor, prices is very 
substantially compressed at retail level.  On  the  other hand,  a  pure ad 
valorem system tends ·to favour  the cheapest products - the relative price 
difference at producer level remains  the same  at retail level, ·whereas 
1 
the absolute price difference  is considerably multiplied. 
It is possible to postulate a  point  betwee~ these  two  extremes,  where 
neither high-cost nor low-cost prodcuts  enjoy a  competitive advantage. 
A rough balance could be struk by choosing a  point where  half of the 
relative price difference between the producer price of the most popular 
price category and those  of a  high-cost and a  low-eost product  is reflected 
in retail price.  To  reach such a  solution me&rJ.S  that the specific duty 
should be the same  as  the ex-factor, price of the most popular product. 
The  ad valorem rate in such a  case would  then be  determined by the level 
of total taxation. 
To  show  the present position in the Member  States,  Table  1  gives the 
"proportionality coefficients" for the  lowest and  highest price category 
compared with the most  popular price category.  The  "proportionality 
coefficient" is the %  figure by which  the relative difference  in ex-factory 
prices.is reflected in the relative difference in retail prices asa  -
proportianali  ty 
coefficient  ..  relative difference in retail prices 
relative difference  in ex-factory prices 
X  100 - 160- TABLE  1 
PROPORTIONALITY  COEFFiCIENT 
Relative difference in retail price an  most  popular price categorY and  another1) 
"  "  "  ex-factory "  "  "  "  "  "  "  " 
Most  popular  Most  popular  Average 
relative to  relative to 
lowest price  highest price 
BELGIUM  II  89.0 
Lt.JX.EMBOURG  86,9  86,9 
Nm'HERLANDS  70,4  70,4 
FRANCE  - 84,3 
F.R.  GERMANY  50,8  50,8 
ITALY  92,8  95,2 
DENMARK  19,4  23,5 
UNITED  KINGDOM  36,6  29,3 
IRELAND  36,8  37,4 
GRElOOE  84,1  92,3 
•  Minimum excise duty 
l) Examples 
Ex-factory price most  popular price category 
Ex-factory price highest price category 
Retail price most  popular price category 
Retail price highest price category 
Proportionality 
coefficient  ... 
Y.  -X  r  r 
X r 
l  - X 
X 
X  100 
X  •  1 
y  ...  1,5 
X  •  5  r 
Yr  •  1 
-
7  - 5 
5 
1,5- 1 
1 
89,0 
86,9 
70,4 
84,3 
50,8 
94,0 
21,5 
33,0 
37,1 
88,5 
X  100  •  80 - 161  -
The  level where  a  Member  State is placed is determined by the  incidence 
of total tax (the higher the tax incidence,  the lower the coefficient) and 
the %  of the total tax which  is specific (the lower the %,  the higher the 
coefficient). 
The  alternative approach proposed by the  Economic  and Social Committee 
would  oblige the Member  States to have  a  total tax incidence at least equal 
to the fixed ad valorem duty.  In a  theoretical case of a  Member  State 
choosing this minimum  level of taxation,  the above-mentioned coefficients, 
because  of a  zero specific element,  would  be  100.  If the total tax is 
increased {which  can then  only take place  b,y  the addition of a  specific 
duty),  the coefficient will go  down.  For  example,  with a  total tax incidence 
of 71.25%,  a  fixed ad valorem rate of 5o%  of retail price,  and a  7.5% 
distribution margin,  the coefficient is 50.  But  if the total tax inoidenoe 
is 85%  of the retail price (the  ad valorem rate unchanged at 5o%)  the 
coefficient is 17.6. 
The  present approach,  with the specific element fixed as a  proportion of 
total tax,  will also give variations in the coefficient when  the total tax 
incidence is changed,  but to a  lesser extent than the alternative approach. 
Graph  1  shows  the area between the  5%  and  55%  specific lines,  which are 
roughl~ the limits at present fixed b,y  the second stage of harmonization. 
In the same  graph is  indicated where  the Member  States have placed 
themselves at 1.8.81.  This  graph clearly shows  that the proportianalit,y 
coefficient in a  Member  State can be  more  than  3 times  the coefficient in 
another Member  State even at the same  level  of total taxation or,  put in 
another way,  the retail prices  in the Member  Stat reflect the ex-factory 
prices  in quite different w~  from  each other and therefore give the 
producers very different competitive conditions. .  . . 
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The  present situation,  with the possibility of varying proportionality 
coefficients at the  same  level of taxation,  will become  uniform when 
structural harmonization reaches  its final stage.  But  no matter what 
approach is followed - fixed specific proportion of total tax or fixed 
ad valorem rate - the proportionality coefficient will invariably differ 
in accordance with the tax incidence.  In graph  2,  two  examples  show  the 
correlation between total tax  incidence and proportionality coefficient 
both in a  system with  2o%  of specific duty and  in a  system with fixed ad 
valorem rates of 40,  50  and 6o%.  In all cases,  the proportionality 
coefficient will go  down  as total tax  incidence  increases. 
Whichever  approach is followed,  the effect of an  increase  in tax incidence 
will invariably be  to improve  the relative competitive position of high-cost 
producers,  because the degree of reflection in retail prices of differences 
in pre-tax costs will fall.  Conversely,  a  reduction in tax incidence  will 
improve  the relative.competitive position of low-cost producers,  because 
the degree  of reflection in retail prices  of differences  in pre-tax costs 
will rise.  Consequently,  a  substantial up .or  down  movement  in tax incidence 
will alter the competitive situation in favour  of high- or low-cost 
producers(l),  the degree  of the alteration being relatively greater if the 
alternative approach is followed. 
(1) A harmonized tax structure consisting of a  fixed specific amount  and 
1  a  variable ad valorem rate would  avoid this situation. The  competitive 
situation would  then be  insensitive to changes  in tax incidence. Tobacco  Report  COM(82)  61- New  Table 7.6 
Cigarette consumption per head 
1970  1975  1980 
B &  LUX  18301)  2030  1920 
DK  1310 .  1420  1370 
D  1950  2040  2080 
F  1370  1610  1590 
GH  1700  2)  2010  2)  2320 
IRL  1730  2360,  2210 
' 
IT  1300  1600  1730 
NL  1430  1750  1620 
UK  2300  2370  2180 
Weighted average  1720  1910  1900 
1)0nly Belgium. 
2)Estimated from  the weight  of manufactured cigarette tobacco. 
Sources:  Manufacturers'  statistics;  Member  States tax statistics. J 
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REPORT  TO  THE  EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT 
ON  THE  IMPLICATION  OF  FURTHER  HARMONISATION 
OF  THE  EXCISES  ON  MANUFACTURED  TOBACCO 
CORRIGENDUM 
Paragraph 1.1.4. Line  8.  Amend  up  5"  to read "p 135"., 
Paragraph 7.1.  1. Line 4.  Amend  "25.  %"  to read. "15 %"" 
Paragraph 7.1.1.  Line 8.  Amend  "22.9%" to read "7.5 %". 
Table 7.1.  Line  "IRL".  Amend  "5600"  to read "5900  2)",  "96001) 11 
to read "8000  2)11  and  "-22.9" to read 
"-7.5"· 
Table 7.1.  Line  "UK"  Amend  "lll.iOO" to read "147.500  2)u 
Table 7.1.  Line  "ALL  MS"  Amend  "457.100"  to read "493.800"  and 
"564557"  to read "562957"· 
Table 7.1  Add  footnote  "2) Fedetab". 
Page  48  .  · Paragraph 7. 3. 2.  Line 4-5 Delete the phrase in brackets 
Paragraph 7.3.2.  Line  6-9 Delete the final  sentence  of the 
paragraph "It is striking ••••  tax 
incidence  (see chapter 9)  ~" 
Page  50 
Page. 54 
Page :2] 
Table 7.6. Delete the table and  insert the new table 7.6 attached. 
In column  "UK"  in the table  Amend  "47. 900"  to read "37900". 
Paragraph  8.3.2 Line 2  - 3  Aniend  "by 23,5 %"  to read 
"by about  15  %". 
Pa.ge  llB  Paragraph 14.1.4 Line  2  :  Delete "about  23  %". 